Economic analysis of agricultural markets: A manual by Scarborough, Vanessa & Kydd, Jonathan
Natural Resources Institute 
Economic Analysis of 
Agricultural Markets: a Manual 
Overseas Development Administration 
Economic Analysis of Agri.cu1tura1 Markets 
A M~ihT"t'!llll . , -.: _ .. J :~~,·L~~-: --_ 
Marketing Series Volume 5 
The Scientific Arm of the 
Overseas Development Administration 
© Crown copyright 
The Natural Resourc Institute (NRI) i an internationally r cognized centre f pertise on th 
natural resources sector in developing countrie . It forms an integral part of the British Government's 
overseas aid programme. lts principal aim is to allevia te poverty and hardship in devel ping 
countries by increa in the productivity of their renewable natural resources. NRl's main fields of 
expertise are resource assessment, food science and crop utilization. 
NRI carries out research and surveys; develops pilot-scale plant, machinery and processes; 
identifies, prepares, manages and executes projects; provides advice and training; and publishes 
scientific and development material. 
Short extracts of material from this publication may be reproduced in any non-advertising, non-
profit-making context provided that the source is acknowledged as follows: 
Scarborough, V and Kydd, J. (1992) Economic Analysis of Agricultural Markets: A Manual. Chatham, 
U.K.: Natural Resources Institute. 
Permission for commercial reproduction should, however, be sought from the Head, Publications 
and Publicity Section, Natural Resources Institute, Central Avenue, Chatham Maritime, Kent ME4 
4TB, United Kingdom. 
Cover: Adapted after a detail of a market scene: an acrylic painting by the Malawian artist, George 
Chilinda. 
,le for single copies of this publication sent to governmental and educational 
. . !Search institutio~~--I_.,_a.n~nrofit::making organizations working in countries 
ehg1ble for Hnt1sn Government aid .t normally be addressed to individuals by 
name, but only under their official ,! 
Natural Resources Institute 
ISBN: 0 85954 317 X 
ISSN: 0952-8245 
MS5 
11 
CONTENTS 
Page 
number 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v 
SUMMARY vi 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
Market Liberalization in LDCs 1 
Use of the Manual 1 
Markets and Development 2 
Markets as Potential Agents of Development 2 
Common Problems and Imperfections in LDC Markets 7 
CHAPTER 2 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 9 
Introduction 9 
Market Performance and Economic Performance 10 
Modelling Markets 11 
Defining Performance Criteria 11 
Economic Efficiency Performance Criteria 12 
Other Performance Criteria 16 
Contradictions and Trade-offs 24 
A Conceptual Framework 24 
CHAPTER 3 DATA COLLECTION 30 
Defining the Research Problem 30 
Narrowing the Research Agenda 30 
Defining Research Objectives 31 
The Availability and Use of Secondary Data in LDCs 31 
Major Sources of Secondary Data 32 
Fieldwork and Primary Data Collection 32 
Fieldwork Techniques- Rapid Reconnaissance 33 
Types of Data Required for Various Market Analyses 40 
The Macro-Environment 40 
The Production and Consumption Sub-Systems 43 
The Marketing Sub-System 46 
CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS 62 
Testing for Economic Efficiency in Markets 62 
The Internal Efficiency of the Enterprise (Firm) 63 
Data and Computational Requirements 64 
Problems and Limitations 64 
Identifying Means of Enhancing Productive Efficiency 64 
Beyond Enterprise (Firm)-Level Productive Efficiency 65 
Economic or Exchange Efficiency 65 
Using the Model of Perfect Competition 65 
Analysing the Conditions of Perfect Competition 67 
Assessing Market Structure - The Size Distribution of Enterprises (Firms) 67 
Price Analyses 70 
iii 
.. 
Price Correlation Coefficient Analyses 
Calculating and Interpreting Correlation Coefficients 
Market Margin Analyses 
Defining Market Margins 
Market Margins and Economic Efficiency 
The Formation of Market Margins 
Gross and Deconstructed Market Margin Analyses 
Measuring and Analysing Market Margins 
Gross Market Margin Analysis 
Deconstructing Marketing Margins- Costs and Returns 
The Costs of, and Unitary Returns to, Storage, Transport and Processing 
Seasonality and Storage 
Spatial Price Differences and Transport 
Processing and Inter-Form Price Differences 
Profitability Analyses 
CHAPTER 5 ANALYSING MARKETING POLICIES 
Introduction 
Government Intervention in Agricultural Marketing 
Defining Agricultural Marketing Policy 
The Problem - Comparing Three Policies 
Market, or Non-Market, Interventions? 
Marketing Policy Defined 
Uses of Policy Analysis 
Objectives and Instruments of Policy 
Problems in Identifying Policy Objectives 
Ways of Identifying Policy Objectives 
Primary Objectives, Subsidiary Objectives and Instruments 
Conflicting Objectives and Multiple Instruments 
The Neo-Classical Approach to Policy Analysis 
The Role of Policy in Neo-Classical Economics 
Divergences, Market Failures and Distortions 
Limitations and Uses of Neo-Classical Analyses 
Other Indicators of the Impact of Policies on Economic Efficiency 
CHAPTER 6 AGRICULTURAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA 
The Background to Economic Liberalization 
Structural Adjustment and Macro-Economic Stabilization 
An Overview of the Policy Reform Strategy 
Sequencing and the Evolution of Marketing Policy Reforms 
Arguments for State Participation in Marketing 
The Performance of Marketing Parastatals 
Continuing Roles for Parastatals 
Managing the Parastatals' Transition to a Liberalized Economy 
Promotion of an Efficient Private Sector 
Financial Liberalization and Agricultural Marketing 
Transport Costs and Inter-Regional Equity 
Liberalization and Consumer Welfare 
Monitoring Requirements 
REFERENCES 
INDEX 
IV 
70 
73 
75 
75 
75 
76 
76 
77 
77 
80 
83 
84 
91 
99 
102 
107 
108 
108 
109 
109 
111 
111 
112 
112 
112 
113 
113 
115 
116 
117 
118 
122 
125 
139 
139 
139 
141 
143 
144 
145 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
149 
150 
151 
155 
Acknowledgements 
This volume was produced under an extra-mural contract between NRI and the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Wye College, University of London. Martin Hebblethwaite, manager of 
the socio-economics programme at NRI, saw the need for a manual as a resource for professionals 
required to provide advice on agricultural and food marketing, often working under tight time and 
data constraints. The manual makes accessible the main findings of the fast-growing academic and 
practitioner literature relevant to developing countries, conveying the essence of theory and 
techniques, of results of empirical studies and of changes in the policy context. In writing the manual, 
the authors carried out fieldwork in five African countries: Tanzania, Malawi, Cameroon, Zimbabwe 
and Zambia. 
The authors are grateful for support from staff of the socio-economics programme at NRI, almost 
all of whom, at some point, commented on drafts of the manual or of country case study material. We 
particularly thank Martin Hebblethwaite, who was involved in the detail of the project from 
conception to completion. At various stages we benefitted from substantial comments from Ben 
Bennett, Jonathan Coulter and Sam Bickersteth. Anne Gordon made a notable contribution by 
reviewing the entire final draft. At Wye College, the work gained from discussion with two 
colleagues working in the marketing field, Helen Wedgwood and Derek Ray, and received strong 
support from the Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics, Professor Ian Carruthers. 
Away from NRI and Wye, help was received from many people. Of these, we wish to single out for 
thanks the staff of the Food Studies Group at Queen Elizabeth House in Oxford, of CIRAD in 
Montpellier and of the Marketing and Credit Service of FAO in Rome. 
V 
SUMMARY 
This manual is intended for the use of economists working on problems of markets and marketing 
policy for the agricultural and food sectors in developing countries under the circumstances 
encountered by consultants responsible for providing advice to governments, aid agencies and non-
government organizations. Under typical conditions, data sources are scarce and of variable quality 
and analysts are required to formulate recommendations within a short period of time. 
The manual begins with a discussion of the potential role that markets and marketing may 
perform in developing countries, considers common problems and imperfections in developing 
country markets and the implications for government action. 
Concepts of economic performance in agricultural marketing, often used loosely, are clarified. For 
each concept of performance, indications are given of appropriate data sources and evaluation 
methods. 
The historical development of the economic analysis of markets and marketing is reviewed, 
revealing two important implications for the conduct of research. First, the theoretical under-pinning 
of the field is under-developed and, second, in assessing performance, there is a need to combine 
various types of research and information. 
There is extensive coverage of data collection, starting with a discussion on how to identify the 
research agenda and, subsequently, to define research objectives with precision. The use of 
secondary data is explored and suggestions made for evaluating its quality. Fieldwork methods are 
reviewed, including findings from the literature on rapid reconnaissance, observational surveys, 
interviews, key informants and case studies. Data requirements for various kinds of market sub-
system are discussed and a number of sample interview guides are given and explained. It is argued 
that the collection of data and its analysis must be closely interactive activities because understand-
ing of the broad picture defines the data requirements for subsequent stages of analysis. 
The uses and limitations of a range of techniques for data analysis are explored, including tests for 
economic efficiency of markets and for the internal efficiency of enterprises. Among the problems 
considered in detail are application of the model of perfect competition, price analyses (including 
real price trends, price variation, seasonal effects and margin analysis). Because it is so frequently 
used in practice, emphasis is given to the collection and interpretation of data on margins and 
profitability for marketing and storage agents. 
Presently, much marketing analysis takes place in economies in which programmes of economic 
policy reform are being implemented and, in recognition of this, the manual provides guidelines for 
the analysis of agricultural marketing policy. Agricultural marketing policy is defined, with 
examples. The importance of distinguishing between objectives and instruments of policy is 
explained, and examples given of how this may be done in practice. 
The neoclassical approach to policy analysis is critically reviewed to highlight its uses and 
limitations. Key concepts are explained, including divergences, market failures and distortions. The 
idea of a policy hierarchy, i.e., of policy optimization under political constraints, is considered and 
practical examples of this are analysed. The use of indicators in policy analysis is covered, including 
the effective protection coefficient and the domestic resource cost ratio. Worked examples are given 
of the calculation of these indicators. 
The manual concludes with an analysis of agricultural market liberalization in Africa. This serves 
to provide readers with an understanding of the context, issues and lessons in economic policy 
reform generally, and marketing policy reform in particular. 
Vl 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This manual attempts to provide marketing analysts with a variety of methodological and concep-
tual tools with which to assess the economic efficiency of markets and marketing policy in less 
developed countries (LDCs). It is based on both a survey of the literature, and the authors' own 
experiences of such exercises. It therefore offers a synthesis of ideas and techniques concerned with 
market analyses, rather than any new theories or methods. Such a compilation was thought timely in 
vi~w of the recent liberalization of many LDC markets. 
MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN LDCS 
From the end of the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, many LDC economies experienced severe 
macro-economic disequilibria, seen in high rates of inflation, overvalued exchange rates, and 
unsustainable deficits in the balance of payments and budget. Chapter 6 outlines this crisis, together 
with some of its causes and effects, in more detail. Here we merely note that: (a) so-called structural 
adjustment programmes have been adopted by most of these countries in response to the crises, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that (b) domestic market liberalization has been one of the 
most important, and widely implemented, of the structural adjustment policies. 
Market liberalization implies a move away from existing market structures. These vary widely 
across LDCs, and so the term is relative, but in the majority of cases, liberalization has meant 
increased private sector participation, at least in domestic markets. In addition, liberalization has 
often meant a change in the role of marketing parastatals and co-operatives. One of the main 
objectives of liberalization was to increase the economic efficiency of marketing and price structures, 
but there has been widespread concern that private sector markets may not prove adequate to the 
tasks set for them. 
It is this process of liberalization, and subsequent changes in the structure and organization of 
domestic marketing, which have been the main motivation for the production of this manual. The 
reforms themselves were stimulated by a recognition that: (a) pre-liberalization marketing practices 
may have constrained agricultural production, producer incomes and consumer welfare, and (b) 
there has been a bias in development economics towards production and a consequent underestima-
tion of the role of marketing. For these, and other reasons discussed later in this chapter, market 
liberalization became one of the main policies of structural adjustment. In turn, the implementation 
of market liberalization has raised many new problems. Of particular concern is the question of how 
to meet some of the policy objectives previously attained through pre-liberalization market 
structures and, if necessary, how to enhance the economic efficiency of new marketing systems. 
It is hoped that this manual will provide analysts, consultants, civil servants and others advising 
on policy and investments with a set of concepts and tools for addressing these problems. Whilst 
liberalization provides much of the current policy context to marketing, the manual can also be used 
in analysing marketing practice, irrespective of the status of policy in a given situation. 
USE OF THE MANUAL 
The methods for assessing the efficiency of markets provided here are directed at research carried out 
under consultancy conditions typically encountered by economists responsible for providing 
operational advice to governments, aid agencies and non-government organizations. In such 
circumstances, existing data sources are scarce and of variable quality, and analysts are expected to 
formulate recommendations on policy or public investments within a short period of time. Rapid 
reconnaissance methods used in this situation often throw up more questions than they answer, 
which should be addressed by longer term research. However, if used with care, such approaches 
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can have an important role in many LDCs, where the data bases available cannot sustain more 
sophisticated methods of research and policy decisions must be made fast. 
It is unlikely that single projects of this type will be directed at analysing all aspects of efficiency in 
a single commodity market, let alone a linked set of markets. Therefore it is thought that analysts will 
use particular parts of the manual as the objectives of their research demand. It is hoped that the 
comprehensive index will ease the search for relevant sections. In addition, an attempt has been 
made to keep the manual as practically useful as possible. To this end much theory, and other pieces 
of text which may be deemed to be of lesser practical value, has been boxed, in order that users may 
choose to read these passages, or not, with facility. 
This chapter briefly reviews the debates concerning the potential roles of markets and marketing in 
development and provides a list of common problems and imperfections in LDC markets. Chapter 2 
of the manual attempts to clarify what is meant by the terms 'economic performance' and 'economic 
efficiency'. This is important, because the common use of such phrases masks ambiguity in their 
precise meaning. Various ways of thinking about the nature of markets are also discussed in Chapter 
2 in order to provide analysts with means of imposing some order on the apparent chaos observed in 
the field. Data collection is the subject of the third chapter in this manual. It discusses the use of 
secondary sources and rapid reconnaissance fieldwork and then lists types of data that may be 
required in an analysis of the economics of a market. Chapter 4 describes various analytical 
techniques commonly used by economists in assessing the economic efficiency of markets, whilst 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the analysis of marketing policies. Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the process 
of market liberalization in Africa in some detail. 
MARKETS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The debate on the role markets can, or do, perform, in economic development is summarized by 
Harriss (1979b). With reference to the literature on India, she identifies three main ways in which 
markets and traders have been characterized, as follows: 
• as agents of development; 
• as powerless agents of stagnation, due to traders' risk aversion and hierarchies of credit-debt 
relationships throughout the market, and 
• as powerful agents of underdevelopment, to the extent that markets are monopolized by a few, 
who are thus able to reap excessive profits, at the expense of producers and consumers. 
These different characterizations encapsulate the emphases of different disciplinary traditions in 
social science studies of marketing: (a) business management and neo-classical economics, (b) 
anthropology, and (c) Marxist economics. Here only the neo-classical approach will be expanded 
upon, because it was the belief in the potential role of efficient markets to contribute to economic 
development that lead to liberalization becoming such an important policy in the 1980s and into the 
1990s. 
Markets as Potential Agents of Development 
Markets can potentially contribute to the development process in two ways. Firstly, they can provide 
a way to allocate resources ensuring the highest value production and maximum consumer 
satisfaction. Secondly, and more controversially, they may stimulate growth, by promoting techno-
logical innovation and increased supply and demand. 
Price transmission and specialization in production 
If it is accepted that economic development requires increased resource productivity, there are two 
important means of achieving this: increased specialization in production (and the exploitation of 
absolute and comparative advantages), and technological innovation. 
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The corollary of specialization is the separation of producers and consumers of particular products 
into distinct groups. For example, farmers, specializing in the production of a certain mix of crops, 
may become dependent on exchange for agricultural inputs, consumer goods, and other agricultural 
products not produced on their farms, possibly including foodstuffs. Specialization in production 
therefore requires co-ordination between producers, distributors and consumers, or between supply 
and demand. Markets provide one means of such co-ordination. Growth in the size and spatial 
spread of the market allows for greater specialization in production, which can lead to further 
increased output from each unit of resource employed. Therefore there is a two-way relationship 
between increasing resource productivity and the development of adequate systems of exchange. 
It is by generating and using prices that markets co-ordinate many otherwise unconnected 
economic decision makers. Prices summarize an enormous amount of information about the 
availability of resources, production possibilities and consumer preferences. In arriving at a price, the 
market provides a way of collecting and passing on this information and so helps future economic 
decision making. Prices can also either reward or punish the decision makers by determining the 
costs of and returns to the decision. In this way, markets co-ordinate decision makers widely 
separated either physically, economically or both. However, the detailed way in which prices are 
generated and passed on in markets is crucial in determining whether resource allocation leads to 
maximum production and optimum consumer satisfaction in reality. 
Price formation and the efficient allocation of resources 
The prices which markets generate are the means through which they determine what, and how 
much, is produced from finite resources, which methods are used in production, and how products 
are distributed. Consumers attempting to maximize their satisfaction do so in the face of fixed prices 
and incomes. The price they are willing to pay for different quantities of any commodity will depend 
on the utility of that quantity of that commodity to them. Through the market they can cast 'monetary 
votes', which can be passed back to producers. If the prices created and transmitted through the 
market are economically efficient, producers, in attempting to maximize their profits and incomes, 
will produce and sell those commodities which consumers most desire and can pay for, and they will 
do so at least cost. The effectiveness of prices as carriers of information, incentives and rewards in this 
process, and the resultant allocation of resources, will depend on the structure and organization, or 
the economic efficiency, of the market. 
If markets are perfectly competitive, and prices reflect the real costs of production, and if 
consumption does not have any external effects (positive or negative) on society, it can be shown that, 
through their influence on economic decision making, markets will lead to an optimal allocation of 
resources. At this optimum, resource productivity and consumer satisfaction are at the maximum 
possible level, given available resources, technology, consumer incomes and income distribution. 
Such an outcome is known in welfare economics as a Pareto Optimum, the criterion for which is that 
it is impossible to improve anyone's welfare through changes in production or exchange, without 
impairing someone else's welfare. Markets must be perfectly competitive for this condition to follow, 
because it is only these markets which generate and transmit prices which accurately reflect the 
scarcity of resources relative to consumer demand. 
In competitive markets, consumers can express their preferences, subject to the constraints of their 
incomes, by paying a certain price for particular qualities and quantities of goods. Producers can then 
attempt to maximize their profits by supplying the relevant quantity and quality of goods at least 
cost. It is the combination of the price structures created by perfectly competitive markets, and the 
maximizing objectives of consumers, producers and owners of resources, which ensures that such 
resources are deployed in their highest returning uses, that output is optimal and that resource 
productivity, production and consumer satisfaction are maximized. 
Box 1:1 summarizes the conditions and assumptions contained within the neo-classical model of 
perfect competition. Various models, that take into account the inter-dependence between the 
economic activities in different markets, have been developed to show that perfect competition leads 
to efficiency in production and in exchange and to an optimal conformity between production and 
consumption. What is important here though is an understanding of (a) the emphasis given to 
competition in economic analyses of markets, and (b) the rationale behind liberalization policies. 
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Box 1:1 The Neo-Classical Model of Perfect Competition 
4 
Necessary conditions 
The neo-classical economic model of perfect 
competition necessitates the following 
conditions: 
• sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers, 
and/or degrees of rivalry between them, 
to prevent any one firm from influencing 
market prices. In particular the price of a 
product or service must not be affected if 
a seller withholds supplies or a buyer 
limits purchases. That is to say that indi-
vidual buyers and sellers must be price 
takers and the terms of exchange must be 
determined impersonally by the market 
through the collective action of all buyers 
and sellers; 
• all commodities or services must be 
homogenous, such that buyers have no 
reason to prefer the goods of one seller 
over those of another; 
• market participants must be economi-
cally rational, i.e. they must attempt to 
maximize their profits, utility and/ or 
incomes; 
• resources and products must be perfectly 
mobile, i.e. there must be no barriers to 
capital, labour, management etc. entering 
any economic activity and it must be 
possible to move these to loca tions in the 
economy in wh ich they will secure the 
highest returns; 
• commodities and currencies must be per-
fectly divisible and fungible; 
• all participants in the marketing system 
must have perfect and equal knowledge 
of the forces likely to affect supply and 
demand, and hence market conditions, 
such that no increased information would 
change their economic decisions. 
Assumed, and facilitating, conditions 
The model assumes the existence of market 
places, where offers to buy and sell are 
made; reliable communications, allowing 
adjustment to equilibrium, within and 
between markets. Conditions which can be 
argued to facilitate the realisation of the 
above include standardized weights, 
measures, varieties and qualities; means to 
enforce contracts and flexible terms of 
exchange. 
Pareto optimum 
Pareto (1906) showed that, under certain 
conditions, perfectly competitive markets 
lead to a situation in which no re-allocation 
of the economy's resources can make any-
one better off without making at least one 
person worse off. 
The conditions necessary for perfect compe-
tition to result in the maximization of the 
value of production and of consumer satis-
faction in this sense include: 
• the absence of economies of scale in pro-
duction, which would otherwise mean 
that output could be increased from given 
resources under monopolistic, rather 
than competitive, conditions; 
• absolute consumer sovereignty such that 
all economic activity is ultimately 
directed towards consumer satisfaction 
and responsive to consumers' monetary 
votes; 
• the absence of externalities, i.e., circum-
stances where costs or benefits of pro-
duction or consumption are imposed on, 
or received by, individuals or groups 
without payment, or receipts, for them 
being made; 
• the absence of public goods (which can be 
conceived of as extreme externalities) 
Utility of Pareto's theory 
The analytical utility of the Pareto condition 
is limited by two considerations. Firstly, for 
the Pareto optimum to be socially optimal it 
is necessary to assume that the distribution 
of income is desirable, which may not be the 
case. Secondly, the condition provides no 
guidance as to the choice between alterna-
tives where a re-allocation of resources in 
production and / or exchange makes some 
people better off, and others worse off. 
Economi ts ha ve tackled these difficulties in 
various ways. The most commonly used of 
these is to determine whether the gainers 
from a re-allocation of resources can com-
pensate the losers and still remain better off 
than before the change. Such a change is 
known as a Pareto improvement. The utility 
of this principle depends on a judgement 
about whether the necessary degree of 
redistribution should, or will, actually take 
place. 
-
--
In advocating liberalization it was argued that, because many LDC markets had been monopo-
lized and controlled by parastatal agencies, and because many prices had been determined 
administratively rather than through market forces, the allocation of resources had become highly 
inefficient, i.e., resources were being used in a way which inhibited the realization of their productive 
potentials, and therefore the absolute value of production was lower than it could have been. In 
addition, agricultural producer incentives had often been weakened, market structures had become 
inflexible and unable to respond to changing external circumstances, and government budgets had 
become overburdened. It was thought that by allowing the market, rather than governments, to 
determine prices, changes in the structure of supply would result, which would raise the aggregate 
value of output, and allow for a more flexible economy, better able to respond to changes in 
international prices, and lower budgetary costs to the government. 
Markets and economic growth 
The important potential role of markets in generating economic growth was recognized by Adam 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776), but since Pareto formulated the theory of optimal welfare early 
this century, there has been an emphasis on the efficiency with which markets allocate given 
resources and technology to maximize output and welfare. However, the potential of markets to 
stimulate economic growth is crucial, especially in LDCs, because statically efficient markets can co-
exist with widespread poverty. 
In the realm of economic growth, markets may provide the incentives to profit-maximizing 
participants to develop new technologies, products, sources of supply, new markets and new 
methods of exploiting them. Some economists (for example Schumpeter) argue that these long-run, 
dynamic potentials of the market for stimulating economic growth are more important for social 
welfare than the efficient allocation of existing resources. However, competition has not always been 
seen as the best mechanism for encouraging growth. Schumpeter (1942) argues monopoly markets 
provide greater incentives to innovate because of the larger profits and reduced risk they imply. 
Markets can also provide a mechanism of surplus extraction and inter-sectoral resource transfers, 
most commonly from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors. For example, governments can use 
markets to tax trade and/ or production; profits made in agricultural trade may be invested in other 
sectors of the economy and transfers may be engendered where land, capital and labour markets are 
linked. This extractive role may inhibit the development of the full potential of the agricultural sector, 
because it draws investment away, but it is usually seen as necessary for the diversification of 
economies and the development of other sectors. 
The development and expansion of markets can create increased demand through various means. 
For example, markets provide a source of productive employment and income generation; their role 
in transferring resources to the non-agricultural sectors leads to the development of a home market 
and hence the demand for agricultural commodities by the non-agricultural sectors and vice versa, 
and the profit-maximization objective of entrepreneurs may lead to the development of new 
products. By commercializing agriculture and other sectors, and by increasing the demand for goods 
and therefore for money with which to purchase them, markets may also encourage increased 
producer price sensitivity and greater specialization into goods and services in which particular 
geographical zones have a comparative advantage. 
Marketing has an intrinsic productive value, in that it adds time, form, place and possession 
utilities to products and commodities. Through the technical functions of storage, processing and 
transportation, and through exchange, marketing increases consumer satisfaction from any given 
quantity of output. The economic value of these functions, in terms of their effect on the allocation 
and distribution of resources, depends on how efficiently they are carried out and how the services 
they represent are priced. As incomes and populations grow and agricultural specialization increases 
and non-agricultural sectors develop, there is an increased demand for marketing services. The role 
of markets in encouraging increased production through price incentives will be crucial. 
Markets and other development objectives 
Markets also have influence on income distribution, food security and other important, and 
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commonly held, development objectives. The precise way in which markets affect these is contro-
versial, as will be seen in Chapter 2. In addition to questions of the economic efficiency of markets, 
important factors are the pre-existing distribution of income, concurrent events, for example 
drought, and subjective political evaluations. 
Government roles 
Governments have an important role in regulating the market mechanism to ensure efficiency, equity 
and macro-economic stability. Markets may not be efficient as a consequence of market imperfections 
and the problem of public goods (see Box 1 :1). Furthermore, although efficiently functioning markets 
will increase the value of total output, as has been noted, there is no reason why they should deliver a 
socially desirable distribution of income. Therefore, there may be justification for governments to 
intervene to produce a more socially desirable distribution of income. The challenge for policy is to 
find mechanisms for intervening in favour of distributional objectives which do not compromise 
(and, hopefully, even promote) growth objectives. 
To encourage the realization of the potential contributions markets can make to the development 
process, governments may, for instance: 
• increase economic efficiency of, and reduce the risks in, markets, for example through the 
provision of information; 
• invest in public or collective goods like improved transport and communications networks, 
which could reduce the costs and widen the extent of marketing; 
• provide a measure of market stability, for example through floor and ceiling price policies on 
basic goods like foodstuffs; 
• initiate income distribution and food security programmes; 
• develop the private sector, if it is in an 'infant industry' phase, through research, training, 
institution building etc.; and 
• guarantee law and order, including adequate property rights and means of contract 
enforcement. 
Summary 
In summary then, encouraging growth in the volumetric size and spatial spread of the market can 
potentially increase economic welfare through possibly engendering: 
• greater specialization in production and hence increased output from each unit of resource 
employed and more efficient allocation of resources; 
• the realization of potential economies of scale in production; 
• an increase in the variety of commodities from which to choose, increasing consumer 
satisfaction; 
• increased price and supply stability; and 
• increased competition between larger numbers of buyers and sellers. 
Improvements in the efficiency with which marketing functions are undertaken can be argued to 
contribute to development through: 
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• providing fuller use of a given level of production, for example by reducing physical losses and 
managerial and labour inefficiency; 
--
-• fostering more efficient production by generating prices which more accurately reflect resource 
availabilities and consumer preferences; 
• reducing the costs of marketing and the marketing margin, thus increasing producer and/ or 
lowering consumer prices, which may lead to increased output (depending on demand and 
supply elasticities); 
• allowing greater specialization in production, and possibly reducing price variability, which 
may lead to increased output; and 
• possibly stabilizing demand and prices and providing incentives for improving product quality. 
COMMON PROBLEMS AND IMPERFECTIONS IN LDC 
MARKETS 
The following list provides an indication of commonly noted market imperfections and marketing 
problems in LDCs: 
• barriers to entry, particularly at higher levels of wholesaling and transportation; 
• monopolization/ cartelization of one or more market functions and/ or geographical areas, 
sometimes as a result of the above; 
• lack of realization of economies of scale, for example in the transport, storage and processing 
functions; 
• externalities, i.e., interdependence between the costs and benefits to individuals and community 
that are not taken full account of through prices; 
• poor information, for example of prices, supplies and demand, which may impede the physical 
flow of goods and lead to excessive price differences between markets because traders are 
unaware of profitable marketing opportunities; 
• market fragmentation (often as a result of poor information) -i.e., different prices obtaining in 
different but equivalent transactions, because buyers and sellers are unaware of other prices 
being offered; 
• wide price variations between markets in time and space, due to high costs and/ or high returns 
(see Chapter 4); 
• high rates of physical loss or spoilage, sometimes due to crude and technically inefficient 
handling and storage; 
• high-cost transactions and handling due to small lots bought and sold; the dispersed and 
diversified nature of production; inefficient operation of transport services; poor infrastructure 
etc.; 
• poor transport and communication networks, which increase the costs of marketing and thus 
impede physical flows and the extent of possible specialization in production; 
• widespread risk aversion, in both the trading and production sub-sectors; 
• inadequate capital markets and hence insufficient liquidity in the marketing system to match 
supply and demand over time and space; 
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• absence or non-enforcement of standardized grades, varieties, qualities, weights and measures 
which makes visual inspection necessary, inhibiting the flow of meaningful information through 
prices, and increasing costs; 
• lack of legal means to enforce contracts which often results in the physical movement of traders 
and inhibits distance trade; 
• low effective demand as a result of low incomes, thus small-scale retail transactions; 
• highly uncertain and volatile supplies of many food crops due to subsistence consumption; and 
• producers with weak market bargaining positions due to the small and dispersed nature of 
production units; indebtedness in general, and to traders in particular; poor information and 
rural transport facilities . 
-
---
Chapter 2 
Economic Performance and Conceptual Frameworks 
• Defining economic performance in agricultural marketing 
• Economic efficiency 
• Technical and operational efficiency 
• Exchange efficiency 
• Other performance objectives 
• Innovation 
• Inter-sectoral resource transfers 
• Equity 
• Employment 
• Food security 
• Co-ordination efficiency 
• Describing a conceptual framework for the economic analysis of agricultural marketing 
systems 
• The internal productive efficiency of the firm 
• The structure, conduct, performance school 
• Marketing sub-systems 
In this chapter, various facets of economic performance in agricultural marketing are defined in order 
to clarify key concepts. This is important because many of the terms employed to describe market 
performance are often used very loosely in consultancy reports, and because understanding what is 
meant by economic performance is essential to creating a research strategy, and in delineating policy 
options. 
For each of the aspects of economic performance covered here, a definition is followed by a brief 
indication of the data and evaluation methods needed in assessing real situations. 
In the second part of the chapter a conceptual framework of the form and context of agricultural 
marketing systems is outlined to help the organization of research. This framework is based on the 
historical evolution of economic analyses of agricultural markets, which itself is then briefly 
reviewed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conceptual or analytical frameworks of market performance, and of the way in which markets are 
structured, are essential to guide effective and efficient data collection. Such frameworks should help 
indicate the most useful area(s) in which to focus limited research resources, and ensure that data 
collected is relevant to the objectives of the research. 
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The stated objectives of any particular research project must be defined as clearly as possible since 
they determine the broad requirements of data collection and analysis. Constructing a logical 
framework is one way in which to order and clarify these broad objectives. The means of meeting the 
latter then need to be worked out, and it is in this that conceptual frameworks, describing economic 
performance and markets, will be useful. 
MARKET PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
It is assumed here that most analyses of markets in less-developed countries will be concerned with 
assessing and determining ways of enhancing economic performance. However, many elements are 
often implied by this term. The most commonly used of these are defined below, and the means of 
measuring and enhancing them are briefly discussed. Market performance is then defined as the way 
in which markets and marketing contribute to various aspects of economic performance. 
Performance criteria are here divided into two categories, those respectively related to economic 
efficiency and other performance objectives, as illustrated in the diagram below. These criteria are not 
exhaustive, and research projects may be directed at others, but it is hoped that the means of 
analysing markets described in this manual can be adapted for particular uses. 
Figure 1 Performance Criteria 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES 
Technical efficiency 
Operational efficiency 
Exchange efficiency 
OTHER PERFORMANCE 
OBJECTIVES 
Innovation 
Inter-sectoral resource transfers 
Equity 
Employment 
Food security 
Co-ordination efficiency 
Economic Efficiency Objectives 
A market system, or parts of it, can be said to economically efficient if: 
• all firms are productively efficient; 
• the spatial distribution of firms, plant and infrastructure is organized to take advantage of scale 
and locational economies, and 
• the operation of exchange generates prices which conform to a competitive standard (French 
1977, p.95). 
Economic or productive efficiency of an individual enterprise is dependent on both technical and 
operational efficiency as defined below. Helmberger (1968) coined the term '0-efficiency' to describe 
the organization of market infrastructure in space, but means of measuring this remain to be 
developed and it is not covered here. Exchange efficiency, also referred to as market level allocative, 
pricing or economic efficiency, is defined and assessed here through reference to the neo-classical 
model of perfect competition (see Box 1:1). 
Other Performance Objectives 
Some so-called 'non-economic efficiency' performance criteria are also reviewed below in an attempt 
to take into account the most important caveats stemming from the assumptions of the neo-classical 
model of perfect competition. In less-developed countries the most important of these are: 
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-• technological innovation; 
• income distribution; 
• food security; 
• poverty. 
The relationship between markets and each of these performance criteria is discussed below, but 
the means and extent of the contribution which the market makes to each criterion is very difficult to 
quantify or define, and often only qualitative evaluations will be possible. For example, with 
reference to increased economic growth, it is necessary to assess the optimal utilization of resources, 
and the organization of markets, over time, given uncertainty and change. However, "progress in 
formulating such a dynamic framework appears to have been very limited to date" (French, 1977; 
p .96). Despite this, the relationship between markets and economic growth can be addressed by 
studying the effects of the former on, for example, technological innovation; inter-sectoral resource 
transfers and effective supply and demand. In addition the relationship between markets and 
income distribution and food security need to be addressed, if only because they are major issues in 
the stated developmental goals of most LDCs. The data collected and analysed, as described below, 
in assessing the economic efficiency of markets, will be able to shed some light on these relationships. 
MODELLING MARKETS 
Following the definition of performance criteria, a multi-dimensional model of the form and context 
of agricultural markets is outlined, which can be used to organize research into economic efficiency. 
This model is based on the historical evolution of economic analyses of agricultural markets to date, 
which itself is reviewed. The model presented here can be divided into three distinct stages, as 
follows: 
• the internal productive efficiency of the firm; 
• the structure, conduct, performance school; and 
• sub-systems analysis. 
DEFINING PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
Economic performance is a complex, multi-dimensional concept, about which there is no agreed 
definition. Some important elements of it are set out below, but the list is not exhaustive, and the 
division of the criteria is inevitably arbitrary. Furthermore, because, in the rest of this manual, 
emphasis is given to economic efficiency performance criteria, other performance criteria command 
greater attention here. 
These performance criteria are often contradictory and difficult to assess empirically. Moreover, 
the standards or norms against which to judge some of them are poorly developed. Therefore, 
performance priorities and trade-offs between criteria need to be defined, and performance 
indicators and operational approximations need to be used, and, in many cases, better developed. 
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Box 2:1 The Economic Performance Debate 
In the debate surrounding economic per-
formance, economists are divided in par-
ticular on the issue as to whether the 
standard neo-classical theory of economic 
efficiency, and the model of perfect compe-
tition, provide a sufficient definition of, and 
means of evaluating, economic 
performance. 
The main arguments against using this the-
ory, and the norms it provides for evalu-
ation, can be divided into ho\lo group , those 
which are critical of the static, informational 
and single market assumptions contained 
within the model, and those critical of the 
objectives defined by the model. 
In response to the former set of criticisms, 
attempts have been made to develop the 
neo-classical model by reducing the sim-
plifying assumptions, and incorporating 
into it uncertainty, information defects, 
multi-market and non-spot trading charac-
teristics etc .. 
Economic Efficiency Perfonnance Criteria 
Technical Efficiency 
However, others argue that the perform-
ance of an economy must be evaluated with 
respect to non-economic, political and social 
objectives as well as those of the neo-
classical tradition. 
In this manual, the neo-classical model is 
used as a base for the evaluation of econ-
omic performance for two reasons. First, 
more dynamic models of economic 
efficiency, which take into account one, or 
more, of the neo-classical assumptions, are 
as yet less well-developed, and llmch more 
complex than that of perfect competition. 
Secondly, many LDCs are not democratic 
and the hybridization of neo-classical econ-
omics with th ories of public choice and 
rent-seeking remains incomplete. Although 
this manual focuses on the neo-classical 
model of economic performance, analysts 
are encouraged to con tantly refer back to 
the a umption of the model of perfect 
competition and also to take into consider-
ation various non-economic objectives in 
their research. 
Definition This refers to the efficiency with which resources are used in marketing, in terms of 
physical input and output ratios. A technically efficient firm, or market, produce the maximum 
possible output from the inputs used, given locationa1 and environmental con tra.i.nts, and it 
minimizes resource inputs for any given level of output. 'Neoclassical economic theory has 
traditionally assumed that firms operate with technically efficient production functions; since this is 
not always true in the real world, the determination of technical efficiency is quite important for 
applied economists' (French 1977, p.94). 
Deviations from technical efficiency can stem from a variety of sources, including a lack of 
knowledge of available techniques or inadequate management due to lack of motivation, skills and/ 
or personnel. 
Assessment In order to assess and potentially increase the technical efficiency with which markets 
and marketing firms operate, inputs used and output produced must be identified and measured.lt 
is unlikely that optimal relations between inputs and outputs will be specified, but relative levels of 
technical efficiency, or inefficiency, can be indicated by comparing differences between similar firm ' 
levels of inputs and outputs. This will also help identify ways of improving technical efficiency. 
To increase technical efficiency, either output must be increased relative to inputs, or inputs must 
be relatively decreased. Technical efficiency can be assessed both statically, with reference to existing 
technology, and dynamically, through predicting the effects on input/ output ratios of technological, 
managerial or other innovations. 
Examples Clear examples of measures of technical efficiency in marketing are provided by the rate 
at which raw materials are transformed into end- and by-products in processing, and the extent of 
qualitative and quantitative crop losses in handling, transport and storage. However, although some 
inputs and outputs related to marketing are relatively easy to identify and measure, others prove 
more difficult. 
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In general labour, capital and raw material inputs are easier to identify and value than manage-
ment skills and risk taking. Indicators, or operational approximations, of the values of such inputs 
then have to be defined and deployed. For example, the premium of managerial over skilled labour 
or clerical salaries can be used to value management skills. Likewise, money lenders' subjective 
evaluations of the risk element in interest rates can be used to indicate the value of risk taking. 
Similarly, for output, volumetric and quality losses, and milling conversion rates, are easier to 
quantify than time, form, place and possession utilities, which are often seen as the ultimate outputs 
of the market system. 'The output of a supermarket, for example, consists of a service associated with 
assembling six thousand or so items in a convenient location where they are readily available to 
consumers. The measurement of this product is considerably more difficult than is suggested by the 
usual presentation of neo-classical production theory' (French, 1977, p.98). Usually the different 
prices consumers are willing to pay for various marketing services are used as indicators of the 
Box 2:2 The Economics of Technical Efficiency 
0 Variable Input 
(a) Level of input use which maximizes the 
marginal product of the input; (b) point of 
maximum average product; (c) point of 
maximum total product. 
The total product curve shows the level of 
physical output for each level of variable 
input. 
The average product curve shows the 
ratio of total product to the quantity of the 
input used in producing it. 
The marginal product curve shows the 
addition to the total product when one more 
unit of the variable input is used, assuming 
all other inputs are held constant. 
The curves are drawn in a way that illus-
trates the common occurrence of diminish-
ing marginal returns to increased 
application of inputs. 
In Region 1, marginal product is greater 
than average product and each additional 
unit of input produces a greater than aver-
age level of input. It is therefore rational to 
continue to increase production at least 
until average product reaches its maximum. 
In Region 3 marginal product is negative 
and total product is falling with each 
additional unit of input used. It is therefore 
not rational to produce beyond the point 
where marginal product equals zero, which 
is the point at which total product is at its 
maximum. 
Region 2 is known as the region of 
rational production, since total product is 
increasing, albeit at a declining rate, and 
marginal product is still positive, although 
it is decreasing. Average product is also 
decreasing, but is greater than marginal 
product. 
Technical efficiency can be measured 
through calculating the ratio of actual out-
put to potential maximum output. 
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latters' values, but these may not always be easy to ascertain, and they more correctly refer to 
operational and economic efficiency criteria. 
Data Researchers may be concerned with one or more aspects of technical efficiency and their 
specific objectives, together with data availability, will determine the sources of data used. For 
example, it is likely that many studies will be concerned with crop losses and spoilage in storage 
and/ or transportation, information on which may be sought through government, academic and 
consultancy reports and/ or through interviews with farmers, wholesalers, retailers, transporters 
and/ or knowledgable observers. 
Operational Efficiency 
Definition This i usually defined as the provision of goods, or services, at least cost and at a level 
of output, or combination f inputs, which ensures that the value of marginal product equals 
marginal factor costs. Operational efficiency is also sometimes referred to as firm level allocative or 
pricing efficiency. 
Box 2:3 The Economics of Operational Efficiency 
M 
0 
~ 
c? 
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~ 
"-o"' 
~, Total 
'- Value 
Product 
Units of Input 
(m) marginal input (or factor) cost; (ab) total 
profit; (c) intersection of marginal input cost 
and marginal value product curves 
For the maximization of productivity in 
resource use, and of consumer satisfaction, 
welfare economics proposes that the price 
of each product should equal the marginal 
social cost and that the price of each input 
should equal the marginal social product. 
Under perfect competition, the profit 
maximization objective achieves this con-
dition. Profit is at a maximum where the 
vertical distance between the total cost and 
the total value product curves is greatest. At 
this point the slope of these two curves is 
equal and marginal value product (or the 
value of the product obtained from using 
the last unit of the variable input under 
consideration) equals the cost of producing 
the last unit of the output. Thus, the profit 
maximization condition holds that, for any 
given price, firms must produce that level of 
output which ensures that marginal costs 
equate with marginal revenues. 
Under perfect competition, there is no 
difference between average, and marginal, 
revenue and therefore profit is maximized 
when price equals marginal costs. 
The ratio of costs when optimal input 
proportions are used, to costs with actual 
inputs used, provides a measure of oper-
ational efficiency. 
Assessment The key questions in assessing the static operational efficiency of markets, and of 
marketing firms, are whether, given current technology and infrastructure, the costs of marketing 
functions can be reduced, and whether the level of output/ combinations of inputs are such that 
marginal revenues equate with marginal costs. There is likely to be an emphasis on the first of these 
since assessments of operational efficiency, like those of technical efficiency, will usually be directed 
at identifying means of incremental improvement. 
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Operational efficiency is therefore closely related to technical efficiency, since reduced physical and 
quality losses imply cost savings. It can be assessed by calculating the actual costs of various market 
functions and comparing these with: 
• technologically feasible minima; 
• the costs of optimal input proportions; and/ or 
• the costs incurred by other firms undertaking similar functions. 
Again, some inputs will be obvious and easy to measure, and indicators and approximations will 
have tu be used to value others. Similarly, there is likely to be a focus on comparing different, but 
similar, firms' levels of costs, and on seeking out means of reducing costs, rather than calculating 
optimal input proportions. 
Having identified any inefficiencies, the causes behind them need to be investigated if means of 
understanding, or overcoming, them are to be found. The system's dynamic capacity for expansion, 
and further long-term cost reductions, for example, through managerial or technological innovation 
or infrastructural investments, can also be examined. 
Examples There are many potential sources of operational inefficiency, including lack of incentives; 
inadequate information or managerial expertise and bottlenecks in input supply. For example, due to 
the seasonal nature of much agricultural production, capacity under-utilization in processing plants 
is a common problem. This could be reduced through increasing storage capabilities or through 
multi-product milling, but the costs, benefits and indirect effects of such programmes need to be 
examined. 
Similarly, lack of competition in the market, and the cost minimizing and profit maximizing 
incentives associated with it, can lead to so-called 'X-inefficiency' (Leibenstein, 1966) and 'organiza-
tional slack' (Cyert and March, 1963). Thus, efforts to increase competition may simultaneously 
increase technical, operational and allocative efficiency. 
Another common source of operational inefficiency in many LDCs is the lack of standardized 
weights, measures, qualities and grades which often makes visual inspection of products necessary. 
This not only increases the direct costs of buying and selling, but also inhibits longer distance trade, 
and therefore increased geographical specialization in production. Thus, both direct and indirect 
costs could be reduced if such standards were effectively instituted. 
Box 2:4 Productive Efficiency 
Productive, or firm-level economic, 
efficiency is the combination of technical 
and operational efficiency. The product of 
the measures of technical and operational 
efficiency, described respectively in Boxes 
2:2 and 2:3, provides a measure of firm level 
productive efficiency. A technically and 
operationally efficient firm will have a pro-
ductive efficiency index of 1.0. However, it 
must be noted that a firm may be pro-
ductively efficient for its size but inefficient 
with reference to optimal scale, and the 
latter may vary with relative factor costs 
(French, 1977, p.95). 
Research into productive efficiency may 
lead to improved marketing performance 
by: 
• determining the relative efficiency of 
existing alternative production 
methods, scales of operation, and busi-
ness practices, thereby aiding individ-
ual marketing firms to move to the 
most efficient production function for 
their environment, or to an improved 
position on a given production func-
tion, and 
• formulating models of efficient organi-
zation within market areas or indus-
tries. The latter may serve as planning 
guides for industry groups, and as aids 
to policy formulation for public agen-
cies and legislative bodies (French, 
1977, p.96). 
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Exchange Efficiency 
Definition This is also referred to as market-level allocative, pricing or economic efficiency and is 
both dependent on, and influential in, the above two efficiency criteria. Although debates on 
definition and measurement continue, the economic efficiency of the market usually refers to the 
combined effect of the productive (technical plus operational) efficiency with which marketing 
services are undertaken, and the degree to which the prices provide incentives to producers and 
consumers that are consistent with resource availabilities and demand. 
Assessment To test the economk or allocative efficiency of markets, therefore, two factors must be 
determined: (1) the accuracy with which prices generated by the system reflect the real costs of 
production, and the real benefits of consumption~ (2) the pr cisi n with which they are transmitted 
through the system. 
There are no direct means of assessing the degree to which actual prices reflect social costs and 
benefits, and therefore methods rely on the hypothesis that perfectly competitive markets maximize 
the efficiency of resource allocation. High degrees of competition in the market should provide the 
incentives to ensure firm-level productive, as well as pricing, efficiency. Thus, analyses of market-
level economic efficiency start by evaluating the degree of competition in the market. 
Indicators of the state of competition in the market include the following, which are all reviewed in 
more detail in Chapter 4: 
• Qualitative assessments of the presence of the conditions of the model of perfect competition; 
• Seller-concentration ratios; 
• Correlations between price movements over space, time and form; 
• Cost and return elements in unitary market margins; 
• Rates of profitability of marketing firms. 
It is important in all analyses of economic efficiency to recall that markets may be more or less 
competitive in particular areas, times, commodities, functions, levels of marketing activity, scales of 
operation, etc .. For example, in the post-harvest period, a number of petty traders/ farmers may enter 
the market for a short time, but constraints on storage may result in monopolization of trade in pre-
harvest periods. Similarly, competition may be stiff at the retail level of food marketing, where capital 
requirements to entry are not prohibitive, but wholesaling may be oligopolistic. 
It is also crucial in assessing economic performance to: 
(a) Combine various types of analyses, since all are only indicative of competitiveness and none 
on their own can be held to be conclusive; 
(b) Establish the sources of apparent imperfections, since the means to overcome them need to 
be identified and not all of them will necessarily result in efficient resource allocation; and 
(c) Return therefore to the assumptions of the model of perfect competition and non-economic 
efficiency objectives, to weigh up the costs and benefits of apparent imperfections. For 
example, where natural economies of scale exist, oligopolistic markets may result in a more 
efficient allocation of resources than competitive ones. 
Other Performance Criteria 
Inducing Innovation 
Technological, institutional, product, managerial and other innovations can be generated within the 
marketing system, and the market can also induce innovations in sectors of the economy to which it 
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is linked. These should reduce costs and increase resource productivity and/ or production and 
output, and thus contribute to real economic growth and increased per capita incomes in the long 
term. Thus, the degree to which markets encourage or inhibit such innovations, and their subsequent 
adoption, should be assessed. 
Box 2:5 Innovation and Competition 
There has been much debate within econ-
omics on the relationship between compe-
tition, or static economic efficiency, in 
markets, and innovation, or dynamic 
efficiency. 
It has been traditionally argued that com-
petition between firms provides sufficient 
incentive to innovate, because innovating 
firms are able to capture the short-run ben-
efits of reduced costs whilst prices remain 
stable. In the longer term, more firms adopt 
the innovation to reduce their costs, and 
thus prices fall back to a competitive equi-
librium as output rises, or competition 
between firms pushes the price down. 
Further, it has been argued that competi-
tive markets induce an efficient rate and 
direction of innovation, such that they 
reflect relative factor scarcities, and the most 
binding constraints on increased output, or 
reduced costs, are lifted first (Hayami and 
Ruttan, 1971; Ruttan and Hayami, 1984). 
This theory of induced innovation is based 
on Hicks' (1932) argument that competitive 
entrepreneurs sought out specifically 
labour-saving technology when wages rose, 
rather than innovations aimed at saving all 
factor costs. 
However, Schumpeter (1942), Galbraith 
(1956) and others argue that intense compe-
tition inhibits innovation, because it means 
greater risk and uncertainty, less capital 
accumulation to invest in research and 
development, and a limitation on the period 
of time over which the benefits of innova-
tion can realized. 
Similarly, Harrison et al. (1987, p.86) argue 
that, in Latin America, intense competition 
and the risky environment this creates leads 
to increasing conservatism in marketing 
rather than increased efficiency. 
The debate continues, but Scherer (1980) 
in summarizing it, concludes that a "bit of 
monopoly power in the form of structural 
concentration is conducive to invention and 
innovation ... but a very high concentration 
· has a favourable effect only in very rare 
cases and more often it is apt to retard 
progress by restricting the number of inde-
pendent sources of initiative and by damp-
ening firms' incentive to gain market 
position through accelerated research and 
development". 
Assessment Progress and innovation are very difficult to measure. In the West, various indicators 
like the level of firms' expenditure on, or employment in, research and development, and the number 
of patents received as a percentage of sales, are used as indicators. These measures have been 
analysed comparatively in determining the relationship between the competitiveness and 'progress-
iveness' of various industries. Thus, not only is there no absolute standard by which to judge 
optimum levels of research expenditure, but such data will certainly be unavailable for the majority 
of food-marketing enterpises in LDCs. 
Some examples of potential innovations in LDC marketing are provided below. However, such 
innovations may lead to economically inefficient, oligopolistic structures and pricing; have adverse 
effects on income distribution and may not always be progressive (Harriss, 1981, p.lOO). For example, 
vertical integration can lead to cost savings and more stable and reliable producer prices, but the 
reduced costs of marketing may not be passed on to producers and/ or consumers, and vertically 
integrated firms may be able to exert local control over the market by undercutting other traders. 
Alternatively, diversification may be aimed at reducing risk, rather than increasing output, or 
minimizing costs. This would imply a decrease in economic efficiency in the static neo-classical sense, 
but since the latter does not take into account the uncertainties of the real world, such innovations 
may prove to be economically efficient in the longer term. Therefore, it is important to assess the 
implications of potential innovations for, and to evaluate the trade-offs between, different objectives, 
including producer returns, entry into the market, consumer satisfaction and prices, and the 
responsiveness of the market to changing demand, technologies and relative prices. 
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By analysing the operation of markets in detail, and in particular the costs of the functions 
undertaken, potential innovations which would lead to expanded capacity and/ or increased 
technical, operational or economic efficiency can be identified. Much 'marketing development' to 
date has taken the form of infrastructural investments, without prior assessments of market 
participants' needs. For example, if the majority of traders lack the finance to buy produce, 
improving the quality of market places is not likely to have substantial impact on the capacity and 
economic efficiency of the market. 
Examples Often there will be few feasible innovations open to small marketing enterprises in 
LDCs, but active marketing can play an important role, in inducing the adoption of externally 
generated innovations in the agricultural sector, and this should be examined. For example, the 
market may encourage or inhibit the adoption of technologies designed to increase production and 
productivity in agriculture. 
Inducing innovation in the agricultural sector It is often argued that, due to the price fluctuations 
implied by relatively free markets, governments have an important role in stabilizing producer 
prices to reduce the risks of adopting new technologies- hence the common existence of floor pricing 
policies. Conversely, one of the most important justifications of food market liberalization in many 
countries was that anti-agricultural state pricing policies had lead to a depression of producer prices, 
which inhibited both increased food production and marketing, and the adoption of high-yielding 
technologies. 
Another example of the effect of markets on agricultural progressiveness is provided by Harriss 
(1978, p.13). In her review of the literature on agricultural marketing in West Africa, she argues that 
the market simultaneously serves to commercialize agriculture, and inhibit investment and progress 
in it, by forcing small farmers to sell their produce early in the season, while later in the season they 
work on larger farmers' land and borrow money in order, for example, to buy back food 
requirements. 
Marketing innovations Within the marketing systems of LDCs, most innovations are likely to be of 
an organizational nature. In the common context of poor information and small-scale dispersed 
production, various institutional arrangements, or management practices, may increase operational 
efficiency; enable the realization of potential economies of scale and/ or reduce marketing risks and 
costs. 
For example, new vertical and horizontal linkages may be forged like vertical integration and 
forward buying; flexible credit relations may be instituted and co-operation between traders or 
producers, for example, in organizing transportation and storage are possible. Firms may diversify 
their businesses through adopting new commodities and functions, or they may instigate new 
management practices - like ordering stocks by telephone or letter and using banking facilities for 
payments. 
Inter-Sectoral Resource Transfers 
In addition to inducing various innovations, markets also play a potentially key role in the extraction 
of resources from agriculture. Since most LDC economies are largely based on this sector, and 
economic diversification is one facet of development, the role markets can play in inter-sectoral 
resource allocation is important in determining the direction of such development. However, there 
will always have to be a trade-off between the rate of extraction of resources from, and the rate of 
growth in, the agricultural sector, and this again needs to be defined and evaluated. 
In assessing the magnitude and direction of inter-sectoral transfers engendered through the 
market, Harriss (1981) suggests the following are indicative: 
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• the domestic terms of trade; 
• the taxation of marketing firms and the use to which such revenue is put; and 
• the profitability of trade, the origins of trading capital and the sectoral direction of investment of 
profits over time. 
...... 
..... 
Equity and Income Distribution 
Most LDCs exhibit a highly skewed income distribution and, more importantly, levels of income 
which engender conditions of abject poverty for the poorest. It is doubted that markets can play a 
significant role in improving income distribution, but they certainly strongly influence it, and it is 
often argued that they exacerbate inequalities. Given that markets can substantially affect the 
distribution of income, and that greater equity is often claimed to be a primary developmental goal, 
analyses of the nature of the relationship between markets and equity are important. 
Box 2:6 Equity and Economics 
In neo-classical terms, economic efficiency 
has as its main objective the maximization 
of output and utility for whole economies. It 
is only socially optimal if income distribu-
tion is universally agreed to be acceptable, 
which is an impossible condition. It there-
fore does not address the equity problem 
directly, but through analysing markets 
using neo-classical tools, various insights 
into the ways in which markets influence 
inequality can be attained. These can then 
be used to predict the effects of various 
markets on income distribution, and to 
inform the design of policies and projects 
aimed at alleviating inequality. Such analy-
ses can, for example provide an indication 
of the degrees of inequality within the mar-
keting system itself; the origins and the 
means of reproduction, or exacerbation, of 
this inequality, and the effects of the market 
on income distribution outside the market-
ing system. 
Definition The term equity is most commonly used to refer to the distribution of income between 
undifferentiated individuals, but it is also important to look at the distribution of income between 
men and women; those of different ethnic origin, between various regions within a country, and 
between different age groups. 
Assessment Much information on the way in which markets impinge on income distribution can 
be obtained through an examination of: 
• the differences in prices received, or paid, by various socio-economic, gender or ethnic 
categories of farmer, trader and consumer; 
• the inter-sectoral and inter-spatial resource transfers implied by market prices; 
• credit, marketing and employment relationships between large and small farmers; traders and 
farmers, and between different categories of trader; 
• degrees of inequality in assets; annual turnover and profitability between different types of 
trader; 
• owner-operator and employee relations, and 
• the gender, ethnic and age characteristics of those involved in marketing. 
Examples A number of factors should be investigated when examining the origins and reproduc-
tion of inequality within the market system itself: the rates of return to various-sized operations, the 
degree of upward mobility within the marketing system, the ethnic and gender distribution of 
marketing participants in relation to individuals' functions, and the functions and sizes of 
enterprises. 
The way in which markets reproduce inequalities outside the system is often seen through the 
differential prices paid, and received, by different groups. For example, poor consumers may pay 
higher prices for their food, because they purchase in smaller quantities than wealthier ones. 
Similarly, poor farmers may receive lower prices for their output because they sell in smaller 
quantities; they are unable to store their produce, and/ or because they are locked into debt 
relationships with their buyers. 
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With reference to inter-sectoral inequalities, available price series data often demonstrate that the 
internal terms of trade have turned against agriculture over time. This may be due to inelastic 
demand for agricultural products, monopsonistic food markets depressing producer prices, market 
power located in the non-agricultural sector, or government policies which act against the agricul-
tural, or food-producing, sector. Similarly, analysing price series data may demonstrate increasing 
regional inequalities. 
Policy and Income Distribution Various market interventions to improve income distribution 
may be identified through such market analyses. Market imperfections often act against poorer 
consumers, producers and traders disproportionately, and increasing competition in these circum-
stances could also improve income distribution, through its effects on prices, access to the market, 
and levels of profitability. 
In competitive markets, the returns to economic activities should be proportional to resources 
invested, costs assumed, and risks and responsibilities undertaken. Similarly, where imperfect 
markets lead to higher and more unstable food prices, poor consumers are taxed to a greater degree 
than wealthier ones, because the former spend more of their income on food than the rich and their 
price elasticity of demand for food is higher. 
Likewise, in many LDCs, smaller farmers are often net consumers of agricultural commodities, 
whereas larger, wealthier ones are net suppliers. Reducing the price of food, through increasing 
market competition and capacity, or reducing the costs of production and/ or marketing, should 
therefore improve income distribution directly, but it can also have indirect beneficial effects. For 
example, lower food prices may increase demand for food products, which could lead to increased 
incomes and employment opportunities in the food and input production and distribution sub-
sectors. 
Alternatively, whilst recognizing the superiority of the market in terms of efficiently allocating 
resources, projects and programmes may have to be separately designed to counteract the inequal-
ities markets may produce. Thus, various targeted subsidization programmes could be operated 
alongside the market. For example, poorer market participants' access to resources, such as storage 
and finance, could be enhanced through specific subsidy projects. This could empower smaller 
traders' market position, relative to those who already have these resources, as well as increase 
competition. However, there remains a great need for better measures of income distribution, and 
also for other indicators of equity performance. 
Markets and Employment 
Analysing the relationship between marketing and employment is also important, not only because 
stable and full employment of all productive resources is one of the conditions of perfect competition 
and is necessary for the maximization of productive potential, but also because creating employment 
is often seen as one means of improving income distribution (Timmer, 1984, p.119). 
In imperfect markets, levels of employment will be partly determined by technical, operational 
and economic efficiency, since market power can lead, among other things, to an inflationary bias 
and excessive unemployment. 
Once again, means of defining and measuring under-employment in the marketing system, and its 
effects in other areas of the economy, remain problematic. Despite this, the potential effects markets, 
and market interventions, may have on employment and inflation, can at least be taken into account 
in research. 
For example, it has been argued that private trade is more labour-intensive than alternative forms 
of trading organization and requires much less capital for slightly less labour productivity (Harriss, 
1981, p.8). Similarly, the effects markets have on foodgrain prices can have implications for 
employment. Melior (1984, p.152) argues that, where increased food grain prices lead to an absolute 
reduction in the consumption of other goods and services by higher income groups, employment 
opportunities are significantly reduced as a result of the decline in real income suffered by these 
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classes. The presence or absence, and levels, of barriers to entry into markets may also affect the 
employment of resources in an economy. 
Food Security 
Markets, through their influence on incomes, prices and commodity flows, play a crucial role in 
determining national levels of production of, and consumer access to, food. There is a critical policy 
dilemma here between attempts to increase levels of food production nationally, and those aimed at 
ensuring all consumers have access to subsistence levels of food throughout the year. Not only do 
increased national levels of food production provide current insurance against poor harvests, natural 
disasters and volatile world food markets, but, in the long term, they may provide for lower food 
prices and improved consumer access to food. However, in the short term, providing farmers with 
the incentives to increase agricultural production and productivity, is likely to have a major negative 
impact on the consumption of the poor, especially those not engaged in agriculture. This dilemma is 
particularly stark in food price policies, where consumer and producer, and long- and short-run, 
goals are diametrically opposed. 
Assessment and Data Therefore, in looking at the relationship between food markets and food 
security, two important research issues often have to be addressed. Firstly, the effects markets are 
currently having on production and consumption must be defined, and secondly potential means of 
reducing disincentives in production and/ or nutritional inadequacies must be identified. 
Consumption The degree to which marketing and production, together, meet current demand in 
physical terms, can be evaluated. Insights into this can be gained by examining the effective 
availability of food throughout the year for different groups of consumers, and defining gaps in such 
access, along with their causes. For example, abrsolute levels of supply may not meet demand; 
physical flows may be interrupted; or some consumers may lack access to food at certain times of 
year due to excessive prices relative to incomes. 
Thus indicators of the effects markets have on consumption can be provided through analysing: 
• the stability of volumes of food flowing through consumer markets; 
• the levels and stability of consumer market prices, particularly those paid by poor consumers 
buying in small quantities; and 
• the ratios between various consumer incomes and food prices. 
Some of this data may be available from secondary sources but, where time and resources allow, 
surveys and interviews enquiring into volumetric flows and price ranges are often preferable. Poor 
consumers are often not represented in survey data and particular efforts must sometimes be made 
to obtain information on the nature of their access to food. 
Production The market availability of inputs and the price ratios between different inputs and 
outputs, need to be calculated for different crops grown on various sizes of farms, in a number of 
representative locations. Again the following are indicative of the relationship between food markets 
and food security: 
• the stability of volumes of food flowing through producer markets; 
• the level and stability of producer prices- particularly those received by small farmers; 
• the ratio between input costs and output revenues. 
Other factors influencing producer responsiveness to price incentives should also be assessed. For 
example, evaluations of extension and credit services may be available; the availability and price of 
high-yielding technology and consumer goods in rural areas can be noted; and the economic 
efficiency of input markets questioned. 
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Food security policy In terms of identifying policy options in facing the food security dilemma, 
there now appears to be a growing consensus amongst economists that, in an environment of rapid 
change, an increased reliance on the market will generate better long-run economic performance in 
production, than reliance on the public sector, and that equity and nutritional objectives should 
therefore be addressed through the design of specific programmes and projects, within a competitive 
market context. 
However, by assessing how and to what extent the market provides adequate and affordable diets 
for the population, and so contributes to national level food security, interventions can be designed 
that work with the market. These may be more effective, in terms of meeting food security objectives 
and minimizing budgetary burdens and production disincentives than those which take no account 
of the market. For example, deficiencies in consumer access to required foods can be the result of low 
incomes, inadequate supplies and / or high prices. Which combination can inform government 
policies on producer floor pricing, input supply, consumer and producer subsidization, food imports 
and food aid distribution. 
If the market is operating to provide available supplies at minimum cost, but low levels of 
production or storage lead to sea onally high prices, in the short-term, food aid could be distributed 
through the market at lower prices, and in the long-term, programmes aimed specifically at 
enhancing production and/ or storage can be implemented. If however, market imperfections are the 
cause of high prices and these cannot be overcome in the short-run, alternative distribution policies 
will have to be designed. 
Co-ordination Efficiency 
Definition This refers to the degree to which effective consumer demand is met by the production 
and marketing sub-sectors, and to which supply and demand are equalized at all levels of the 
marketing system. It is therefore closely linked with food security since consumer needs are 
transmitted to food producers through the marketing system. If the signals do not get transmitted, or 
traders are unable to respond to them, both producers and consumers will be taxed. 
Harrison et al. (1987, p.57) define a well-co-ordinated food marketing system as one in which: 
• consumers receive stable, adequate and reasonably priced supplies; 
• consumer and producer prices reflect biological production patterns; 
• storage, transport and processing costs equate with the differences between prices in time, form 
and space; 
• returns to farmers encourage production which satisfies consumer demand; and 
• markets clear. 
The neo-classical model of economic efficiency assumes consumer sovereignty, and subsequently 
focuses on the utilization of resources in production. Economically efficient markets should stimulate 
the production and distribution of the combinations of produce, and related services, that best reflect 
consumer preferences and real relative costs of production. However, given imperfect markets, and 
the importance of markets in individuals' access to food, the degree to which consumer demand is 
being recognized and met by the market can justifiably be analysed separately from economic 
efficiency issues. 
Economic and co-ordination efficiency The potential role of efficient price formation and transmission, 
in determining effective co-ordination, is important and should not be ignored. For example, the 
financial returns to farmers, in combination with other factors, influence their production decisions, 
and hence the relationship between the quantities and qualities produced, and those of aggregate 
demand. It has long been assumed that moving towards the conditions of perfect competition will 
improve markets' responsiveness to consumer needs. In some cases this may be sufficient for the 
effective physical co-ordination of the marketing system, but in LDCs other factors are also often 
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necessary. As Shaffer et al. (1985, p.310) point out, while economic efficiency is important for the static 
allocation of resources, it only relates to marketed surpluses and does not have a role in the 
effectiveness of supply and demand co-ordination and its potential contribution to increased 
productivity. 
Physical infrastructure and co-ordination efficiency Physical infrastructure is important; in particular 
that which enables traders to move commodities through time and space and provides all market 
participants with access to market information, means of communication and regularly used market 
places. Jones (1970) suggests that, over time, traders' profit maximization behaviour should lead to 
an effective demand for such facilities, but given the 'infant industry' status of private trade in many 
countries, means of enhancing market capacity and co-ordination efficiency, may legitimately be 
analysed separately from competition and static economic performance. 
Institutional organization and co-ordination efficiency Various institutional forms, like vertical inte-
gration, trader associations, farmer organizations, consumer co-operatives, and fixed contractual 
arrangements, may also enhance co-ordination, through the improvement of information and 
financial flows. For example, the vertical integration of production and marketing, within a single 
firm, centralizes information on consumer preferences and production possibilities, and hence 
improves the accuracy, and timely availability, of such information. However, it may also inhibit 
pricing efficiency, through diminishing the role markets play in price determination, and reducing 
competition. Therefore, the relative costs and benefits of each institutional form have to be evaluated 
in relation to objective priorities. 
Assessment In order to examine co-ordination efficiency, consumer demand characteristics must 
be delineated and the means by which production and marketing respond must be evaluated. In 
food marketing, the following can be assessed, although they are often difficult to quantify and, 
therefore, once again, the use of indicators may be necessary: 
• the stability and adequacy of supplies of nutritious and preferred foods; 
• consumer access to such foods in terms of location of sales and price relative to income; and 
• the returns to, and the timely availability and price of, inputs necessary for different types of 
food production. 
On the consumption side, Harrison et al. (1987, p.41) suggest that locational convenience, product 
assortment, regularity of supplies and relative prices in upper, middle and lower income neighbour-
hoods, can indicate the degree to which the system provides a relevant price and quality mix for each 
consumer group. If poor consumers are paying more for their food than wealthier ones (including 
the costs of travel to the point of purchase) some inefficiency is implied, whether couched in co-
ordination, pricing and/ or equity terms. 
Similarly, indicators of the effectiveness of co-ordination can be provided by questioning farmers 
about their cropping decisions, and the reliability of, and prices on, their input and output markets, 
and ascertaining whether traders actively promote products, and/ or relay information to producers 
about consumer demand. 
It is often alleged that traders in LDCs are passive co-ordinators, that they tend to accept a surplus 
and do their best to sell it profitably, but do not identify and promote new markets or potential means 
of improving supply to meet existing demand. If this is substantiated, then means of encouraging 
more active co-ordination on their part should be sought. For example, Harper and Kavura (1982) 
suggest that training and assisting traders to become active co-ordinators may be important in 
promoting producer and consumer satisfaction, and thus increased productivity. 
Again, both static and dynamic aspects of co-ordination efficiency can be addressed. For example, 
the ability of production and marketing to respond to qualitative and quantitative changes in 
effective consumer demand is important, since both these are expected with rising population and 
incomes. 
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Contradictions and Trade-offs 
There will always be some contradiction between these performance criteria and thus trade-offs will 
have to be accept d, and objectives prioritized. For example, there has been a long debate on the 
extent t which the mean of enhancing equity and economic fficiency cm1flict, at least in the short-
run. Li.kewi e, maximizing technical efficiency may be delet rious to employment levels, or to 
economic efficiency if cale ec nomies exist, and it engenders monopoly power. Stiff competition in 
the market place may inhibit technical innovation due to the risks and low profit margins implied. 
We have already seen that the high transaction costs of buying from small and dispersed producers, 
together with the lack of good market information, has often led to various institutional arrange-
ments, like forward buying and vertical integration, in order to reduce risks and costs. However, 
these may also lead to inefficient pricing, depressed producer prices, and greater inequality in 
income distribution through monopoly controls. Therefore, the reduced costs of marketing implied 
have to be assessed alongside these disbenefits. 
The emphasis of particular criteria over others will necessarily entail subjective judgement and 
political decision making. However, the costs and benefits of trade-offs can be evaluated, and the 
rationale behind choices or policy recommendations made explicit. A systematic framework of 
objectives is therefore crucial in policy research, since although it is impossible to trace all effects 
comprehensively, policies designed to achieve one goal will influence other dimen ions of perform-
ance. By constructing a trade-off matrix the most important relationships between objective criteria 
can be identified and characterized, as illustrated in Box 5:3. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARKETS 
The specific focus of any study will be dependent on project objectives. Here, the primary emphasis is 
on economic efficiency, but even then the terms of reference may require analysts to focu on the 
efficiency of a particular market function like storage; the operations of one type of participant like 
retailers; or the marketing of one commodity or group of commodities. Whatever the cope of the 
study, a conceptual framework of markets aids the organization of research and allows the 
incorporation of systemic connections. 
Reviewing the historical evolution of the economic analysi of ma1·ket and marketing reveals two 
important implications for current research into the performance of marketing systems. The first is 
that the field remains theor tically underdeveloped and that therefore (a) mud1 re earch is 
necessarily of an inductive nature, and (b) there is a need to combine various types of research and 
information in assessing performance criteria. The second is the need to combine analyses of the 
following since they all have a major impact on performance, however defined: 
• the internal technical and operational efficiency of the activities of enterprises; 
• the degrees of competition between functionally similar firms, i.e. 'horizontal' relations; 
• the nature of the relationships between different categories of firm within the marketing system, 
particularly those of exchange, i.e. vertical market relations; and 
• the relationship between the marketing, production and consumption systems and various 
environmental characteristics, i.e. systemic and environmental relations. 
Figure 2 depicts this conceptual approach to studying the economic efficiency markets and will 
provide a basis on which to discuss methodological means of analysis. 
The Historical Evolution of Economic Analyses of Markets 
Reviewing the historical evolution of economic market analyses helps organize research. In the 1940s 
and 1950s the main emp~asis in marketing economics was on the internal technical and operational 
24 
p 
Figure 2 A Conceptual Framework of Markets 
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efficiency of marketing firms. In this intra-firm organization, management structures, motivation and 
incentive arrangements, and decision-making rules and processes, were seen as important influences 
on the efficiency of operations. 
However, by their very nature, markets are systemic and all elements within them are linked. Since 
the 1960s, this characteristic of markets has increasingly been emphasized in defining means of 
analysing their efficiency. For example, the so-called structure, conduct, performance, or industrial 
organization, school focuses on the behaviour of groups of similar, rather than individual, firms, and 
the influence the horizontal relationships between these firms has on market performance. 
Similarly, the 'food systems framework' developed by Michigan State University, stresses vertical 
and horizontal relationships between the participants, institutions and functions related to a 
commodity, or group of commodities. All three of these main schools of marketing economics will be 
reviewed here, in order to provide a basis for a methodological framework. 
25 
-I 
The Internal Productive Efficiency of Marketing Enterprises 
French (1977, p.l60), in his thorough review of the literature on the analysis of productive efficiency 
in marketing, argues that we now have a good static theoretical framework for measuring costs, and 
analysing the efficiency, of individual firms. He divides approaches to estimating firm-level 
economic efficiency and cost relationships into three groups as follows: 
• descriptive analyses of accounting data; 
• statistical analyses of the same data, using econometric methods to estimate production function 
relationships; and 
• analyses which combine physical production and cost relationships, using engineering, biologi-
cal and other types of data on inputs and outputs of the production fucntion. 
All are aimed at the objective of improving technical and / or operational efficiency, but to this end, 
they have different sub-objectives. Only the first method will be reviewed here, because it is the least 
demanding in terms of time and data, and because it is more easily accessible to market participants. 
The other techniques are unlikely to be possible under the constraints of the type of research 
envisaged. 
Descriptive analyses based on accounts data are used to calculate average costs, and provide 
standards and data for cost comparisons between different types or sizes of firm. Various hypotheses 
can then be formulated to explain any differences in costs, by qualitatively assessing organizational 
characteristics of the firms. However, there is a danger in attempting to make generalizations about, 
and postulating causality between, the relationships between costs and firm characteristics because 
there are so many factors which can, and do, affect costs. For example, amongst other factors, 
economies of scale, different production techniques and organizational structures, location and 
environmental conditions, vertical or horizontal integration, managerial and other employee 
efficiency, remuneration and motivation, capital intensity, capacity utilization, rates of physical crop 
losses, and input prices all affect the costs of producing marketing services. These may or may not be 
easy to evaluate. For instance, ways of assessing managerial performance remain poorly developed. 
Aside from this problem of inference, assessing the internal productive efficiency of firms may also 
prove difficult due to non-availability of reliable data, and the need to standardize costs across 
various types of firm, using different accounting methods. However, this method is the simplest, and 
least data-hungry, available, and will therefore be returned to in Chapter 4. 
The Structure, Conduct, Performance School 
This provides a broadly descriptive model of the nature of various sets of market attributes, and the 
relationship between them and performance. The emphasis is not on the internal organization of 
firms, but on the relationships between functionally similar firms, and their market behaviour as a 
group.lts basic tenet is that, given certain 'basic conditions', the performance of particular industries 
depends on the conduct of its sellers and buyers, which in turn is strongly influenced by the structure 
of the relevant market. 
The school is not unified and there is much on-going debate within it. Despite being imprecise and 
controversiat a simplified outline of the approach is provided below, because it "provides the only 
well developed framework for examining behaviour of imperfectly competitive markets" (Marion 
and Mueller, 1983, p.l7). 
Performance is, as always, defined variously and much debated. Commonly the following 
characteristics of an industry, and its markets, are referred to, although the focus is usually only upon 
the first two: 
• productive and allocative efficiency; 
• 'progressiveness', 
• equity, and 
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• employment. 
Conduct refers to firm behaviour, for example pricing and selling policies and tactics; overt and 
tacit inter-firm co-operation, or rivalry, and research and development activities. 
The structure of the industry, or market, is defined as 'those characteristics of the organization of the 
market that seem to exercise strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within the 
market' (Bain, 1968, p.7). Three characteristics are usually stressed, namely the number and size 
distribution of firms in relation to the size of the market; the presence or absence of barriers to entry 
facing new firms, and physical, or subjective, product differentiation. In addition, the ratio of fixed to 
total costs, and degrees of vertical integration, are sometimes examined. 
Basic conditions refer to environmental, and supply and demand, characteristics which are 
exogenous to the market. They include for example legal and infrastructural frameworks, govern-
ment policies and cultural evaluations of co-operation or aggressive individualism, the location and 
ownership of essential raw materials, the nature of available technology, the durability of the 
product, temporal patterns of production, commodity weight:value ratios, the adequacy of grade 
descriptions, the degree of workforce organization, the price elasticity of demand at various price 
levels; the availability of, and cross-elasticity of demand for, substitutes, the rate of growth and 
variability of demand over time. 
Although the primary direction of determination is from basic conditions and structure, to conduct 
to performance, feedback effects are permitted. For example, sellers co-ordinating their prices, a 
behavioral characteristic, may affect the structure of the market by raising barriers to entry. However, 
these are rarely assessed, and usually analyses begin with a definition of structural characteristics, 
which are then used to classify industries, or their" markets, somewhere on a continuum between 
pure competition and absolute monopoly. These classifications then form a basis for predicting firm 
behaviour and economic performance. 
The most important hypothesis generated by this school holds that, as market or industry structure 
moves away from that depicted by the model of perfect competition, the degree of competitive 
conduct will decline and there will be a consequent decrease in output and allocative efficiency, and 
an increase in prices. But all classification systems have limitations in providing a base from which to 
make predictions, and many industries and markets cannot be adequately defined by these 
structural categories. For example, markets may be fragmented, in the sense that at different levels, 
or times of year, they have different structures and this model is unable to cope with such 
fluctuations. 
Problems faced by the school The school has been subject to much, and varied, criticism, but 
probably the two most important weaknesses are the degree of inference concerning behavioral and 
performance characteristics, and the types of indicator used to assess the latter. 
The structure of a market may provide the conditions for potential types of firm behaviour, but 
there is no necessary fulfilment of these, and therefore structure cannot be held to be absolutely 
deterministic of conduct and performance. For example, aggressive rivalry between a few firms may 
ensure that structurally oligopolistic markets exhibit characteristics of conduct and performance akin 
to those of the perfectly competitive model. Similarly, where significant scale economies exist, 
oligopolistic market structures may provide for better economic performance than atomistic and 
competitive ones. However, within this paradigm, there has been a tendency for inference to be 
accepted as proof- i.e. to leap from structural categorizations to performance characteristics. 
Industrial organization studies have largely concentrated on structure and performance, and, in 
particular, the relationship between industry concentration and firm profitability a indicator of 
these, whilst conduct J1as been relatively neglected. This is probably due to data and mea urement 
difficulties and the underdeveloped nature of the theory. As Helmberger et al. (1981, p.553) point out 
'in the absence of total independence and explicit collu ive agreement, .. .it is difficult to bserve and 
record the nature of competitive processes'. Thus, the determinants and effects of types of market 
conduct remain poorly understood. For this reason many continue to support the focus on structure, 
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and the inferential approach towards conduct. However, it can be argued that, through qualitative 
interviews and alternative research techniques, behavioral characteristics can be researched further. 
Similarly, the emphasis on the relationships between firms has lead to the neglect of the internal 
organization of firms and basic conditions as potentially major influences on the nature of 
competition in a market. 
Empirically defining the structure of markets in LDCs can be very difficult. However, the 
conceptual categories of structure, conduct and performance are useful organizational tools in 
research, and analysing structure enables the formulation of hypothe es about conduct and 
performance, which can then be tested through other means. Therefore mean of ru1alysing structural 
characteristics of markets are reviewed in Chapter 4, but it is stressed that these types of analyses 
should be combined with others, and that they should be used solely to generate hypotheses, not 
conclusions, about the competitive nature of markets. 
The Food Systems Framework 
In the late 1960s, Shaffer (1968, 1973) argued that there was a need to examine the nature of vertical, 
as well as horizontal, relationships between firms in assessing market performance, and to identify 
binding constraints on, or in, the system, and opportunities for enhancing its productivity and 
performance. This lead to the development of the food systems, or sub-sector, framework. 
It is based on the concepts of structure, conduct and performance, but attempts to broaden, and 
inject a more dynamic aspect into, the model. To this end, it goes beyond industry boundaries and 
assesses structure and conduct vertically and horizontally over the entire commodity flow from 
input supplier to ultimate consumer. The rationale behind this extension is that structure and 
behaviour at one level in the system, influences those in others. By analysing the structure of the 
whole sub-sector, hypotheses concerning the effects of the nature of vertical co-ordination between 
different, but related, industries, on market and economic performance, can be developed. (The 
French concept of filiere also takes the importance of vertical integration and vertical linkages into 
account. Broadly filiere means a commodity production and marketing chain.) 
The food systems framework also advances the structure, conduct, performance model, in 
addressing the potentials for change in the structures of supply and demand, and in particular the 
role markets can play in bringing these about. It therefore examines the problems of economic 
development and the static nature of the neo-classical model of perfect competition more directly. 
Thus, the economic, infrastructural and institutional environments in which markets are operating 
are not taken as given, but are studied in terms of (a) their impact on market performance, and (b) the 
constraints on and opportunities for markets to contribute to improved economic performance. 
Such constraints and opportunities are defined through interviews with market participants and 
local political leaders concerning their subjective evaluations, as well as through classical market 
analysis tools. The identification of managerial, institutional, technological and other innovations 
which would then lift constraints, and aid the realization of opportunities, is then stressed. 
There are two further aspects of the commodity systems approach. Firstly, it explicitly recognizes 
the importance of joint products (e.g., at the farm level- cotton and cotton seed; at the marketing 
level- channels which handle a number of commodities). Using a commodity systems perspective, it 
is possible to compare a number of distinct multi-commodity, marketing systems handling a related 
series of products. For example, the following could be compared: mall-scale informal traders, 
large-scale private traders, co-operative systems and parastatal trader . Secondly, it allows for the 
fact that enterprises may use the same facilities for producing/handling a number of commodities . 
For example, where a farmer produces and markets sorghum, millet, sunflower and cotton, an 
analysis which assumed that there was a such a thing as a sorghum marketing system would run the 
danger of obscuring important complementary and substitutional activities. 
In practice, in specifying the boundaries of sub-systems, the policy analyst has to make pragmatic 
judgements to: 
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• define a set of activities which have sufficiently strong inter-linkages to be sensibly described as 
a system or sub-system; and 
• arrive at a definition of a system which makes sense for the policy problem under examination. 
A comprehensive, standardized analytical and methodological approach has yet to be developed 
within this framework, but the emphasis on identifying constraints and opportunities, and on the 
interdependence between various markets and marketing functions, is important. 
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Chapter 3 
Data Collection 
• narrowing the research agenda 
• the availability and use of secondary data in LDCs 
• rapid reconnaissance techniques of primary data collection 
• data requirements for analysing the performance of agricultural markets 
This chapter discusses how and why to collect the basic data needed for any economic research in 
terms of primary data, secondary data, rapid-appraisal techniques. 
In order to know what data to collect, one first has to know the aims and objectives of the research. 
Sometimes this has already been clearly defined by very specific project terms of reference. More 
usually, these terms of reference are vague and the analyst will need to take some basic decisions on 
how to narrow the research agenda to fit the budget and the time available. 
Secondly, the chapter discusses secondary data in LDCs, in terms of sources, availability, use and 
evaluation. 
Thirdly, the chapter describes rapid appraisal techniques of primary data collection and their use 
in analyses of the market. These techniques have become important for two reasons. 
1. In a time of rapid change, policy decisions have to be taken very quickly. 
2. Long-term research is very expensive. 
Their limitations should be remembered, however, and they should be used in addition to, rather 
than instead of, more formal methods. 
Lastly, the chapter gives many examples of the types of data needed for market analyses, together 
with their sources and uses. The examples are presented on the basis of the model in Figure 2. 
DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Narrowing the Research Agenda 
Attempting to analyse entire national food systems with reference to various performance criteria is 
very rarely possible, given limited resources. Thus, most studies of LDC markets narrow the research 
agenda by concentrating on: 
• one or more major urban areas and their food sheds- i.e., the areas which supply their food; 
• one or more of the major food items in consumer diets; 
• one or more aspects of market performance, and/ or 
• particular market functions, channels, institutions or participants. 
The extent to which the research agenda is narrowed down will depend on the resources and 
secondary data available, and the depth and breadth of coverage, required. The choices made in this 
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narrowing-down process will usually be determined by the terms of reference, but they should 
always be explicitly justified, and should not lead the researcher to ignore systemic connections. 
Box 3:1 Criteria for Narrowing the Agenda 
For example, the choice of particular urban 
areas may be justified by their importance in 
terms of population numbers; their specific 
marketing problems or through reference to 
previous marketing studies. Similarly, areas 
in the food shed covered should be chosen 
to ensure some degree of representative-
ness. Regions with very different pro-
duction, or infrastructural, characteristics 
and/ or those which are the most important 
suppliers to towns, may be included. 
The commodities chosen for study will 
often be those which are most important in 
the national diet, but there may also be other 
reasons for coverage. For example, the 
Defining Research Objectives 
commodities focused on should be those 
with the greatest possible potential in pro-
duction, consumption and/ or food security, 
or those believed to suffer particular mar-
keting problems. 
Concentrating on specific market func-
tions, or participants, is likely to be based on 
perceived weaknesses in a certain level of 
the market, or on coverage in other market-
ing studies. For example, it might be sus-
pected that storage is inefficient in technical 
terms, or that wholesaling is being monopo-
lized, and thus research will be directed at 
the relevant elements within the market. 
It will be assumed here that the focus of research is specific to a commodity and region and aimed at 
assessing economic efficiency within the system itself, using the model of perfect competition as an 
initial standard for comparison. Despite this economic focus, much of the data collected in 
attempting to understand the operation of markets, and to assess their economic efficiency, can also 
be used to shed light on other performance criteria. 
Moreover, due to the dearth of information available about private markets and marketing in 
many LDCs, analyses will often have to begin by defining the existence of markets in space, time and 
commodity terms, and by describing how markets actually function and operate on the ground, 
before an evaluation of any performance attributes can begin. 
Having delineated the marketing sub-system research, a more detailed appraisal can identify 
where, when and for which commodities markets are working. In cases where they are, an attempt 
should be made to understand the causes, and to specify interventions to improve performance and 
the distribution of the gains from market efficiency (Timmer et al., 1983, p.164). 
In addition, the systemic linkages between the marketing, production and consumption sub-
systems, and the context in which they operate, will be taken into account. It is important to 
characterize these because of the two-way relationship between this overall context and the 
marketing sub-system. For example, the macro-economic, physical, legal, demographic and insti-
tutional environments within which markets operate, are likely to impinge on the nature and 
efficiency of the marketing system, and in some instances they will in turn be affected by the 
marketing system. 
THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF SECONDARY DATA IN LDCS 
In many LDCs a lot of little-used secondary data has been collected, but establishing both its 
existence and location is often very time-consuming, and it is very varied in quality. In attempting to 
evaluate such data, as much information on its collection should be obtained as is possible. For 
example, documentation of the rationale and objectives and means of collection may be available, 
and interviewing individuals involved in the process may provide insights into its quality. In 
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particular, it is useful to establish why and by whom, or what institution, the collection was initiated, 
and how and by whom it was implemented. Given the objectives and institutional background, 
researchers can speculate about likely biases within the data. 
For example, it may be possible to establish the fieldwork techniques used- the types, and means, 
of sampling undertaken, the questionnaires, interviews and case studies used, the observations 
made. How quantitative data were measured may also be revealing. In the latter case, for instance, 
reported monthly prices might be averages of prices obtaining through the month, or spot random 
samples. Weights and measures may not have been very accurate, and measures and grades used 
may not have been those used by traders, in which case the way in which conversions were 
calculated is interesting. It is also important when dealing with price data to attempt to establish 
whether prices refer to the same qualities and varieties of commodities, because, for example, 
products may change in nature and quality over a price series. If enumerators were used, finding out 
what incentives they faced and how they were supervised may also be instructive. 
Secondary data can also be subject to initial isolated analyses, in order to determine their internal 
consistency. For example, Goetz and Weber (1987, p.6) recommend graphically plotting quantitative 
data to provide a quick insight into trends and relationships, and their intuitive plausibility. They 
suggest that these exercises can be used to identify inaccurate recordings and to approximate missing 
values. Such data can also be cross-checked with different sources of related data; through interviews 
with market participants and knowledgable observers and, if the data are still being collected, 
current reportings can be compared against the researcher's own field observations. 
Major Sources of Secondary Data 
• Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, Finance, Industry and Planning 
• National Development and Commercial Banks 
• Regional and Local Development Agencies 
• Local and International research agencies and consultancies 
• International funding agencies 
• Development project managers, personnel and reports 
• Local and foreign universities; local student theses 
• Parastatal or other governmental agency annual reports 
• Private market research agencies 
• Producer organizations, for example co-operatives 
• Trader organizations, for example, trader associations 
• Licensing, taxation and foreign exchange allocation offices 
FIELDWORK AND PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION 
The focus of primary data collection will depend on the terms of reference and the secondary data 
available. Following the compilation and analysis of secondary data, information requirements need 
to be prioritized to ensure efficient primary data collection. Similarly, the objectives of, and resources 
available for, fieldwork, and the quality of secondary data, will influence the timing and length of 
field visits. For example, if the research is concerned primarily with the costs and productive 
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efficiency of storage, it may be preferable to undertake fieldwork when crops are being placed in, or 
released from, stores. Alternatively, where the research agenda is more diffuse, it is often the case that 
traders have more time to participate in interviews during the off-, or pre-harvest, season. 
Where time and resources allow, formal sample surveys of market participants may be under-
taken. There is a large literature on these (e.g., Casley and Lury, 1987) and they will not be covered 
here. Conversely, in many instances rapid appraisal, or reconnaissance, techniques will be necessary. 
It is they, rather than formal techniques, which we concentrate on here since much less has been 
written about these in respect to marketing analyses, and they are likely to be increasingly used. 
Fieldwork Techniques - Rapid Reconnaissance 
Holtzman (1986) provides the most comprehensive formulation to date of rapid appraisal techniques 
applied to marketing systems, and much of what follows is derived from his work. He defines a rapid 
reconnaissance survey as 'a broad and preliminary overview of the organization, operation and 
performance of a food system, or components thereof, designed to identify system constraints and 
opportunities'. 
Distinguishing characteristics of rapid appraisal research, include the following (Agricultural 
Administration, 1981; Chambers, 1983; IDS Bulletin, 1981): · 
• narrowing the content, and temporal and spatial dimensions, of the agenda (as described 
above); 
• a reliance on secondary data where possible; . 
• informal fieldwork techniques; 
• an emphasis on indicators, including the direction and order of magnitude of quantitative data, 
rather than detailed measurements; and 
• the use of simple forms of data analysis. 
This approach to research has become increasingly necessary and accepted over the last decade. 
The necessity arises from the prohibitive costs of long-term research, and the greater emphasis being 
placed on policy, as opposed to projects, in the development agenda. Long-term, data-intensive, 
analyses are often unable to meet the temporal demands of policy decision making. Rapid appraisal 
techniques, in spite of their limitations in certain dimensions, have also been shown to provide 
valuable and accurate data. Rapid appraisal fieldwork techniques can be classified into three forms, 
each of which will be reviewed below, namely: 
• direct observation, and observational surveys; 
• market participant, and knowledgable observer, interviews and case studies; and 
• analyses of marketing enterprise records. 
Direct Observation and Observational Surveys 
Direct observation 'By directly observing marketing processes and functions, investigators are 
able to identify marketing problems and evaluate what key informants say about the organization 
and operation of the system against what is actually observed' (Holtzman, 1986, p.47). Direct 
observation can lead to subjective judgements on, for example, the qualities and adequacy of 
infrastructure and facilities, and of the characteristics of some marketing functions, participants and 
transactions. Thus, the following types of phenomenon can be initially assessed through observation: 
• the general state of roads, vehicles used for transporting foodstuffs, stores, mills and market 
places; 
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• demand relative to supply seen in queue formations, for example; 
• haggling and bidding in price formation; 
• quantities involved in cash and commodity exchanges; 
• the quality of physical handling and packaging; and 
• the availability of market information through mass media, etc. 
Direct observation can also be made more systematic; for example, through following a specific 
unit of produce along the marketing chain from farmer to consumer, or following the whole range of 
a particular wholesaler's activities. However, direct observation will not enable judgements concern-
ing the hierarchy of binding constraints on market capacity or efficiency. 
Observational surveys These can be used on a localized scale to various ends. For example, if 
sample population characteristics cannot be determined through secondary sources, an informal 
survey may be sufficient to provide the basis of a sample frame. If the project is confined to a single 
urban area or market place, observational surveys will often be able to furnish investigators with 
rough indications of numbers of different types of participant active in the market in the current 
period. This is particularly the case where market participants are spatially grouped according to 
commodity and function, as is common in many LDC market places. These characteristics of the 
population can then be used to construct categories of participant from which to subsequently select 
representative interviewees. 
Similarly, observational surveys can be used to count the numbers of different-sized vehicles 
entering and leaving, various market places, and bags of a particular commodity or group of 
commodities loaded and unloaded, through one or more days. 
The data obtained from observational surveys can then be cross-checked for their accuracy and 
representativeness, through interviews with market officials and participants, or other knowledge-
able observers. 
Interviews and Case Studies 
Because of the dearth of information on private marketing available through secondary sources in 
many countries, market participant and knowledgeable observer interviews will often be the source 
of the bulk of data concerned with the marketing sub-system. In addition, such interviews are 
necessary to ascertain subjective perceptions concerning marketing constraints and opportunities, 
and detailed information about the nature of marketing, and the costs and prices obtaining. 
Informal interviews Under the conditions of rapid appraisal, using formal questionnaires will 
probably not be possible, unless the research is highly specific and localized. Similarly, where there is 
a dearth of information about private marketing the use of questionnaires is inadvisable in the first 
instance. However, some idea of the questions to be addressed, and the best way in which to do so, 
should be decided in relation to research objectives. 'Informal interviews will be structured in the 
sense that the intention is to cover important topics in a preferred sequence. Yet they will be 
unstructured in the sense that interviewers will be able to vary the length and format of an interview, 
probing promising lines of inquiry in depth, where feasible, or adhering to non-controversial or less 
sensitive topics where necessary. .. Allowing informants enough flexibility to discuss issues and 
topics which interest them or problems which they find especially bothersome can have high pay-
oHs. Investigators can often uncover unexpected in-sights in this way' (Holtzman, 1986, p.SS). 
Harrison et al. (1987, p.l24) similarly recommend the use of 'detailed interview guides' rather than 
structured questionnaires. 
Case studies These are defined by Casley and Lury (1987, p.64) as involving 'the detailed 
examination of a relatively few persons or items'. The techniques entailed in case studies are wide-
ranging and flexible, including for example, close observation, analyses of records, detailed dialogue 
with respondents and possibly participation by researchers in the relevant activity. Case studies are 
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often concerned with the same types of information as interviews, but are much more detailed. They 
are particularly useful where attitudinal, historical and/ or sensitive data are required. Because they 
are time-intensive, and produce results less amenable to generalization, they are usually best 
combined with informal surveys. Surveys are often used as a basis on which to choose particular case 
studies, and the latter may influence the issues to be addressed in the survey. 
Numbers of interviews The types and numbers of interviews and case-studies undertaken will 
depend on project objectives and resources available, the quality and quantity of information 
obtainable from secondary sources, and the numbers and heterogeneity of enterprises in the 
population. Some trade-off between breadth and depth of coverage will usually have to be made, 
and the resultant mix of direct observation, observational and interview-based surveys, and in-depth 
case studies decided upon. However, an attempt should always be made to actively counter-balance 
common biases in rapid appraisal studies against disadvantaged groups, like the very poor and 
women, and to ensure representative coverage as far as is possible. 
Where to start If information concerning the total population cannot be obtained from secondary 
sources, observational surveys or knowledgable observers, Holtzman (1986, p.SO) suggests that 
strategically placed market participants, such as large-scale wholesalers or processors should be 
interviewed before others. 'They are typically more knowledgeable about the organization and 
operation of the entire marketing system than other participants and ... will have more of a systems 
perspective about the inter-relationships among parts of the system and resulting system perform-
ance' . The information obtained from such interviews can further direct the fieldwork effort. For 
example, subsequent interviews can be carried out with those participants with whom wholesalers 
and / or processors deal. 
Historical data and group interviews Interviewing participants who have been trading over many 
years may provide information on various historical aspects of, and changes in, marketing practices 
and policies. As Harriss notes (1981, p.23) 'to some extent...the problem of the absolute brevity of 
fieldwork is eased by drawing wherever possible from merchants' life histories'. 
Group interviews, with a number of relatively similar traders, whether formally organized or the 
result of spontaneous voluntary participation, can generate a lot of information in a short space of 
time; encourage reticent informants to contribute and serve as a forum for debate, for example, 
concerning trader perceptions of binding constraints and major opportunities. However, where one 
or two individuals appear to dominate such a group, emergent findings should not be generalized, 
and the utility of the exercise may be greatly diminished. 
Anonymity and consistency If possible, all interviews should be conducted anonymously and 
confidentially. This may overcome the tendency towards misrepresentation due to fears of taxation 
or the sensitive nature of phenomenon like credit relations and rates of profitability. Consistency 
checks can be built into informal interviews in a number of ways: 
(a) questioning interviewees about internal inconsistencies in their responses; 
(b) questioning inconsistencies between their responses and those of other interviewees; 
(c) using different sets of questions to obtain the same information; 
(d) asking the same questions of a variety of participants performing similar functions along a 
particular market route; 
(e) asking the same questions of people working at adjacent stages in the marketing chain; and 
involved in transactions with one another; 
(f) cross-checking information from group interviews with that from individuals. 
Recording the information Data gathered from interviews should be recorded in a way which as 
Uninhibiting, and as temporally efficient, as possible. Tape recording interviews can be highly 
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Box 3:2 Key Informants (adapted from Holtzman, 1986, p.53,54) 
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INFORMANT 
Small 
Consumers 
Farmers 
Market 
Officials 
Civil 
Servants 
Bank Loan 
Officers 
Informal 
Money lenders 
Extension 
Agents 
NGOs 
Development 
Agencie 
Missionaries I 
Volunteers 
ADVANTAGES 
Detail d knowl.edge of consumer marke~; th 
season11lity and levels of consumer priC<'.s; pre-
ferred products, qualities and val"ieties ~nd 
other consumpt·ion characteristics. Can provtde 
information on consumer pref~ences regard· 
ing different types of retailing operation. 
Detail d knowledge of loCi11 i•\pltt and output 
markets, and of the advantages and di adv,,n-
tages of different buyer · and sellers iJ1 these; of 
producer price and levels of marketed surplu 
and stocks i11 local area; of costs of, and crop 
loss in, storage; of marketing and production 
practices, and the rationale f01· these. 
Easily loca ted and usually willing to be inter· 
view d . C.1n often provide much information 
on numbers, and si?.es of dill rent categories of 
trading firms nnd on m;~rket supply, demand 
and price trends manifest in market places 
under their jurisdiction. Deti'liled knowledge of 
mar\tet regu lations; costs of paying for rox ; 
licences and !"enHng st:alls 'in local market 
places. l'ay have detailed know!edge of organ.i-
zation of marketing, and of constraints c111d 
opportunities facing traders . 
6asily located. Knowledg of national and local 
government policies and regulations 110ncern-
iJ1g market·ing, and official r11tionaJe for these; of 
secondary ources on regional, and national, 
den1and and supply i.tuations and trends; of 
numbers of d ifferent types of trnder registered 
and licensed; of levels of turnover reported, and 
of taxes imposed and recuperated. 
Ensily located and stationarr. C.1n provide 
information on conditions o lending; bank 
interest rates a.nd demand for official credit 
from marketing sect r, and 011 the pattern of 
use to which such loans are put. May have 
knowledge of larger firm ' operations, nsse , 
turnover and gross returns. 
Detailed information on tern1s and conditions 
of h1formal I nding including interest rates; 
rates of demand for irlformru credit nd of 
defaulting on loans; on use of loans and ch~rac­
teristics of lTaders Uke asset ownership, tum-
over, profitability. 
May have detailed information on fam1ers' pro-
duction ru1d marketing practices; local producer 
price, and demand and supply, pattems for 
mputs and output ; and fam1 characteristics 
llke size distribution, !technology utilization and 
cropping patl rns. 
Knowledge of secondary sources availabl and 
their reliability. Often involved in locall7.ed 
project with detailed knowledge of production 
and/or consumption problems faced by poor· 
est dec;lles; may b > willing to provid infor-
mation on sensi tive issues, lik government 
policies and their effects on, or corrupt·io11 in, 
the marketing sy t m. 
Knowledge of secondary sources available and 
their reliability and of unpublished or on-gou1g 
research. Detailed knowledge of international 
lending Institutions and governmental policies 
and aims; of nnlionallevelmarkel' character! -
tic~nmd imports and exports. 
May be able to describe difficult· to bscrve 
phenomena; have detailed knowledge of local 
production, COilSUmption and marketing, and 
may be willing to discus sensitive issues. 
DISADVANTAGES 
Knowledge of consumption matters likely to be 
highly specific to ocio-economic group and 
local area, therefore important to icfentify nnd 
interview range of consumers. May over-state 
price levels; be subject to common image f 
exploitative traders, and have no kn wfedge 
how market work or , re organized. 
A with consumers, knowledge of production 
and marketi11g may be highly localized and 
sodo-economicnlly pecilk May adopt 
uncriHcally view f cxploiti'ltive traders; lack 
knowledg of marketing system beyond first 
handfu1g stage, and understate prices received. 
May be umvill ing to discuss how stalls, licences 
etc. are aUocatcd. May desire to protect traders', 
or local governments', lntere ts. Unlikely to 
know much about rural marketing practices if 
located iJ1 urban areas, and vice versa, or about 
other areas of the marketing chain. 
May lack details of how market operate on the 
ground and be subject to common image of 
exploitative traders and popular, but unsub-
stantiated, views of production and con ump-
tion patterns and problems. 
May lack knowledge of how markets operate. 
Only likely to have information onlarg<'St trad-
ing concern . May make judgements on ba i of 
narrow rate of return criteria, and may be 
~mwilling to provide information about bor· 
rowers' operations. 
Usually extremely difficult to identify and 
locate and unwilling to be interviewed concern-
ing money lending activities. May provide mis-
leading information. 
May hav n knowledge of how markets oper-
ate beyond first handling sti'lge. May be biased. 
towards larger farmers in production infor-
mation. May have too few resources tocany out 
many field trips and therefore primary know!· 
edge of production sys tems may be limited. 
May lack information on how markets operate 
and are organized on the ground. 
May lack detailed information of how markets 
operate and are organized on the ground. 
Knowledge of production, consumption and/ 
or l'narketing may be highly localized. May not 
have d tailed information on how markets 
operal or arc organi:o-.ed on the ground. 
Box 3:2 Continued 
INFORMANT 
Wholesalers 
Assemblers 
Processors 
Transporters 
Retailers 
Importers/ 
Exporters 
Commission 
Agents 
Producer Co-ops 
Trade 
Associations 
Parastatal 
Managers 
Institutional/ 
Large consumers 
Researchers 
ADVANTAGES 
Located at system node, thus systems 
perspective. 
Knowledge of production, stocks, flows, prices 
and demand in different rural and urban areas. 
Often the major storers, ;md therefore may pro-
vide information on costs of, returns to, magni-
tudes, tempera! dimensions and rationales of, 
storage. 
Knowledge of exchange arrangements with 
farmers and wholesalers; and of supplies, 
stocks and prices in particular rural areas. 
Systems perspective; knowledge of demand for 
processing services and for by- and end-
products; costs and prices f processing; differ-
ent technologies available and transformation 
rates etc. 
Knowledge of spatial and temporal commodity 
flows- magnitudes, directions and seasonality; 
and of costs of transport services. 
Stationary and therefore more easily located 
and often with time to undertake interviews. 
Knowledge of consumer desires, and needs, 
and of retailing operations, costs and price 
movements. 
Knowledge of magnih.tde, timing and prices of 
imports and exports; and of organization, costs 
and pdces, regulations and requirements of 
Importing and exP.orting. Will often have 
ilccounting records tf operating legally, a these 
may be required by government. 
Systems perspective; knowledge of supply and 
demand situation, wholesaling activities and 
prices in urban area. 
Knowledge on roles, rationale and magnitude 
of public sector marketing interventions; 
detailed records on buying, storin~ and selling 
timlngs, areas, quantities and priCeS, and on 
costs of publlc se~tor marketing. 
Knowledge of services in demand, and there-
fore of constraints in trade; and of numbers, 
sizes and characteristics of member firms. 
Same as !or producer co-ops. In addition may 
be involved in implementing food aid policies, 
storage and imports/exports, and may provide 
information on these. 
Likely to have records of activities, and 
accow1ts. Knowledge of seasonality of supply 
and wholesaler transactions and possibly of 
importing. Stationary and therefore easy to 
lo01te and Interview. 
Detailed knowledge of secm1dary sources avail-
able an? their quality and reliability, and of 
unpublished and on-going surveys, research 
projects etc .. 
DISADVANTAGES 
Often very busy and mobile and thus difficult to 
interview at le11gth, henc advantages of trav-
clling with them on business. May over-
estimate costs, and lmder-estlma returns and 
turnover. 
Knowledge of market conditions and activities 
may not extend beyond rural area of operation, 
and buying from farmers and selling to whole-
salers. May over-est·imate costs and under-
estimate returns. 
May under-report throughput and size of oper-
ation depending on tax laws. Smaller mlllers are 
unlikely to keep records. 
Unlikely to know about detailed operations of 
market, and marketing activities, as often not 
involved in buying and selling commodities 
themselves. High degree of mobility and may 
be difficult to interview. Nfay over- and under-
report costs and returns respectively. 
Often wlll not have knowledge of markets and 
marketing b yond urban/rurnllocatio.n. 
Unlikely to have detailed knowledge about 
domestic marketing. Likely to be unwilling to 
be interviewed if illegal, or to provide infor· 
mation on aJllhe costs of their activities if these 
involve bribery etc. May over-estimate costs 
and under-estimate returns. 
Unllkely to keep records; may be unwilling to 
discu contractual arrangements; may under-
estimate returns and over-estimate costs; may 
under-report turnover depending on tax laws. 
May be elite-dominated and not accurately rep-
resent all producers. May be government 
appointees and not represent membership. 
Unlikely to have detailed knowledge of private 
sector marketing. 
May be elite-dominated and unrepresentative 
of diverse interests; may be unwilling to be 
interviewed, or be misleading, in an attempt to 
protect traders' interests. 
May be unwilling to divulge records, or be 
interviewed, depending on sensitivity of oper-
ations; may know little about private sector. 
Unlikely to have knowledge of marketing sys-
tem, or of other consumers' relationships with 
the market. 
lt\forrnation may be .highly specific and related 
to particular research projects undertaken; it 
may not included tails on marketing practices, 
problems, organization, c sts and ret1.1ms of 
dUfercnl participm1ts. 
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inhibiting, and hill h·anscription i very time-consuming. Conv~rsely, attempting to avoid. any 
recording during the interview may lead to much important data bemg lo t. Therefore,. ome wntten 
record wiil usually have to be taken during interview. However, th re are vanous ways of 
minimizing th effects this has on the length of intervi w time. For example, the sequence of common 
Box 3:3 Example Intervi w Guides 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE USED BY AUTHORS IN CAMEROON, MALAWI, TANZANIA, 1990 
Trader Classification: interview number, functional category, gender, ethnic/religious 
identity, age group, place, location - i.e., market place, home etc., 
status in firm 
Nature of Business: number of commodities and functions dealt in, temporal dimensions 
f involvement :in sp cific marketing activities, other businesses/ 
employment engaged in, assets owned/rented, ownership arrange-
ments, e.g., individual own r operator, partnership, family; other 
Size of Business: tw·novet~ assets, stocks, credits/loans, total value 
Organization of Operations: marketing activities ngaged in, buying and selling loca-
tions, to/from wh m and where go ds/services are 
bought/ sold, reasons for these, seasonality of these; source 
of market information, contact and pt;ce agreement mech-
anisms, mea11s of tra11sport, torage, processing used, avail-
ability, and organization of u e, age of facilities, capacity, 
and rates of utilization, rates of transformation in milling, 
and commodity los es in other functions 
Unitary Costs, Prices Returns: current examples, maximwn and minimum over last year, 
break down of costs, including prices of commodities and 
input and physical eo 1m dity losses 
Other Costs: overheads like general maintenance and permanent labour, licences, taxes, 
stall/ store rentals, depreciation on buildings and machinery, family mone-
tary needs 
Labour: types and numbers of labourers employed, remuneration, availability of labour I 
work 
Credit and finance: borrowing and/ or lending activities, occupational id entity of lenders I 
borrowers, motivations for lending and borrowing, quantities 
involved, igibility I securiti.e , terms and conditions of repayment, 
use of larger loan if available 
Profitability: value of assets, stocks, labour bill, annual turnover, income, costs and profits 
for last year, comparison with previous years 
Use of Profits: expansion of current trading operations or other businesses, family 
subsistence, new ventures 
Trading History: numb r of years in busine s, level of entry, reasons for entering trade, 
reason for dealing in particular functions alld conunodities, initial 
capita] r quirements, source of initial capital, estimates of current entry 
requirements, means of tra.in.ing, learning, building up contacts, mem-
bership of trader, worker, farmer organization 
Previous, and Other, Economic Activities: size and typ of farming, f01·mal mployment, 
reasons for I aving, other busines s, how 
concurrent activities ar managed, divisions of 
labour, time tc. 
questio11s can be memorized, and answers coded accordingly; quantitative data may be recorded 
dw·ing the iJ1terview whilst qualitative data may be written up immediately after each one and a 
shorthand can be developed. If there is more than one interviewer, standardizing the format of 
interviews is obviously essential for comparative purposes. 
Box 3:3 Continued 
THE STANDARD MARKETING SCHEDULE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PROJECT ON 
AGRARIAN CHANGE included the following types of data (see Appendix 1, Harriss, 1981): 
SAMPLE INFORMATION: interview number, type, place, date, time taken, interviews, individuals 
present, rapport 
PERSONAL INFORMATION: job, place of birth, age education, caste, religion 
FAMILY: relatives, their ages, education, work, location 
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY: type of occupatio11, employed/self employed, time periods, places. 
BUSINESS INFORMATION: 
Other current occupations/businesses, part time/voluntary work, 
land own d, irrigation, means of cultivation, land rental relations, 
crops grown, means of mark ting, ther property 
Assets: ownership (co-operative/family/parh1ership/own/employee) date of starting trade, com-
modities traded, premis sand equipment 
Initial capital: date, purpo e, value, source, loan details 
Business Size: total value of share, number of shareholders, value of deposits, number of depositors, 
cash value of stock, cash on hand, credit loaned or borrowed, buildings/ equipment, 
current value, value of survey commodity, capital turnover period 
Money Borrowed: purpose, value, freque11cy, source, security, interest rate, repayment 
Use of profits: ploughed back, dividends, land, education, property, jewellery, family consumption, 
lent out/ paid back 
Annual Running Costs: rental on land, buildings and machinery, r placing equipment, general 
maintenance, depreciation, permanent labour, telephone, storage, fuel, 
transport, stationery, po tage, .travel, taxes, licences, repayment and 
interest on loans, entertainment, conting ncies, other 
Employment: family, non-family, jobs, type of labour, caste, years, days per year, pny, average per 
week, rumuaJ bill, time off for agriculture, changes in numbers of waged employees, 
increase in turnover necessaq to increase labour force by one, 1 ngth of training, 
mobility, organization, relationship with employer, other types of labour or work 
Commissions: n t profit/unit (range and losses) 
Annual Turnover/Income: sales and rental, item, unit, qua11tity, value 
Storage and Transport Facilities: type, number, overh ads, age, capacity, location, value 
Storage Practices over year: commodity, month, maximum, minimum, average, buffer 
Milling: commodity, type, engineering capacity, location, number of day working, average number 
of hour per day; average quantity milled/day, total actually milled/year, desirable 
throughput, conversion ratio , differen.t types of commodity, costs/charg per unit for 
different varieties, profits, range and average, quantities, use, prices, income and destina-
tions of by-products 
Sources of Goods Bought: item, types and numbers of seller, qum1tity bought, purchase price, 
payment, marketing costs, trausport costs, place of origi:n of seller 
Major Destinations of Goods Sold: item, major buyers, numbers, quantity bought, minimum and 
maximum, selling price, payment and quantity of cash, place of 
origin/de tination of buyers 
Services Rendered: lending to buyers and seller , quantity currently lent, maximum and minimum 
lent, interest rate, security, repayment, defaulter , changes in last 5 years, 
numbers, quantities and purposes of loans, effect of not lending, information on 
prices and news, moisture and dirt testing, transport, cost , destinations, 
frequency and purposes, storag for client, extensi.on 
BUSINESS HISTORY: trade expansion, old technology replacements, change in organization of 
marketing/varieties, new and collapsed businesses 
MANAGEMENT: ordering goods, months, items, methods, sizes, waiting times, payment methods, 
etc. 
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Analyses of Enterprise Records . . 1 t over a number of years, can E · · 1 d f k t. ng participants of eac 1 ea egory, · xamtnmg t , r c r s o: mar 1 . f d t However often such records are not 
"d l . f f the followmg types o a a. ' provL e roue , m or~a 10 11 0 11 d . t" 1 and surveys, interviews and case studies are therefore available, or th y ar ma ura te an par Ia' 
likely to remain important. 
• Geographical and temporal commodity flows; 
• The volumes of particular commodities bought, stored, processed, transported and sold, and 
hence the technical efficiency of operations; 
• Purchase and sale prices, and the costs of, and returns to, various operations, at different times of 
year, i.e., indicators of operational and pricing efficiency; 
• Degrees of commodity or functional specialization, diversification, seasonal shifts and vertical 
integration; 
• Types and values of asset ownership; 
• Credit and employment relations, and remuneration to different types of employees; 
• Involvement in other economic activities etc. 
TYPES OF DATA REQUIRED FOR VARIOUS MARKET 
ANALYSES 
Specific data requirements will depend on the project objectives, as well as on the secondary sources 
available. Some examples of the types of data necessary for understanding the organization and 
operation of food markets, and assessing their technical, operational and economic efficiency, are 
provided below. If the terms of reference are highly focused, it is unlikely that data from each of the 
categories set out below will be required. Conversely, the examples provided are not exhaustive, and 
other types of information may be necessary. 
There are many possible ways of conceptually organizing the data requirements for market 
analyses. Here, they are broadly categorized, as shown below, along the lines of the conceptual 
framework depicted in Chapter 2 p.25, although there is much overlap between categories and 
sources are often shared. For example, because the internal workings of firms, and their horizontal 
and vertical relationships, are all closely related, much of the data required to analyse the nature of 
any one of these aspects of the market will also provide insights into one, or both, of the others. Thus, 
data on costs, prices, profitability, credit and information are likely to provide analysts with the 
means to form hypotheses about all three of these phenomena, and their inclusion in one or another 
of the following sub-sections is an arbitrary matter. 
The Macro-Environment 
As described above, the macro-environment refers to the demographic, ecological, legal, institutional 
and other contexts within which markets, production and consumption take place. Through 
assessing the nature of these environments, the degree to which inefficiencies in, and constraints on 
improvements of marketing are rooted within the system itself, or in external factors, can be 
determined, and policy aimed in the relevant direction. Government policies and transport 
infrastructure are focused on below, because they are thought to be particularly important in their 
effects on market performance. 
Government Policies and Laws 
Government policies and objectives set down the rules and regulations of marketing; determine the 
nature of public participation in, and/ or regulation of, marketing, and they influence markets and 
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Box 3:4 Categories of Data Requirements 
THE MACRO-ENVIRONMENT 
Government policies and laws 
Infrastructure 
Linked markets 
THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION SUB-SYSTEMS 
Population and consumption data 
Agriculture and/or food production 
THE MARKETING SUB-SYSTEM 
Innate and market-related commodity characteristics 
Spatial and temporal commodity flows 
Institutional commodity flows and marketing chains 
Identifying market channels 
Categorizing market participants 
Market functions 
Market activities 
Buying and Selling 
Storage 
Transport 
Processing 
Intra-firm organization 
Resource utilization and allocation 
Technical and operational efficiency 
Profitability 
Horizontal relationships between firms 
Number, and size and spatial distributions, of firms 
Barriers to entry 
Trader, producer and consumer organizations 
Vertical relationships between firms 
Costs and prices 
The organization of exchange 
Information 
Credit 
marketing through their effects on macro-economic variables. Conversely, markets may also have an 
effect on both macro-economic variables and government policies, for example through trader 
organizations and their political demands. 
Most of the data on government policies and interventions affecting marketing can be obtained 
through secondary sources, in particular, development agency and ministerial reports. However, 
interviews with civil servants, bank managers, market participants and public-sector marketing 
institution managers, can provide further insights into the nature of government policies; the 
effectiveness of their implementation and their implications for the marketing system. In some cases, 
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the effectiveness and influence of such policies may be observed in the market place- for instance the 
degree to which standard weights and measures are used. 
The following government policies are examples of those likely to be important in most market 
analyses, although again the list is not comprehensive: 
• The existence, and nature, of direct intervention policies, public marketing institutions, their 
mandates and functions, their buying and selling practices and prices; 
• The existence and levels of governmentally determined floor and ceiling prices; the means, and 
effectiveness, of defending these; 
• Policies leading to the implicit or explicit subsidization and taxation of agricultural, or 
marketing, inputs or outputs; 
• Commercial/trading licensing laws and procedures, and other regulatory laws; 
• Taxation policies pertaining to traders, and their incomes, and the imposition of other market 
charges; 
• Laws concerning storage practices, for example ceilings on volumes; 
• Legal, or other, restrictions on the directions and volumes of commodity flows; 
• The institution of standardized weights; measures; varieties and quality grades; 
• Restrictions on, and direct intervention in, food imports and exports, together with food aid 
policies; 
• Governmental provision of market information, trader training, and trader access to commercial 
credit; 
• Macro-economic policies, particularly exchange, interest and wage rate policies. 
Infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure plays an important role in constraining the feasibility of transactions, and in 
determining the costs and influencing the economic efficiency of marketing. For example, poor 
transport and communication networks may lead to remote producers facing low prices and a very 
limited number of buyers, and to high transport costs and thus higher consumer, and/ or lower 
producer, prices. In some LDCs, transport infrastructure is one of the most binding constraints on 
increasing the extent, capacity and economic efficiency of domestic markets. 
Again, most of the data required here can be obtained from secondary ources, particularly from 
government offices and previou infrastructural tudies. This information can then be supplemented. 
with direct observation of the nature and qualily of facilities available in local areas, and with market 
participants' subjective perceptions of their adeq acy. The loca tion and quality of infrastructural 
facilities can then be recorded and illustrated through mapping. For example: 
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• Transport networks - types, spatial coverage, quality and passibility; 
• Vehicle numbers, repair and maintenance services, rail capacity and costs, fuel and spare parts' 
availability and prices; 
• Telecommunications- numbers and distribution of phones, costs, effective operation, costs and 
reliability of postal system; 
• Market places -location relative to centres of production and consumption, size, number, types 
and quality of infrastructural facilities provided. Different types of market place can be 
1 
dis lingttished on institutional, infrastructural, temporal and functional grounds: for example, 
para tatal or eo- perative buying and selling points and rural, village and urban market places 
or assembly, redistributive and terminal market places; 
• Numbers, types, capacities and spatial distribution of processing plants and storage facilities . 
The Production and Consumption Sub-Systems 
The relationships between marketing and production or consumption are dialectical. The structure 
of production and consumption, supply and demand, determine th essentialnature of the domestic 
marketing problem. Similarly, the effects markets have on the level and nature of production and 
consumption are of crucial importance in economic development, income distribt1tion and food 
security. Analysts may be concerned with the effects of the market system on production and/ or 
consumption, and/ or the implications of the latter for marketing. 
Population and Consumption Data 
Population, income and consumption parameters are important in providing indicators of the 
demand characteristics of markets, and the implications of these for the production and marketing 
sub-systems, and for assessing the degree to which production and marketing meet effective 
demand. The way in which the marketing system influences the relationship between consumer 
incomes and the availability and price of staple foods is likely to be an important research issue in 
analyses of markets and consumption. Similarly, understanding current demand characteristics, and 
the ways in which markets respond to these, may indicate ways in which markets can poten tially 
influence demand. 
Secondary data In many LDCs, much data concerned with consumption will be available at a 
natio.nallevel from secondary sources. This is particularly the case where consumer price indices are 
calculated, and hous hold budget surveys and population censuses are w1dertaken. In addition, 
food balance sheets, specific consumption studies, and estimate of demand elasticities and 
projections, may be available. 
If both household budget and food balance data are available, different categories of consumer can 
be defined, which allows detailed investigation of particular groups, for example, the poorest and 
most vulnerable which are often the target of specific government policies. 
The following types of data are often available at a national level, and provide insights into current 
and future demand. 
• Size and distribution of the population; 
• Population density and urban concentration; 
• Numbers of households/families in urban centres; 
• Numbers of net consuming rural households; 
• Rate of population growth; 
• Per capita incomes and food expenditure; 
• Rate of growth in per capita income; 
• Income distribution; 
• Per capita average daily calorie consumption; 
• Seasonal and secular trends in consumption over time; 
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• 
• Daily calorie consumption of the poorest deciles; 
• The homogeneity or heterogeneity of diets; 
• Commodities in different income groups' food baskets; 
• The mono- or multi-staple nature of diets (as this affects income and price elasticities of 
demand); 
• Ethnic and language diversity- where many languages are spoken, commission agents may 
assume important roles in finding buyers and sellers in markets. 
Primary data Data from secondary sources can then be cross-checked against, and supplemented 
with, localized primary data collection through interviews with selected urban and rural consumers, 
and with knowledgeable observers, such as nutritionists, health officers, market officials and others 
who have worked on consumption. Primary data collection will usually be necessary in attempting 
to assess the nature and adequacy of consumers' access to food, and the prices they face, in particular 
places and times of year. In this it is important to ensure that the consumption patterns of different 
socio-economic and ethnic groups are covered, because poor people often consume different 
commodities; are likely to be more responsive to changes in prices and incomes; and more 
susceptible to hunger, malnutrition and disease. 
Box 3:5 Markets and Consumption 
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Where the relationship between markets 
and consumption is the main focus of 
research, a more systematic and quantita-
tive approach to them is likely to be necess-
ary. However, this is an enormously 
complex task. As Timmer et a.l., (1983, p.48) 
note 'the quantitative impact on food prices 
(and on the food energy intake of various 
population groups) of changes occurring in 
production, marketing, macro or inter-
national arenas can be specified with confi-
dence only if empirical food consumption 
parameters for the society are available' -
i.e. income, own-price and cross-price elas-
ticities. Calculating these demand parame-
ters is not easy, especially where own 
production contributes much to consump-
tion, since time series data are often short 
and of dubious accuracy. 
Disaggregating consumption data, in 
order to assess the nature of the relationship 
between markets and consumption by dif-
ferent socio-economic groups, or in differ-
ent regions or seasons, is also often difficult 
given available secondary data. 'Skill and 
intuition, acquired through experience with 
statistical estimation on a variety of data 
sources and through wide spread discus-
sion with knowledgeable people in the food 
marketing arena, are essential for achieving 
sensible results' (Timmer et al., 1983, p.SO). 
Timmer et al. suggest that the starting 
point in analysing food consumption pat-
terns is u ually food balance sheets, which 
most countries now publish annually. From 
these, average levels of consumption of var-
ious foods can be obtained, but figures may 
be biased in either direction, and should 
therefore be cross-checked against sample 
survey data and/ or knowledgeable 
observer interviews. 
Disaggregating food balance sheets by 
income class can be undertaken using 
household budget surveys. All countries 
which pubJjsh a cost of living index have 
the e, but they vary in content and quality. 
Some only provide expenditw·e data which 
cannot be used for U1is purpose, unless 
price data for relevant regions, seasons and 
qualities are also available, thus enabling 
quantities consumed to be calculated. Other 
budget surveys will provide more infor-
mation, for example quantities of different 
products consumed by various households, 
along with certain sociat economic and 
nutritional characteristics of those 
households. 
Combining data on household food con-
sumption and budgets should allow 
researchers to construct food balance sheets 
for three or four income groups, and these 
can be cross-checked on a local scale against 
interviews with a few (ten to fifteen) re-
presentative consumers in each group. 
Agriculture and Food Production 
Production characteristics have an important impact on the nature and costs of marketing, the 
returns to farmers, and the availability and price of food. For example, the nature of production can 
determine whether long- or short-distance trading is dominant, and the importance of storage and 
processing as marketing functions. 
Conversely, the market crucially affects production through its influence on the prices of outputs 
and inputs, and the availability of the latter. Increased agricultural production and productivity 
require, among other factors, reliable and remunerative outlets and input supplies. To evaluate the 
responsiveness of production and marketed supply to price signals, data on levels of production; 
volumes marketed and prices over time, as well as information on other factors which affect farmers' 
production and marketing decisions, like the availability and cost of inputs; credit and consumer 
goods, is required. 
Secondary data The following production data can usually be obtained for the national level from 
secondary sources: 
• Agriculture's contribution to GDP. 
• Percentage of population involved in agriculture; 
• Climate - how many growing seasons a year, is agricultural production risky, when are 
commodities under study sown and harvested? 
• Important crops and cropping patterns; areal/volumetric importance, and trends in production 
of different crops, the relationship between crop production for internal consumption and 
export; ' 
• National and regional deficits and surpluses, imports and exports, concentrations of production; 
• Land tenure and distribution, average sizes and distribution of farm sizes, implications for 
marketed surpluses/ deficits, trends in land ownership, tenancy arrangements, the 'price' of 
land. Harriss (1981, p.29), for example, found a positive correlation between inequality in 
landholding and in the size distribution of trading firms; 
• Production and yield estimates, and their variability and trends. Sometimes annual production 
estimates, divided by crops and regions, and sometimes by farm size and technological inputs 
used, can be found in project reports, extension offices etc.; 
• Marketed surpluses, rates of on-farm retention for consumption, animal feed, seeds, in-kind 
payments, numbers of food-deficit farmers; 
• Inputs used, and the extent and distribution of utilization, the state of agricultural technology, 
extension services and messages, the availability and costs of inputs; 
• The returns to different types of crops grown, and the variability in those returns. 
Primary data Where the above data are not available from secondary sources, interviews with 
farmers, extension officers, crop production researchers and traders can provide insights into these 
production characteristics. In addition, analysing the production side of the market at a local level 
will usually require interviews with a representative range of farmers in the area under study. 
Classifications of the types and number of farmers concerned, in terms of crops grown, the size of 
landholding, location relative to market places and towns, and technologies and market channels 
used, can often be compiled at a regional level through secondary sources. This is necessary to ensure 
coverage of different production systems, which is important because their relationship with the 
market is likely to vary. 
The following types of question may then be asked through interviews with purposively selected 
informants. 
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., 
• Why do they grow particular crops and combinations of crops? 
• How, where and to whom do various farmers sell most of their produce? 
• Is there a wide range of choice of sales outlets? 
• Why do they choose particular outlets; do these vary for different crops; is the availability of 
credit important? 
• Do farmers have difficulty in finding buyers when they want to sell? 
• How easy is it for farmers to take produce to urban/rural market places? 
• How far away is the nearest market place? 
• Is most produce sold through rural, urban or parastatal market places or directly from the farm? 
• Does this affect the prices received? For example, farmers who rely on visiting traders may be in 
a relatively weaker bargaining position than those selling in organized rural, or urban, market 
places, with many buyers and sellers. 
• What are the prices different types of farmers receive; why do prices differ? 
• Does the market discriminate by variety and quality of produce, by quantities sold, are credit or 
debt relations, or other factors, important in the determination of producer prices? 
• Where do farmers obtain their information on prices? 
• Do they bargain with traders concerning price? 
• What marketing functions do farmers perform themselves - storage, transport, bulking, 
milling? 
• When and why do various farmers sell the quantities they do? 
• Do they buy food, when and why? 
• Do they buy agricultural inputs on the market? 
• How easy are these to obtain and what prices are paid for them? 
The Marketing Sub-System 
The data requirements for examining the internal workings of the market sub-system are divided 
here into those related to (a) the analyses of commodity characteristics and flows; (b) enterprise or 
firm level organization and decision making, and (c) the nature of horizontal and vertical relation-
ships between marketing enterprises. 
Innate and Market-Related Commodity Characteristics 
Innate commodity characteristics influence the nature of marketing and price formation. As Jones 
(1972, p.74) points out, the inherent characteristics of a commodity will affect the extent of market 
integration, the speed with which changes in demand are transmitted to, and responded to by, 
producers, and the magnitude of seasonal price rises. Box 3.7 provides some examples of this 
relationship. The following types of information may be sought either from secondary sources, like 
commodity manuals and previous studies, direct observation of the marketing processes attached to 
specific commodities, or through interviews with agriculturalists or other knowledgeable observers. 
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• The geographical and meterological determinants of production, the effects of these on trading 
networks. 
• The temporal distribution of harvests. 
• Perishability and bulkiness; the costs and ease of transportation and storage relative to price and 
calorific value. 
• Supply responsiveness, gestation between planting and harvesting. 
• Physical handling required. 
• Processing necessary or possible. 
• Extent of consumer differentiation viz quality and relative prices. 
• Marketed surplus as a proportion of production and in terms of absolute national level volumes, 
trends and variability. 
• Standards of measurement and grades of quality and variety used. 
• Different marketing stages and functions through which commodities can and do actually pass. 
Box 3:6 Markets and Production 
As with consumption, where research is 
particularly concerned with the nature, and 
implications, of the relationship between 
markets and production, a more systematic 
approach than that outlined above will be 
necessary. Timmer et al., (1983, p.122) 
suggest that, without resorting to econo-
metric modelling, aspects of farming sys-
tems research and linear programming can 
be used to assess the structure of pro-
duction, and to analyse the effects of mar-
kets and marketing on farmers' decision 
making. 
For example, homogenous agro-climatic 
zones can be identified, along with re-
presentative farming systems within each. 
Then input/ output matrices, which take 
into account the relationships between var-
ious farm enterprises, can be used to con-
struct 'farming system tableaux' for each 
type of farm, in each agro-climatic zone. 
These tableaux, recording inputs, activi-
ties and constraints, represent and quantify 
the economic activities undertaken on var-
ious farm types, the relationship between 
such activities and the inputs and outputs 
entailed in each. They are a means of map-
ping and comprehending farmer decision 
making and they form a basis for predicting 
the effects on this, of technological, market 
and price changes. 
The data required to construct represen-
tative farming systems tableaux for each 
agro-climatic zone, include the following: 
combinations and sequences of crops 
grown, farm size distributions, localized 
price and yield data and information on 
non-farming economic activities (see Tim-
mer et al., 1983 for details). 
The complexities of the relationships 
between markets and production cannot be 
overstated. For example, Southworth et al. 
(1979) and Jones (1972) found that, in West 
Africa, the timing of farmers' sales and their 
storage practices were influenced by a set of 
forces which included the timing of har-
vests of different crops, own consumption 
needs, expectations about future prices and 
supplies, the timing of producers' cash 
needs, transport availability, levels of trader 
demand, access to storage facilities, fears of 
theft, and the timing and size of monetary 
income from other sources. In addition, 
proximity to market places, land size, the 
nature of tenancies and family sizes are 
likely to be influential in this single decision. 
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Box 3:7 Innate Commodity Characteristics and Marketing 
It is argued that, in general, longer pro-
duction periods make supply adjustment 
more difficult and the magnitude of season-
al price rises should be greater the longer 
the time periods between harvest and the 
larger the storage costs or losses. The geo-
graphical extent to which markets are inte-
grated will be smaller for high bulk, low 
value commodities, because transport costs 
and returns will inhibit movement 
between markets, and storage at point of 
production becomes optimal. If commodi-
ties require processing before consumption, 
the costs of processing will reduce the elas-
ticity of primary demand and the time lag 
implied by processing may lead to delayed 
supply responses to hanging d mand. 
Spatial and Temporal Commodity Flows 
Due to the dearth of information available about private markets and marketing in many LDCs, 
analyses concerned with market performance will often have to begin by defining the existence of 
markets spatially, temporally and in commodity terms, and by describing how markets actually 
function and operate on the ground, before an evaluation of any performance attributes can begin. 
Understanding the spatial and temporal dimensions of particular commodity flows is a first step 
towards achieving this. In addition, establishing the direction and timing of such flows is crucial to 
assessments of economic efficiency based on analyses of price and cost data. 
Secondary data Gross national spatial and temporal dimensions of physical flows may be available 
from secondary sources. At the local level, previous surveys on patterns and quantities of farm 
production, and on marketing and household consumption, may have been undertaken and may be 
indicative of possible or likely flows in time and space. Additionally, indications of current flows may 
be sought through parastatal, or producer organization, records. More often, however, primary data 
collection will be necessary at the local level. 
Primary data These can be collected in various ways depending on the availability of secondary 
sources and fieldwork resources. For example, surveys can be undertaken of farm level marketing 
and household consumption patterns and/ or of the numbers of sellers and stackers of foodstuffs in 
market places, together with estimates of their turnover and inventories to indicate quantities being 
handled. Rough estimates of physical flows can also be calculated from check-points at market place 
entrances, or on roads leading to urban centres, where commodity types, and quantities, origins and 
destinations of produce, may be recorded. 
In all these instances, the problem of representativeness, in particular in terms of the temporal and 
spatial limitations on the coverage of surveys, and the possibilities of foodstuffs being traded outside 
market places, must be taken into account. One way of doing this is through interviewing traders and 
knowledgeable observers, for example market officials, about seasonal, annual and spatial or 
institutional variations, and their importance in terms of physical flows. Where possible the 
following types of question need to be asked of market participants and observers. 
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• How many market places within the area of study export and/ or import the relevant 
commodities? 
• Over what distance do imports come/ exports go? 
• At what periods during the year are these imports/exports undertaken? 
• Which are the most important sources and destinations in terms of volume? 
• What proportion of produce received/supplied by the area under study comes from/goes to 
each? 
Box 3:8 Hypotheses from Spatial and Temporal Flows 
The scale, timing and direction of commod-
ity flows can be illustrated through map-
ping and can be used, alone, or together 
with other types of data, to form hypotheses 
concerning competitive conditions. For 
example, the diversity and complexity of 
spatial flows is an important indication of 
the responsiveness of traders to shifting 
price stimuli, and hence of the degree of 
competition in the market. Where markets 
are linked with a large number of others, it 
can be hypothesized that under competitive 
conditions there will be a continual flow of 
goods between many markets which will 
even out price differences (Harriss, 1981, 
p.136). This hypothesis can then be tested 
with reference to price data from different 
market places, and through establishing 
whether traders actually have the oper-
ational flexibility and necessary information 
and resources to move commodities in a 
way that does even out the prices. 
Jones (1972, p.109), also using data on the 
spatial pattern of commodity flows in 
Nigeria, identifies two main types of mar-
keting system, with important implications 
for economic and co-ordination efficiency. 
Where the commodity in question is 
produced in a few specialized areas, trade is 
long-distance and operates through a 'redis-
tributive' market system. Conversely, short-
distance trade, resulting from dispersed 
production, is associated with 'two level', or 
'point-to-point', market systems. 
Redistributive system 
Two-level or 
point-to-point 
Jones argues that information about sup-
plies in the redistributive system is of higher 
quality, and is more speedily transmitted 
through the market, because most supplies 
move through a few centralized points. In 
turn, this provides for superior market per-
formance in terms of the allocation of sup-
plies relative to demand, the speed of 
responsiveness to changes in demand and 
supply, and the degree of market inte-
gration exhibited in close correlation 
between prices in consuming centres. 
Where possible however, data on physical 
commodity flows should be combined with 
price and cost data to further the assessment 
of economic efficiency. 
• Are there urban to rural flows in the off-season; are there periods of marketing connection and 
disconnection? 
• To what degree do these flows correlate with changing patterns of supply and demand? 
Institutional Commodity Flows 
In addition to the spatial and temporal patterns of commodity flows, the institutional means through 
which the former are achieved need to be established. This serves several purposes. 
• Building up marketing chains furthers the understanding of the operation of the market on the 
ground. 
• The exercise requires and leads to the identification and classification of market participants, 
which is necessary for subsequent purposive sampling. 
• Marketing chains are important in understanding which firms/ dealers are engaged in vertical 
relationships of exchange. They can be used to illustrate and clarify not only the movement of 
commodities, but also financial, credit and information flows, and the location of storage and 
processing facilities, in the system. The patterns revealed through such illustration may shed 
light on opportunities and constraints faced by traders, consumers and/ or producers. 
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• Defining marketing chains for different commodities, regi ns and seas ns indicate the links 
connecting one price series with. another. 'Knowing when and where crops are sold, their 
transport a11d storage destinafons, and who the ultimate consumer is, permits the analyst to 
specify the likely causal direction of market connections' (Timmer et al., 1983, p.167). This is 
crucial for subsequent price, cost and margin analyses if they are to provide meaningful 
assessments of economic efficiency. 
• Estimating the shares of marketed surplus handled by different mar~eting institutions and the 
volumes traded through each link, in various marketing channels, provides an initial overview 
of market structure (Timmer et al., 1983, p.167). 
Box 3:9 Market Channels or Chains 
It is especially important to carefu.lly ident-
ify institutional channels where markets are 
believed to be fragmented. For example, in 
many LDCs pre-liberalization, at least two 
almost completely separate marketi1lg 
chains co-existed, in the form of parastatal 
ru,d parallel, or private, markets. Analyses 
of market margins and prices in different 
market places, aimed at assessing degrees 
of competition, or the effects of the market 
on production and consumption, which fail 
to take into account this institutional separ-
ation, can be highly misleading. 
The relationship between parastatal and 
private marketing sub-sectors post-
liberalizatioll may indicate other facets of 
integration and fragmentation. For 
example, in Tanzarua, the author found 
that although, in general, private traders 
avoided buying from or selling to the public 
ector institutions, due to price and quality 
considerations, large wholesalers, dealing 
in very large quantities and over longer 
distances, had a preference for trading with 
the public sector. This uggested that the 
private mark t lacked an efficient infor-
mation system, and widespr ad means to 
store large quantities of grain, which lead to 
its being integrated on a regional, rather 
than national, level. 
Identifying marketing channels can also 
lead to hypotheses concerrung exchange 
efiiciency. For exan1ple, similar fieldwork in 
Malawi post-liberalization, revealed that in 
some nrral market places, a group of traders 
were buying from farmers who delivered 
their produce to the market, and immedi-
ately selling these commodities to urban 
traders within the same market place, on the 
same day, for a profit. Their ability to do this 
wa dependent on farmers' distru t of 
weighing scales used by the urban whole-
salers. They therefore preferred to seU to 
those buying by the plateful, but received a 
lower price in doing so. 
Similarly, in both Malawi and Tanzania, 
the division between wholesaling and 
retailing was not always clear, as there 
existed a class of traders, referred to as 
wholesaler-retailers, which bought and sold 
commodities in a range of different-sized 
units from both farmers and wholesalers, 
and to both retailers and consumers (Scar-
borough, 1990). They constituted an extra 
link in conventional market channels, and 
therefore may be seen a increasi.t1g costs 
and margins. However, they may also ease 
entry into the retail level, by offering to sell 
in smaller quantities than other wh le-
salers, and hence they may allow for 
increased competition at this level. 
Identifying market channels In order to define the institutional flow ofconunodities, the different 
types of marketing channel have to be identified, and all the participants in the market categorized. 
Information on parastatal and co-operative market channels will usually be obtainable from 
secondary source and through interviews with managers or other employees. There may also be 
secondary data on private sector channels, but often the movement of crops through these will have 
to be established through observation and interviews with market participants and knowledgeable 
observers. 
Categorizing market participants The criteria used to establish meaningful classe of participant 
will be specific to the objectives of individual projects. Functional categories, like rural/urban 
assemblers, wholesalers, wholesaler-retailers, retailers, processors, tra11sporters, farmer-traders, 
commission agents, and money lenders are likely to be universally used. 
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Functional categories will often not be mutually exclusive though, because individuals or firms 
may combine several market roles, but through identifying the various functions undertaken, and 
the exchange relations between the institutions responsible for them, marketing chains can be built 
up and the means by which commodities move from producers to consumers more clearly 
understood. Cross-cutting, additional categorization may also be necessary depending on the 
objectives of the research. These may be related to gender, commodity types, public/private sector or 
other divisions. For example, in addition to functional categories, Harriss (1981, p.22) also distin-
guishes betwe n, respectively, traders dealing in traditional agricultural commodities and modern 
teclmologies, those undertaking single and multiple marketing functions, those handling single and 
multiple commodities, and those based rurally and in urban centres. 
It may be possible to pursue this categorization exercise through secondary sources, but in most 
cases trader surveys and participant, and knowledgeable observer, interviews will be necessary. 
It is unlikely under rapid appraisal conditions that accurate estimates of annual/ seasonal 
quantities of commodities passing through the links in different cl1ain will be possible. However, in 
very localized studies market participant interviews which probe into the quantities handled by 
individuals annually or seasonally, combined with observa.tionaJ survey identifying numbers of 
traders in particular categories may provide rough indications. For example, if the market chains 
through which commodities flow have been established, and the number of participants in each 
category estimated, rough indications of the quantities passing through each link in various chains 
can be calculated by multiplying the average quantity handled annually by a representative number 
of traders in each category, by the estimated numbers of participant of that category in the chain. 
Market Functions 
Having identified the main market channels and functions undertaken, it is necessary to understand 
the organization of those functions and the exchange of commodities along the chains. This ensures 
that, in subsequent performance analyses, comparisons between inputs and outputs, and costs and 
prices, are meaningful and accurately reflect those obtaining in individual operations. As Harriss 
(1979a) points out, the absence of such qualitative assessments has often lead to nonsensical or 
misleading analyses of performance. In addition, understanding how marketing is undertaken 
should lead to more fully informed attempts to explain apparent inefficiencies. Therefore, before 
analysing the efficiency with which market functions are undertaken and priced, analysts need to 
know how, where, when and by whom they are carried out. 
Marketing activities Noting the various activities involved in each function, and the means by 
which they are carried out, helps this overall analysis. This exercise i also useful in identifying and 
quantifying all the inputs and outputs, and costs of, and returns to, undertaking market functions, 
which is necessary for subsequent technical, operational and economic efficiency analyses. 
For example, buying directly from farmers may entail the following activities: 
• gathering information on supplies, demand and prices; 
• locating and forging contacts with sellers; 
• raising finance; 
• arranging means, and negotiating the price, of transport; 
• hiring casual labour; 
• travelling to the point of purchase; 
• grading the commodities according to variety and quality; 
• negotiating the terms of sale, including the price, and possibly credit and future buying 
arrangements, and exchanging commodities and payment; 
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• assembling, bulking, weighing/measuring and bagging the commodity; 
• loading the commodity onto a vehicle; and 
• travelling to point of sale, storage or processing, unloading, stacking and selling. 
Ascertaining how marketing functions are carried out may be possible through reference to 
secondary sources where previous research has been undertaken, but, in most cases, it will be 
necessary to interview knowledgeable observers and traders representing each market channel and 
function, and to make further close observations. The following checklists indicate the types of 
question that may be asked in such interviews. The data thus collected will also provide insights into 
the internal organization of firms, and the nature of the vertical and horizontal relations between 
them. 
Buying and selling With reference to buying and selling the following types of question need to be 
addressed: 
• Where are they carried out, and at what times of year? This may have important influences on 
the participants' relative bargaining positions, and will almost certainly affect the costs of 
marketing, and hence prices paid or received. 
• Do farmers sell to rural assemblers in rural areas, or to rural or urban wholesalers directly. 
• Do urban wholesalers buy directly from farmers, at their houses or in rural or urban market 
places, or do they buy from assemblers/ commission agents, co-operatives, parastatals. 
• If wholesalers travel to the rural areas to buy, how often do they travel, is it a seasonal activity, to 
how many different rural locations, how much do they attempt to buy in a single journey? For 
example, urban traders may have regular suppliers which reduces risk and time in seeking out 
supplies, or they may travel to many places seeking out the lowest possible prices. 
• If farmers travel; why and how often do they do so, in how many locations do they attempt to 
sell, why do they choose particular ones, what forms of transport do they use? 
• If wholesalers rely on urban deliveries, who undertakes such delivery and how, are there cost 
savings in assembly and bulking, as well as transport, for the wholesalers, is this reflected in the 
prices they pay and at which they subsequently resell? 
• Is information less lagged and/ or more comprehensive when farmers deliver their produce to 
the towns? 
• How is exchange between wholesalers and retailers organized, do they operate from the same 
market places, or does one party have to travel, how are prices agreed? 
• Do wholesalers and retailers sell only in the market places or from stores, door-to-door and/ or 
from their homes? 
• How are contacts between buyers and sellers forged, and how are terms of sale agreed? 
• What weights and measures and classes of variety and quality are used; are they standardized? 
Storage Similar types of data are also required on storage, processing and transport. Thus the 
following need to be addressed before assessing the technical, operational and economic efficiency of 
storage by establishing the costs of, and returns to, the function: 
• Where, in the market chain, is storage located; how widely dispersed is it; what are the 
implications of the latter for judgements concerning future supplies, and for trader access? 
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• What types of stores are used; what is their capacity and what are the rates, and time 
dimensions, of utilization; how weather- and pest-proof are they? 
• Are stores owned or rented? 
• How is produce bulked, packed and stacked inside the store? 
• What pesticides and other chemicals are necessary or used? 
• What are the primary motivations for storage, are they related more to security of supplies or to 
increasing income? 
• What are the determinants of the volumes and length of storage? 
Transport Similarly, for example, for transport the following need to be understood before realistic 
estimates of crop losses, costs and returns can be embarked upon: 
• What types of transport are used? 
• Who owns or rents vehicles, what are the rental arrangements and how are they agreed? 
• How is transport is organized and what are the implications of this for time and capacity 
utilization rates? 
• What is the availability of vehicles and other means of transport, fuet spare parts and 
maintenance services? 
• How are loading and unloading organized and remunerated? 
• Are there formal transport tariffs related to types of produce, and to what extent are they 
applied? 
Processing Initial surveys of processing are likely to be aimed at gathering similar types of 
information. For example, the following questions need to be answered: 
• What processing functions are necessary or actually rendered? 
• Who undertakes these and where? 
• What technologies are used? 
• How many mills/plants are there per town or village? 
• Does this concentration and variety offer consumers and traders real alternatives? 
• How much processing is done domestically by hand? 
• What are the different rates of transformation? 
Intra-Enterprise Organization 
Having understood how these marketing functions are organized, analyses concerned with econ-
omic performance then need to examine the internal operation of enterprises, the horizontal 
relationships between similar enterprises and the vertical relationships between those engaged in 
exchange with each other. 
With reference to the allocation of resources and means of organizing marketing activities within 
the enterprise, the precise focus of enquiries will again depend on research objectives. Continuing the 
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assumption that economic efficiency is the prime object of study, the following will have to be 
addressed: 
• the allocation and utilization of labour, and of recurrent and fixed capital, within various 
enterprises; 
• the technical and operational efficiency with which market functions are carried out; and 
• enterprise level profitability. 
Resource utilization and allocation It is neces ary to understand how resources, primarily labour 
and capital, are u ed and allocated withil1 enterprises in order to (a) identify, quantify and value 
inputs and outputs; (b) explain differences m technical and operational efficiency and profitability 
between enterpris s and (c) make suggestions for improvement of intra-enterprise productive 
efficiency. In addition, data on the organization ofr ources within enterprises will shed light on the 
nature of phenomena like credit and labour relations, inequality, degrees of vertical and horizontal 
integration and the implications of these for competition in the market place, and inter-sectoral 
resource transfers. 
Where enterprise bookkeeping records are available to analysts, and are believed to be representa-
tive of their economic activities, they should provide the information necessary to build up a picture 
of how resources are used within the enterprise. This is more likely to be possible amongst public, co-
operative or very large enterprises. Often, however, market participant interviews will be necessary, 
and the following types of question can be addressed: 
• Are marketing functions the only economic activities engaged in by the enterprises operating in 
the market, what combinations of economic activities are engaged in, and how are labour and 
capital divided between them? 
• Do traders at various levels in the market specialize in dealing in one or a few commodities, or 
are enterprises diversified? 
• Do traders specialize in one or several functions? 
• Is commodity or functional diversification manifest concurrently or sequentially; does it lead to 
vertical or horizontal integration? 
• What are the pros and cons of specialization and diversification; is the primary motivation 
behind diversification related to the maximization of profits or the minimization of risk? 
• What are the predominant patterns of ownership of marketing enterprises? 
• Where partnerships are common, what is the rationale behind forming a partnership, are they 
based on kinship relations, how is the division of labour, capital inputs and profits distributed? 
• What capital assets are owned and what is their current value? 
• What types of labour are employed; how much is employed and how is it deployed and 
remunerated? 
Technical and operational efficiency Whether judged relatively, or against absolute standards, 
a sessing enterprises productive efficiency requires the identification, and physical and monetary 
quantification, of inputs and outputs entailed in the market function under observation. As noted in 
Chapter 2, some inputs and outputs will easier to identif)" quantify and value than others, and the 
use of rough indicators and approximations is likely t be necessary in many instances, particularly 
under the conditions of rapid appraisal Simila.rly, it is m1likely that accw·ate valuations of marginal 
factor costs, and value products, will be possible. Rather, operational ef.ficiency can be approached 
through comparing the unitary, and total, costs and returns, exhibited by a variety of enterprises, 
with those of similar enterprises and with technologically feasible minima. 
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Thus the types of data required for assessing productive efficiency will be: 
• Rates of spillage, or qualitative crop loss, incurred in buying and selling, transporting, loading, 
unloading and stacking, storage and processing. 
• Rates of transformation of commodities into end- and by-products in processing. 
• Rates of utilization of labour, vehicles, stores and processing plants. 
• Unitary and total values of the inputs and outputs of various functions, for different types of 
enterprise, in terms of size, location, capital intensity and degrees of vertical and horizontal 
integration and specialization or diversification. 
Some of this data may be available from secondary sources, like government, parastatat 
consultancy or academic reports, but in many cases it will have to be obtained through market 
participant, or knowledgeabl observer, interviews and direct obs rvation. For example, in addre -
ing operational efficiency, government estimate or actual parastatal costs of buying, selHng, 
transport, processing and storage can. be, and have been, used as indicators of the prjvate eo ts of 
these functions, and together with secondary data on prices, to calculate returns. But given the 
paucity of this data in many countries, and taking into account differences between private and 
public costs and prices, together with the fact that there are unlikely to be any secondary data on the 
qualitative aspects of these phenomena, primary data collection will almost always be preferable. 
Because so little is known about private marketing in many countries, and the data required is wide-
ranging, a combination of techniques is suggested, including examination of available firm records, 
interviews with traders, in-depth case studies and, in some instances, direct observation. 
Profitability Rates of profitability at the enterprise level provide insights into productive and 
exchange efficiency, as well as into the nature of horizontal and vertical relationships between 
enterprises. For example, markets can be characterized as being c mpet:itive and economically 
efficient if profit levels are found to be 'normal'. Calculating enterprise-level profits, usually 
expressed annually, requires data on total costs and output. Such analyses ther fore necessitate in-
depth case studies and/ or analyses of detailed enterprise records, rather than data relating to si:ngl 
transactions. The data needed to calculate rates of profit ti1en depends on how absolute levels of 
profit are to be represented. This in turn will partly depend on the objectives of the research. Most 
commonly, rates of return to capital are used, and therefore data on the values of working and fixed 
capital within the enterprise are needed. Alternative ways of representing profitability are con-
sidered in the next chapter. 
Horizontal Relationships Between Enterprises 
Examining the nature of horizontal relationships between similar enterprises i analogous to 
analysing the structure of the market as definedl by the industrial organization school. As noted 
above, although not deterministic, the structure of a market can significantly influence prices, supply 
and the economic efficiency of marketing. 
The nature of competition between similar enterprises is the focus of structural studies and 
therefore the main aim here will be to collect data to aid the formulation of initial hypotheses 
concerning conditions of competition at different levels of the market. Since a high number of active 
buyers and sellers all along the marketing chain, ease of entry into all functions and widely available 
market information, together carry a strong presumption of competitive conditions and behaviour 
(Timmer et al., 1983, p.l66), market structure is most commonly evaluated by assessing the following: 
• the relative numbers, and size and spatial distributions, of various types of enterprise; 
• the presence, absence or level of barriers to entry faced by new or potential entrants into the 
market. 
The data required to analyse these characteristics can also be used to identify the potentials for 
exploitation, discrimination and uncompetitive behaviour, and therefore to characterize the levels of 
inequality, and the means of its reproduction, within the system. The availability of credit and market 
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information are also important in horizontal relationships, especially for example as a means of 
procuring entry into the market, but they are considered in more detail in the next section. 
Lele (1971) suggests that per capita income of the working population associated with trade, or 
various parts of it, can also provide an indication of the structure of the market. Similarly, Harriss 
(1985, p.282) proposes that the income and wealth of traders is a good indicator of the economic 
power facing farmers, consumers and/ or other traders with which they deal. 
Numbers, and size and spatial distributions of firms Estimating the numbers, size and spatial 
distributions of each category of intermediary provides an indication of both the local structure of the 
market, and the range of alternatives faced by participants in the marketing chain in their buying, 
selling and hiring functions. Subjective perceptions of the latter can also be obtained through 
interviews. 
The numbers and sizes of each type of trader are necessary because conditions of competition can 
vary between different levels of the market and, because, although absolute numbers may appear to 
be large, the ratio between buyers and sellers may suggest potential opportunities for discrimination. 
Numbers and size distributions of enterprises are likely to fluctuate through time and so trends also 
need to be established. 
Size is usually defined by the volume, or value, of annual sales turnover, or the value of current 
assets. There is unlikely to be any systematic information on trader numbers and, as noted above, 
they are likely to be highly variable through time, both intra- and inter-annually. However, census 
data, tax and licence records where available, and previous research reports or area samples may 
provide some estimates, which should then be verified by fieldwork at the local level. 
The primary research undertaken to define these characteristics will again depend on the 
availability of secondary data and the scale of the study. If the research is localized, for example 
restricted to a single town, and time and resources permit, formal or informal surveys may be 
possible. These can be supplemented by trader and knowledgable observer interviews. 
Market officials will often be able to furnish researchers with the numbers of various categories of 
traders under their jurisdiction, and traders will usually be able to provide indications of changes in 
numbers, annually and seasonally. Market officials, or licensing and taxation offices, may also be able 
to provide estimates of trends in the numbers of intermediaries and of the levels of volumes stored 
and processed annually, although the latter are likely to be understated if reliant on traders' reports. 
Researching the effects that increased numbers of traders have on different sizes, or types, of firms 
can also provide indications of market structure. For example, fieldwork carried out by the authors 
among traders in Tanzania, following the liberalization of domestic food markets, revealed that all 
market participants perceived a significant increase in numbers post-liberalization, but that only 
small-scale retailers thought it made business more difficult. This suggested that entry into lower 
levels of trade was easy, relative to that into higher levels. Further probing suggested that capital 
requirements, rather than collusive activity, was the main constraint on entry into wholesaling. 
Barriers to entry In addition, the ease with which potential participants can enter various functions 
is commonly used as a means of assessing the degree of competition in an industry. To assess the 
nature and levels of any barriers to entry it is important to collect data at different levels of the 
market. For example, highly competitive, small-scale retailing commonly co-exists with oligopolistic, 
larger-scale wholesaling and the degree of competition will thus vary with level. 
Four types of barriers to entry are common: product differentiation; economies of scale; absolute 
cost advantages of established firms; and heavy capital requirements (Semmler, 1984, p.108). 
However, the first of these is unlikely to be important in LDC food markets and usually the focus is 
on the last. 
Information on the barriers to entry can be obtained from interviews with market participants 
which inquire into the following: 
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• Modes of entry into trade, including the means of building up capital, acquiring marketing skills 
and contacts, periods of apprenticeship, whether such apprenticeships are based on kinship, 
tribal or caste connections. 
• Traders' subjective perceptions of barriers. 
• The origins, and levels, of initial capital required for traders of different sizes, and/ or dealing in 
different functions and commodities. A comparison of minimum capital entry requirements for 
different functions, and their changes over time, with those necessary to enter other economic 
activities, will indicate the relative ease or difficulty of entering the market. For example, Harriss 
(1981, p.65) suggests that initial capital requirements necessary to enter the trade can be 
compared to those which would enable the purchase of a small farm. 
• The degree of mobility between functions and commodities. 
As noted above, it is important to characterize barriers to entry at different levels of the market 
since monopoly and intense competition can co-exist. This can, to some extent, be indicated by 
comparing the sizes and ages of enterprises, which may reveal that large enterprises start large or 
that there is much expansion and upward mobility in the system. 
It is difficult to assess barriers to entry through interviewing traders, since all have entered the 
market. Further information might therefore be gained by questioning potential entrants, for 
example farmers, about their perceptions of market entry. Additional insights into the nature of 
barriers to entry can be obtained by observing: 
• The age, gender and ethnic distributions of owners, operators and employees for different types 
of enterprise; and 
• The extent to which fluctuations in the number of active traders follow rises and falls in 
profitability. 
For example, Scarborough (1990) found a high concentration of female participants in retailing, 
and male domination of wholesaling in Malawi, which suggested barriers other than those directly 
related to capital requirements. Similarly, in both Malawi and Tanzania, there was a universal 
perception that numbers of traders at various levels had increased significantly post-liberalization, 
when the costs associated with illegal operations were reduced. 
Trader, producer and consumer organizations The existence and forms of trader, producer and 
consumer organizations may significantly affect both the structure of the market and the barriers to 
entry, and need to be analysed. 
For example, if trader organizations exist, their role, and the conditions, and size, of membership 
will be instructive since they may inhibit entrance or increase competition and efficiency. Member-
ship may be limited by function, ethnic group, gender, or through high entrance fees. Roles may 
include the regulation of disputes; the representation of traders to legal authorities; the provision of 
storage facilities or credit; centralizing and organizing utilization of transport; and payment of joint 
licence or taxation fees. If credit, storage and transport facilities are widely provided, economies of 
scale could be realized and entry requirements lowered. Alternatively, if membership necessitates 
financial resources, and the association facilitates collusive behaviour, competition and economic 
efficiency could be adversely affected. 
Vertical Relationships Between Enterprises 
If horizontal relationships between similar marketing enterprises are the basis for examining the 
structure of the market, the nature of vertical relationships of exchange sheds light on the conduct of 
market participants. Having shown, in Chapter 2, that structure cannot be accepted as an absolute 
determinant of conduct, and argued that market analyses need to go beyond the marketing sub-
system itself, the necessity to examine vertical relationships between enterprises should be clear. 
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The institutional organization of xchange; the quantities and types of commodity passing through 
each link in various marketing channels; the prices obtaining at each of these; and the nature of 
monetary, credit and information flows are all manifestations of the nature of vertical market 
relations. Often there will be a causal relationship between horizontal and vertical relations, and 
therefore the following types of data may provide insights into horizontal relationships as well as 
vertical ones. 
Costs and Prices Prices of inputs and commodities can reveal a lot of varied information about 
marketing systems, production and consumption, but secondary data on prices is often inadequate 
in terms of quantity and accuracy, and can thus be very misleading. Usually, time series are short and 
incomplete and only wholesale and/ or retail prices for agricultural commodities bought and sold in 
towns are available. Farm-gate and other rural prices are often not collected. Moreover, in many 
countries, only official or parastatal price information is available for periods preceding liberaliza-
tion, and it cannot be assumed that these were the only prices faced by producers and consumers. 
It is important therefore to subject any available price data to preliminary evaluations, as described 
in Chapter 2, and to supplement such data where possible with that obtained through observation, 
interviews and case-studies. Where price and/ or cost data is only obtained through interviews, 
however, the scope of analyses will necessarily be limited in time and space. 
Various forms of price and cost analyses are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, and are therefore not 
expanded on here. They include: 
• price correlations to assess market integration and co-ordination efficiency; 
• gross market margin analyses; 
• deconstructed market margin analyses, to obtain insights into productive and economic 
efficiency; and 
• enterprise level profitability, to assess economic efficiency. 
The organization of exchange In addition to prices, various qualitative aspects of exchange need to 
be determined, since they will affect prices, as well as other aspects of market performance, including 
economic and co-ordination efficiency; income distribution; market responsiveness to changes in 
demand and supply; hocks a11d policy shifts generated out ide the market itself. Different forms of 
exchange also have implications for the costs and pricing of marketing services; the quality and 
dissemination of market information; and the levels and incidence of risk in the market. 
Analysing these qualitative aspects of vertical relations will usually only be possible through 
market participant interviews and case studies, unless previous relevant research has been under-
taken. Interviews should be carried out with purposively sampled representatives of all the key 
stages in the market channels under consideration. A 'purposive' selection is recommended, to 
ensure a few representatives of each type of enterprise are interviewed. 
The following types of question need to be addressed, unless the nature of vertical relations has 
already been clarified through the construction of market chains: 
• To and from whom do different trading enterprises sell and buy commodities and/ or services; 
when, where and why? 
• What are the physical and institutional arrangements for organizing exchange? 
• How are contacts made and contracts forged, and how are they enforced in long-distance trade? 
• Do traders tend to buy from, and sell to, regular customers, or do they seek to maximize profits 
through responding to the most recent price information available? 
58 
• What is the range of choice producers, consumers and various market participants face, in 
whom to buy from, and sell to? 
• How are prices arrived at- on the spot through individual negotiation, bidding between buyers, 
or by reference to administratively determined levels. Or are they pre-arranged through 
communication; forward buying contracts; or credit relations. 
• Is there much individual haggling or are prices across a market place relatively uniform? 
• Is the latter the result of competitive or monopolistic conditions? 
• Do prices discriminate between varieties and qualities; different scales of buyers and sellers? 
• What role do commission agents or brokers serve in vertical co-ordination. For example, they 
may be used to locate supplies or large demand orders; to establish initial contact with sellers; to 
complete initial purchase terms and conditions of payment. They may also guarantee sales on 
credit and buy and sell, store and process goods themselves. They can take many different 
forms, for example urban firms organizing long-distance contracts, or individuals actively 
promoting sellers' produce. 
A wide range of exchange mechanisms are possible, and often operative in LDC food markets. 
They include, for example, forward contracting; reciprocal regular customage; tied credit and debt 
relations; co-operative bargaining, and vertical integration. These exchange relationships can 
influence prices; returns; market structure and performance in multiple ways. For example, the 
advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration in terms of various performance criteria have 
already been discussed in Chapter 2. Forward buying corytracts between producers and assemblers, 
wholesalers or processors, may reduce the costs of seeking out supplies, and of the risks associated 
with fluctuating supplies and prices. However, they may also result in reduced returns to farmers, 
and flows of market information, and/ or increased buyer profits; barriers to entry to potential 
buyers; and a lack of responsiveness to changing supply and demand. Similarly, wholesalers and 
producers may reduce the risks and costs of marketing through abiding by formal, or informal, 
reciprocal contracts of exclusive exchange, but this may also lead to unresponsive pricing and 
reduced competition. 
Information The importance of the role of market information in terms of economic efficiency and 
performance, as well as equity, is widely accepted as the following quotes show. The view is widely 
held that accurate, timely market information enhances market performance by improving the 
knowledge of buyers and sellers concerning supply, demand and other factors affecting price. High 
quality market information also is said to foster competition which tends to eliminate high cost 
operations and inefficient firms' (Helmberger et al., 1981, p.562). 'One of the most important steps a 
government can take to improve the fairness of market price formation so that it discriminates less 
against the small farmers at one end and the consumer at the other is to provide these individuals 
with timely and accurate information about actual market conditions ... More equal balance of 
knowledge provides a more equal distribution of the gains from efficient market price formation' 
(Timmer et al., 1983, p.154). 
The availability and quality of market information affects the nature of both horizontal and vertical 
market relations. Exclusive access to market information, or the control of information and/ or 
capital, are important sources of monopoly, and the nature of horizontal and vertical relations 
strongly influences the spread of information. 
Because information plays such a crucial role in the market performance, analysts must attempt to 
determine how traders judge likely levels of supply, demand and prices obtaining in different places 
and times. The sources, and quality, of such information for different categories of participant should 
be checked and evaluated. Traders may obtain such information in a variety of ways, ranging from 
mass media available to all, to exclusive collection on an individual basis. The following types of 
question therefore need to be asked: 
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• How, and from what sources, is market information gathered; how is it disseminated? 
• What types of market information are considered necessary? 
• Do traders actively seek it out? 
• Is there any public provision of market information? 
• How accurate is the information obtained from various sources? 
• Does its quality vary between different crops, areas or marketing chains? For example, is 
information harder to obtain in rural than urban areas? 
• How quickly, and how discriminately, is it distributed? 
• To what degree do different traders and farmers share the same information? 
Harriss (1981, p.203) found that traders in South India used a variety of means to obtain 
information, including telephones; word of mouth; letters and telegrams, depending 011 the distances 
and price fluctuations involved. 'Telephones and telegrams are used when pricing relations change 
fast at the time of harvest and at post-harvest gluts. Telegrams are used for long-distance price 
information, while personal contacts, gossip and letters tend to be used for shorter distances and for 
times when not much change is expected in the pricing relationships.' 
Credit The nature of credit relations within the marketing system provides insights into traders' 
relative market bargaining powers; condition of supply and demand, and of competition; and into 
key opportunities and constraints on trade. Similarly, credit has a critical influence on conditions of 
entl'y into the market, and 011 price levels. Therefore the following types of question should be 
addressed: 
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• Who extends credit to whom within the market sub-system and what does this imply? For 
example, in Malawi, within the private marketing sector, credit was found to flow from farmers 
to small-scale wholesalers and wholesaler-retailers, to retailers and thence to salaried con-
sumers in the form of delayed payments. Conversely, large-scale wholesalers always paid 
farmers with cash. This difference in solvency between these two levels of the market, suggested 
a divergence in terms of rates of accumulation, and therefore in degrees of competition 
(Scarborough, 1990). 
• What forms does this credit take? 
• What are the primary motivations for lending? Guaranteed steady supplies may be more 
important in money lending between b·aders and farmers, than profits earned from interest. If 
the primary objective of lendjng to farmers is to secure supplies, the profitability of trading is 
likely to exceed that of money lending. If credit is extended to farmers to secure supplies, or 
reduce the costs of obtaining such supplies, is this because of the vagaries of agricultural 
production, or those of marketed surpluses, or because buying from farmers is highly 
competitive? Where large traders lend to smaller ones, it is possible that this is a11 attempt to 
ensure forward sales, or high levels of competition at lower levels of marketing, thus preventing 
upward mobility, and increased competition au\ongst larger traders. Is it used as a means of 
reducing costs, for example of transport, and mmimizing commodity losses during marketing? 
• What are the likely effects of credit relations on price levels? For example, apparently low 
producer prices may conceal credit and interest repayments. 
• What other sources of credit are available, formal and informal? 
• What are the values of various types of loan? 
• What are the terms and conditions of different sorts of borrowing, lending and repayment? 
• How is eligibility established? 
• Are loans secured against produce and/ or assets? 
• What are the means of, time limits, and interest rates, on repayments? 
• How do interest rates in different credit markets compare, and what are the implications of any 
differences? For example, competition between wholesalers or assemblers for farmers' surplus 
may take the form of low interest rates on credit, which may be indicative of particular 
conditions of supply and demand and competition within that level of the market. 
• How is credit used by different groups of borrowers? 
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Chapter 4 
Data Analysis 
• Testing for economic efficiency 
• The internal productive efficiency of the marketing enterprise 
• The conditions of perfect competition 
• Seller concentration ratios 
• Price correlation coefficients 
• Gross market margins 
• Deconstructed market margins 
• Enterprise level profitability 
This chapter discw;ses various technique of da ta analysis comm only used to assess productive 
efficiency within the enterprise, and conditions of competition and economic efficiency within 
marketing ystems. For each type of analysis, an attempt is made to pecify the data and 
computational requirements, aud to discu s the i11terpretation, use and implica tions of results. In 
addition, possible reasons for undertaking these analyses are described, and their practical and 
theoretical strengths and weaknesses are evaluated. 
The internal productive efficiency of enterprises is approached through calculating and comparing 
levels and monetary values of inputs and outputs, for a sample of enterprises. 
The economic efficiency of the marketing sub-system is addxessed with reference to the neo-
classical model of perfect competition. The main types of analyses covered are th.os concerned with 
seller concentration ratios; inter-spatial, -temporal and -form price correla tion coefficients; gross and 
deconstructed market margins, and firm level profitability. However, it is stressed in this tha t 
analysts must: 
(a) combine various types of analyses, as all are only indicative, and none are conclusive; 
(b) be aware of the dangers of generalizing the results of localized or specific studies, since the 
extent to which markets are competitive may vary considerably between levels, places and 
times, and 
(c) keep in mind the conditions, limitations and assumptions of the theory of perfect compe-
tition, and those under which it is argued to result in optimal resource allocation and the 
maximization of consumer satisfaction. 
TESTING FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN MARKETS 
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that a market sub-system or parts of it can be said to be economically 
efficient if: 
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• all enterprises are technically and operationally, that is to say productively, efficient; 
• the distribution of enterprises, plant and infrastructure is organized in a manner which enables 
scale and locational economies to be exploited; and 
• the operation of exchange generates prices which conform to a competitive standard. 
Therefore, in assessing the extent to which markets are economically efficient, or inefficient, these 
three conditions must be tested for. However, it was also noted previously that: 
• in many instances, particularly under rapid reconnaissance conditions, accurate measurement 
will not be possible, and rough indications will have to suffice; 
• there is likely to be an emphasis on identifying potential improvements, rather than comparing 
empirical situations to abstract optimal efficiency conditions; 
• there are no generally accepted means of assessing 0-efficiency, the second of the above three 
conditions of economic efficiency; 
• for perfectly competitive markets to result in the static maximization of resource productivity, 
there must be no externalities, scale economies or other market failures; and 
• even if there are no market failures, perfectly competitive markets may not lead to the 
optimization of resource productivity in the long term, or the maximization of social welfare 
where (a) income distribution is highly skewed and/ or other non-economic objectives are 
socially important, or (b) market participants do not seek to maximize profits, returns to owned 
resources or subjective utilities. 
Despite these contingencies, various types of data analyses are described below which are all 
aimed at assessing the economic efficiency of markets as defined above. They provide the basis on 
which to: 
• analyse the workings, and economic efficiency, of current market operations; 
• explain apparent inefficiencies; 
• assess the potential for, and means of, improvement in relation to economic efficiency or other 
objectives, such as food security and greater socio-economic equality. 
THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ENTERPRISE (FIRM) 
As noted in Chapter 2, an index of technical efficiency can be calculated as the ratio of actual, to 
potential, maximum levels of output. Similarly, operational efficiency is indicated by the ratio of costs 
using optimal input proportions to those of actual inputs used. However, with limited time and data, 
research into the internal productive efficiency of firms is often aimed at the potential for incremental 
improvements, rather than the calculation of optimal variables. This can be undertaken through (a) 
comparing levels and values of inputs and outputs for different enterprises, and (b) enquiring into 
the internal organization of their operations. 
Comparisons can then be made between the input and output levels, and the costs and returns for 
individual enterprises with: 
• the average levels and values of a particular class of enterprise; 
• those of the most efficient enterprise of the same type; 
• the average of those of different classes of enterprise; and 
• those of the same class, or particular enterprise, but for earlier years (if time series data is 
available). 
In this way, two standards for comparison are obtained - firstly, the average levels of inputs, 
outputs, costs and returns for each category of enterprise and, secondly, those of the most efficient 
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enterprises. The latter will exhibit minimal costs and maximum output for any given level of input. 
An understanding of exactly how economic activities are organized is then necessary to explain 
differences in these parameters, and to suggest means of enhancing productive efficiency. 
Data and Computational Requirements 
Essentially, what is required in addressing technical and operational efficiency in this way is: 
• The categorization of sample enterprises to be compared. Enterprises can be classified according 
to functional type, size, location or other factors, depending on research objectives. 
• The identification and measurement of physical quantities, and monetary values, of all inputs 
used, and outputs produced, for the sample of enterprises. Usually, simple averages of the levels 
and values of inputs and outputs, over a particular time period, are used in these calculations 
and comparisons. The degree to which classes of input and output are disaggregated will 
depend on research objectives, and the availability of data. For example, labour may form a 
single category of input, or, if analysts are particularly interested in labour utilization and 
productivity, it may be broken down into casual, permanent, piece-rate, male, female and other 
categories. Some inputs and outputs are easier to quantify and value than others, and therefore, 
indicative values will sometlimes have to be used (see Chaptex 2). In addition, under conditions 
of rapid reconnaissance, it is unlikely that accurate measures of technical and operational 
efficiency will be possible. This is particularly the case where detailed accounting records are 
unavailable, and where estimates of input and output averages have to be obtained through 
market participant interviews and direct observation. 
• The calculation of mean levels and values of each type of input and output, and for each 
category of enterprise, over the period under consideration, in order to provide a standard for 
comparison and relative evaluation. Often, ranges of levels and values of inputs and outputs are 
also provided for each group of enterprises. 
• The explanation of variations in levels and values of inputs and outputs, between enterprises 
within the same category, and between different classes' averages. These will have to be based 
largely upon the general observations and experience of the researcher (French, 1977, p.l22). 
Problems and Limitations 
Apart .from the problems of data availability, and the measurement and evaluation of parameters, 
identifying the reasons for differences between enterprises' levels and/ or values of inputs and 
outputs is probably the most important difficulty .in assessing enterprise-level productive efficiency. 
Firstly, physical levels and monetary values of inputs used and outputs produced are influenced by 
numerous factors. Secondly, it is usually impossible to quantify organizational characteristics. For 
both reasons, great care must be taken wheu postulating and generalizing causes of variations in 
measures of productive efficiency. For example, the costs of providing a marketing service can be 
influenced by economies of scale; managerial efficiency; production techniques; organizational 
structures; rates of qualitative and quantitative crop losses; capital intensity and labour productivity; 
means of remuneration and motivation; use, or not, of unpaid family labow·; input p1ices; degrees of 
capacity utilization, and of vertical and/ or horizontal integration, and locationa1, environmental and 
infrastructural conditions. Given the inability to quantify aJl these variables, explanations of 
differences between enterprises' physical inputs and outputs, and their costs and returns, will have 
to be based on a thorough understanding of the internal organization of each of the enterprises under 
study, and a qualitative comparison between these, as well as on the experience of the analyst. 
Identifying Means of Enhancing Productive Efficiency 
The inability to calculate precise and absolute measurements of technical and operational efficiency, 
and of the fuuctional relationships between these and organizational characteristics of the enterprise, 
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do s not pr vent attempts t increase productive efficiency. Through a combination of rough 
measures of technical and operational efficiency, and a detailed understanding of the internal 
organizalion of the enterprise and its marketing funcUon , re earchers can begin to identify means of 
increasing such efficiency. For example, during fieldwork in Malawi, Scarborough (1990) found that a 
number of wholesalers only bought produce from their home villages, although grain was 
concurrently available in other places, which were either nearer to the selling point, and/ or being 
bought by other wholesalers at a cheaper price. Thus, an apparent instance of operational inefficiency 
was observed, and the causes of it could be pursued though interviews with those concerned. It 
emerged that, in some cases, this buying pattern was due to lack of knowledge of alternative sources 
of supply and that, in others, the benefits of reducing risk through maintaining regular relationships 
with particular fanners, and/ or the ability to establish familial divisions of labour within the 
marketing enterprise, were perceived as over-riding the costs of purchasing in home villages 
(Scarborough, 1990). Similarly, the handling of commodities in storage, transport and processing can 
be a crucial determinant of qualitative and quantitative crop losses, which are important in technical 
efficiency. Handling in different enterprises may contribute significantly to differences in enterprises' 
technical efficiency indices. 
Beyond Enterprise (Firm)-Level Productive Efficiency 
A different assessment is required if industry- or channel-wide productive efficiency is the object of 
study, since then 0-efficiency becomes important. While ways of measuring this as a separate 
characteristic remain to be developed, various economic analyses of the economic efficiency of a 
market sub-system can be carried out. These should take into account potential economies of scale; 
the benefits of vertical and horizontal integration; the siting and quality of plants, market places and 
other infrastructure; the level of transport costs and the efficiency of different production methods 
(see Chapter 5). 
ECONOMIC OR EXCHANGE EFFICIENCY 
In attempting to characterize the economic efficiency of markets, the standard of perfect competition 
is most commonly used as a base for evaluation. This is because more dynamic models of economic 
efficiency are as yet less well-developed, and more complex, and because the hybridization of neo-
classical economics with other political and social efficiency theories remains incomplete (see Box 
2:1). Therefore, the analyses described below focus on assessing the degree of competition in the 
market sub-system under observation. 
Using the Model of Perfect Competition 
It is important when undertaking analyses of economic efficiency which are based on the conditions 
of perfect competihon, to recall that markets may be more or less competitive iu particular areas; 
times; commodities; functions; levels of marketing activity; cales of operation etc .. As previously 
noted, in the immediate post-harvest period, a number of petty traders or farmer /trader may enter 
the market for a short time, but constraints on storage may enable the monopolization of trade in 
later, pre-harvest periods. Similarly, competition may be stiff at the retail level of food marketing, 
where capital requirements for entry are not prohibitive, but wholesaling may be oligopolistic. 
It is also crucial, in using the model of perfect competition, to: 
• combine various types of data analyses, since none on their own can be held to be conclusive; 
• to establish the sources of apparent imperfections, since the means to overcome them need to be 
identified, and not all of them will necessarily be deleterious in terms of the efficiency of 
resource allocation, or economic performance, more broadly; and 
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Box 4:1 Using the Model of Perfect Competition to Analyse Market Efficiency 
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Because of the stringent conditions necess-
ary (a) to ensure markets are perfectly com-
petitive and (b) for them to result in Pareto 
optimal conditions, (see Box 1:1) it is often 
necessary when analysing economic 
efficiency to refer to a standard in which 
competitive levels are defined as 'good 
enough', and to question the assumptions 
and objectives of the model. 
No real-world markets are perfectly com-
petitive, and the principal use of the model 
is as a yardstick against which to compare 
real situations. It enables the systematic 
analysis of the economic efficiency of mar-
kets; the isolation of departures from the 
perfect situation; the definition of causes of 
this; the characterization of these depar-
tures as either benign or harmful, and it aids 
policy decision making. 
However, doubts concerning the useful-
ness of the model of perfect competition as a 
policy instrument in the context of real 
world imperfections, led to an attempt in 
the 1940s and 1950s to define conditions 
which were operational, and would define a 
state of 'workable competition'. 
Workable competition 
Sosnick (1958, 1968) summarizes the litera-
ture on workable competition. He defines 
the theory of workable competition as 'an 
attempt to indicate what practically attain-
able state of affairs are socially desirable in 
individual capitalistic markets'. He also lists 
sixteen conditions that would define an 
industry, or market, as workably competi-
tive, as follows: 
• the existence of as many buyers and 
sellers as scale economies permit, and 
enough buyers and sellers to ensure 
alternative possibilities; 
• free access of buyers and sellers to the 
market, with no preferential treatment 
of particular individuals or groups; 
• the absence of artificial inhibitions on 
mobility; 
• moderate, and price-sensitive, quality 
differentials in the products offered; 
• some uncertainty in the minds of rivals 
as to whether price initiatives will be 
followed; 
• the absence of participants powerful 
enough to coerce rivals, or engage in 
exclusionary, or predatory tactics; 
• responsiveness on the part of partici-
pants to profits and losses; 
• the absence of agreements, or collu-
sion, between rivals on commercial 
policy; 
• the absence of misleading sales 
promotion; 
• production and distribution should be 
technically and operationally efficient, 
and should not waste resources; 
• output levels and qualities should 
respond to consumer demands; 
• profits should be at levels just sufficient 
to reward investment, productive 
efficiency and innovation; 
• prices should encourage rational 
choices, and should guide markets to 
equilibrium; 
• opportunities for technological and 
product innovation should be 
exploited; 
• promotional expenses should not be 
excessive; 
• financial success should accrue to those 
who best serve consumer wants. 
All these conditions are relative, and thus 
require value judgements. This is particu-
larly the case when some, but not all the 
criteria, are satisfied. In addition, some of 
the criteria remain difficult, if not imposs-
ible, to measure, but these conditions do 
provide an indication of what can be 
expected in testing empirical situations for 
economic efficiency. They can also be used 
for attempting to identify means of improv-
ing the efficiency of markets. 
• therefore to return to the assumptions of the theory of perfect competition, and to other 
performance objectives, to weigh up the costs and benefits of appar nt imperfections. For 
example, where there are significant economies of scale in marketing operations, oligopolistic 
market structures may result in a more efficient allocation of resouxces tha11 competitive ones. 
ANALYSING THE CONDITIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION 
Determining the presence or absence of the requirements of the model of perfect competition can be 
used indirectly to assess the economic efficiency of markets. Many studies concerned with the 
efficiency of food, and/ or agricultural markets begin with this form of analysis. In particular, there 
has been much emphasis on: 
• relative numbers and sizes of different types of trading enterprise; 
• barriers to entry into the market; and 
• the availability of market information. 
This focus follows from the assumptions that (a) inefficient pricing is often associated with 
oligopolistic market structures and poor market information, and that (b) in food marketing, 
participants are economically rational and products are divisible, and therefore these two conditions 
do not have to be tested. However, as Jones (1974, p.16) points out, although such exercises can 
provide a basis for enquiry, and a guide to further research, they do not allow for an evaluation of 
how well markets perform various functions in the absence of some of these conditions, nor of the 
costs of such imperfections. Hence the necessity for combining different types of analysis. 
Approaches to assessing the size distribution of enterprises are discussed below. Bain (1969) 
suggests that barriers to entry into the market can be measured by the maximum ratio of the selling 
price to minimum long-run production costs that can exist without attracting new enterprises, but it 
is unlikely that this will be possible in LDCs, or under the constraints of rapid reconnaissance. 
Therefore, as detailed in Chapter 3, the nature and levels of barriers to entry will usually only be 
assessed relatively, and through interviews with current or potential market participants, and/ or 
surveys of the age, gender and ethnic distributions of traders. Similarly, there are no absolute 
measures to quantify the availability of market information beyond those suggested in Chapter 3, so 
these latter two conditions are not considered further. 
Assessing Market Structure - The Size Distribution of Enterprises (Firms) 
Bearing in mind the problems associated with structural analyses of markets discussed in Chapter 2 
and, in particular, the non-deterministic nature of the relationship between structure, conduct and 
performance, assessing market structure can nonetheless be a useful starting point in data analyses. 
It can be combined with observational surveys and participant interviews, aimed at determining the 
presence or absence of other conditions of competition, and in developing initial hypotheses about 
likely behavioral attributes, for further corroboration. 
As noted above, market or industry structure is most commonly evaluated by examining (a) trends 
in the numbers and sizes of firms relative to each other, and to numbers of consumers and producers, 
in particular times and places, and (b) the presence, absence,levels, and nature of entry barriers faced 
by new enterprises. 
Seller Concentration 
In characterizing market structure in industrialized market economies, seller concentration, or the 
size distribution of enterprises' sales, has been the most commonly used criterion. It is hypothesized 
that the more concentrated an industry, and/ or the greater the barriers to entry, the easier it is for 
enterprises to collude in their output and pricing practices, and the more likely that, in the long-run, 
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output levels will fall and prices will rise. Other performance criteria will imila.rly be adver ely 
affected. For example, it is argued that inflation and wlemployment will also increase, because highly 
concentrated industries exhibit some of the characteristics of monopolies, like lower pmduction and 
higher prices than competitive ones. 
In food marketing, very large numbers of consumers and farmers at each end of the marketing 
chain are suggestive of competitive conditions and, therefore, the main focus in. analysing market 
structure is on th numbers and sizes of enterprises within the system, and the p tential acce s of 
additional participants to it. I£ at any point in the market chain only one, or a few, buyer , r ellers, 
dominate the market, in terms of volumes of commodities handled, uncompetitive behaviour is 
possible. 
For example, indications of the likelihood of competitive behaviour in, and hence performance of, 
the milling industry can be found through analysing data on the numbers and spatial distribution of 
mills in relation to centres of population, and hence demand for milling services. Changes in the 
number of mills over time will also be instructive. lf there is a significant growth in the number of 
mills following market liberalization, one can hypothesize that barriers to entry were prohibitive 
though are not any longer. However, the capital investment and foreign exchange necessary to 
purchase mills should also be examined, because entry into the industry may be restricted by the 
lumpy nature of the investments, and by imperfect finance and foreign exchange markets. This 
information may be obtainable from secondary sources, since in many LDCs the allocation of foreign 
exchange is heavily regulated. 
Concentration indices Having collected data pertaining to the numbers and sizes of enterprises, 
there are various indices which can be calculated to provide some form of measurement of the degree 
of market concentration. The most commonly used m asure of maTket power, or seller concentration, 
is given by the proportion of total industry sales accounted for by, for example, the four largest 
enterprises in the industry, as follows: 
C = (XP /IP)lOO; 
where C = the index of concentration; XP = the aggregate output of a certain number of largest 
enterprises, in monetary or volumetric terms; IP = the total output of the industry. 
Khols and Uhl (1985, p.l87) suggest that, as a rule-of-thumb, a four enterprise concentration ratio of 
50% or more is indicative of a strongly oligopolistic industry; of 33-50% a weak oligopoly, and less 
than that, an unconcentrated industry. 
Limitations on the use of concentration indices Calculating and using concentration ratios as a 
measure of market structure is subject to empirical, theoretical and inferential problems. In most 
LDCs, where firm records are u ually not available publicly, it would be difficult to determine such 
ratios on anything but the most local of scales. In addition, this single measure does not reveal 
anything about tl1e distribution of sales between the number of largest enterprises, nor does it take 
into account product differentiation or other possible monopoly elemen.t , and it does not allow for 
the possjbility of different degrees of oligopoly through time, space, market levels, Junctions and 
products. 
For example, ther may be high levels of concentration in one area, without the same enterprises 
having a high sha1·e of the mru·ket in another. Alternatively, the level of concentration for the industry 
as a whole may be low whilst, simultaneously, local instances of high concentration may be found. 
This concentration index also falls prey to the inferential problems of forming hypotheses about 
conduct from structural characterizations. For example, a large number of similar-sized enterprises 
may result in a low concentration index, but the possibility that these enterprises could collude, to 
form effective oligopolistic conditions, has to be kept in mind. Alternatively, highly concentrated 
industries may nonetheless be intensely competitive. This may be particularly so where such 
enterprises face actual, or potential, competition from imports. 
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Localized use of the concentration index Nevertheless, the larger the munber of participants in an 
industry, the more difficult it is to organize oligopolistic behaviour, and, depending on the objectives 
of the project, the concentration ratio given above can be usefully determined in local circumstances. 
In such instances, particular trader numbers in a specific market place can be estimated, together 
with the daily values of their total sales, and the monthly distribution of sales. This enables an 
estimation of the percentage of traders having monthly sales worth more than a certain amount of 
money, together with the proportion of the volume of the commodity concerned, traded in that 
market place, which they collectively handle. Another simpler indication of concentration is found 
through comparing the combined turnover of the largest enterprises with that of the remainder. If the 
former exceeds the latter some degree of concentration is implied. 
Similar calculations of structural concentration can be undertaken in relation to storage and 
processing in a local area. This can be done either using the volume, or value, of commodities 
handled, or other measures of firm size, for example asset ownership or numbers of employees. 
The data required for such calculations will probably have to come from interviews with traders 
and marketing officials, although local licensing and taxation offices may hold the required 
information. 
Implications of results Where there appear to be relatively few enterprises dominating the market, 
it is necessary to understand why this is so if means of increasing economic efficiency are to be 
sought. For example, there may be barriers to entry, like minimal capital or storage requirements, or 
there may be collusion over buying and selling, credit or information, between members of particular 
ethnic or socio-economic groups. Alternatively, there may be significant economies of scale which 
may mean concentration is more economically efficient. Similarly, where there is an even distribution 
of relatively small enterprises, the efficiency of their operations cannot be assumed, but must also be 
verified. For example, there may be pervasive insecurity in the markets due, for example, to traders' 
Box 4:2 Other Measures of Monopoly Power 
The Herfindahl Index of industry concen-
tration is calculated as the sum of the 
squared market shares of all sellers. A very 
small index indicates the presence of many 
firms of comparable size, whilst one of 1, or 
near 1, suggests that the number of firms is 
small and/ or that they have very unequal 
shares in the market. 
Lerner's Index of monopoly power 
measures the difference between marginal 
costs and prices, and is given by: 
M=(P-MC)/P 
where M is the measure of monopoly 
power; P is price; and MC marginal cost. 
It attempts to measure pricing strategies, a 
behavioral characteristic, directly. This 
index needs a great deal of data and it is 
unlikely that under the conditions of rapid 
reconnaissance it would be possible to use 
it. In addition, the relationship between P 
and MC will, to some extent, depend on the 
price elasticity of demand, which only 
partly depends on monopoly power. 
Furthermore, marginal cost is an ambigu-
ous concept. 
Killick (1981, p.225), in response to some 
of the problems of the index described in the 
text, suggests the following measure: 
HC = (XP I IP + M)100 
where HC is a hybrid index of 
concentration; 
M represents competitive imports; 
XP = Total output (or employment) of X 
number of largest firms; 
IP =Total output (or employment) of indus-
try or market sector. 
Economists have also attempted to classify 
market structure, and characterize conduct, 
by calculating the price elasticity of demand 
faced by firms, and the cro s-price ela -
ticities between firms. The hypothesis here 
is that, if a perfectly elastic demand curve is 
exhibited, markets are competitive and 
efficient. This is extremely complex and 
needs much data however, and does not 
always lead to mutually exclusive categor-
izations. 
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low incomes and assets, and/ or large price fluctuations. This may lead to a preference for family 
labour and risk-averse market strategies, like those aimed at ensuring supplies, rather than 
maximizing profits. In addition, the appearance of numerous small enterprises may be seasonally or 
spatially specific, and efforts must be made to find out whether this is the norm. 
PRICE ANALYSES 
Further insights into the economic efficiency of markets, and pmticularly the costs of market 
imperfections, can be obtained through an xamination of the ways in and degrees to which price 
behaviour departs from that predicted by the model of perfect competition. 
Thus, for exampleJ as a gro s indication, if price series, and supply and demand, data are available, 
the frequency and magnitude of price changes can be analysed. In a perfectly competitive market, 
th se should be directly related to the frequency and magnitude of shifts in supply and demand, and 
elasticities of supply and demand. For many agricultmal commodities, dem<md is inelastic in the 
short-rUll, and supply shifts seasonally. Beyond uch generalization however, the data required for 
analysing the relationship between price and 1 vels of supply and demand are often not available. 
Another rough test of the conditions of competition can be undertaken through looking at price 
variation. Under competitive conditions, prices may vary from day to day due to 'transient factors', 
in addition to t·espond.ing to Ullderlying shifts in supply and demand (Tomek and Robins_on, 1981, 
p.88). 'Transient factors' may be viewed as daily shifts in supply and demand, as a result of, for 
example, changing evaluations of market information on the part of market participants. Under 
monopoly conditions, prices are unlikely to respond to the latter. Therefore more frequent, but 
smaller, fluctuations in price levels, may be used to hypothesize that conditions are competitive, and 
vice versa. 
Analysing prices in various ways can reveal a lot of other information about markets and 
marketing, and Box 4:3 provides a summary of the most important of these. However, these analyses 
are always subject to the problems of data availability and accuracy, and to those of inference. They 
should, therefore, be used with caution. Subsequently, only analyses of price correlation coefficient 
and market margins are discussed in detail, since these have been the two most commonly used 
means of assessing the economic efficiency of markets to date. 
PRICE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSES 
Price correlation coefficient analyses are an indirect means of assessing economic efficiency, and have 
been used to indicate how well, and how far and fast, prices and price changes are transmitted 
through the market system. The latter has an important influence not only on resource allocation 
within a connected system, but also on the extent of the system, and hence on the possible degrees of 
specialization in production, and o-f the range of resource allocation. 
The 'law of one price' (see Box 4:4) is the basis on which correlation coefficient analyses are used in 
both the following: 
• determining the size, and degree of integration, of markets in various time, space and form 
dimensions, and 
• forming hypotheses about the efficiency of market co-ordination and price formation. 
This law implies that the spatial and temporal extent of markets, as well as the degree of integration 
and the efficiency of price formation, can be examined through an analysis of the correlation between 
movements of prices of the same commodity in different markets over space, time or form, and those 
of substitutes and complements over time. 
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Box 4:3 Price Analyses (adapted from Holtzman 1986:25) 
PRICE ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES DATA PROBLEMS 
REQUIREMENTS 
Trends in real prices Assessing how incen- Farm gate prices U e of econdary data 
tives to consume and Wholesale prices Definition of farm gate 
produce different prod- Retail prices and wholesale price 
ucts change over time, De/inflator 01ange in product over 
and to see whether these time 
concur with availabilities Availability and rep-
etc. resentativeness of de/ 
inflators 
Relative price relation- Assessing changes in Prices for key substitutes Availability and reliab-
ships agricultural/ rural terms and complements; ility of data 
of trade, and in farmers' inputs and consumption 
crop mixes, and regional goods 
patterns of resource allo-
cation over time 
International/ domestic Testing comparative Import parity prices, Only applies to inter-
price comparisons advantage, or the econ- including international nationally traded 
omic efficiency of home transport costs products 
production and market- Export parity prices, Specification of inter-
ing relative to the costs including domestic national prices; transport 
and benefits and import- transport costs costs and exchange rate 
ing and exporting Exchange rates used 
Quality differences 
Seasonal price variation Testing the integration of Average monthly, High rates of inflation 
markets, and modelling weekly or daily prices at may detract from 
price formation, over the same level of the seasonal component 
time market, and at the same Availability of tempor-
Calculating seasonal place for identical prod- ally disaggregated, and 
indices ucts reliability of, secondary 
Comparing seasonal data 
price movements with 
harvest times; stor-
ability; supplies of 
substitutes; changes in 
government policies; 
levels of supply and 
demand etc. 
Inter-spatial price Correlation coefficient Price data for at least High levels of correla-
variation analyses; testing market several locations, col- tion between prices may 
integration over space lected at the same time indicate either effective 
Modelling margins and and same level of the integration and/ or 
price formation in space marketing system, for competition and econ-
Hypotheses concerning identical products omic efficiency, or mono-
direction of commodity poly conditions 
flows, market connec- Thus, additional data 
tions and causes of these and analyses required 
Inter-form price Correlation coefficient Prices of specific vari- High levels of correla-
differences analyses; testing inte- eties and qualities of raw tion between prices may 
gration over form products, and of the indicate either effective 
Modelling margins and same in relation to end- integration and/or 
price formation through and by-products competition and econ-
processing Various conversion omic efficiency; or mono-
Hypotheses concerning ratios relevant to the poly conditions 
efficiency of different technologies concerned Thus, additional data 
technologies and analyses required 
Complexity of taking 
into account different 
rates of extraction and 
qualities of raw and end-
products 
Gross market margins Hypotheses concerning Prices of the same corn- Gross market margins 
economic efficiency of modity at different levels cannot be used as a 
marketing of the marketing system measure of economic 
Analysing changes over through time, space, efficiency and decon-
time in relation to form and function struction, using cost data 
supply; demand, income, is necessary 
policy etc. 
Assessing different par-
ticipants' relative market 
power positions 
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In a perfectly efficient and integrated market, correlation coefficients between the following 
variables would equal one. Prices over time for: 
• the same commodity in different places; 
• different forms of product in the same place; 
• the same commodity, in the same place, but in different seasons; and 
• complements and substitutes in the same season, form and place. 
Thus, price correlation coefficient analyses can, theoretically, be used to test the economic 
efficiency of the market; the likelihood of the existence of a domestic market and whether it serves to 
effectively connect producers and consumers throughout a country. The latter is important if it is 
suspected that there is much fragmentation, and local monopolization, of markets, which then only 
react to local supply and demand conditions. 
However, the technique is subject to serious interpretative problems, since different sets of 
circumstances can be consistent with similar results. For example, although competitive, efficient and 
integrated markets exhibit closely correlated movements of prices over space, time and form, 
inefficient, or even disconnected markets may, for various reasons, also be characterized by the same 
price relationships. Conversely, highly competitive and efficient conditions may not be revealed 
through price correlations; for example, if there is multi-directional trade which has not been taken 
into account. Thus, price correlations alone cannot be used as definitive indicators of market 
performance, and corroborative evidence is required to explain the resulting correlation 
characteristics. 
Despite much serious criticism over the past decade (Blyn, 1973; Harriss, 1979a), static price 
correlations remain the most common measure of spatial market integration. Devoid of mono-
deterministic assumptions, and combined with other information and analyses, they do provide a 
means of analysing this characteristic. This is particularly the case where 'one has no a priori basis for 
identifying a model of market structure' (Ravallion, 1987, p.114). 
Box 4:4 The Law of One Price and Correlation Coefficients 
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There is a theoretical relationship under 
perfect competiti0n between prices in 
space, time and form called the law of one 
price. This tates that under perfectly com-
petitive conditions, after taking into account 
the costs of adding place, time and form 
utility to products, all prices within a mar-
ket will be uniform and aligned. Similarly, 
the prices of perfect substitutes and comple-
mentary products will be perfectly corre-
lated. This follows from the profit seeking 
behaviour of marketing firms, which leads 
them to shift their products, services and 
resources from lower to higher valued uses. 
Shifting such resources depends ou (a) the 
receipt of information concernirlg current 
and expected market conditions, like 
supply and demand, and the potential rela-
tive returns to resources, and (b) the capa-
bility to physically respond to profitable 
alternatives thus revealed. Given perfect 
information, and the ability to respond to it, 
together with profit-maximizing objectives, 
traders' arbitrage activities should lead to 
the fulfilment of this law, and an allocation 
of resources between alternative uses which 
ensures maximum output. 
Coefficients of linear correlation (rxy = 
cov(xy) I xy) measure the strength of associ-
ation between two variables, when no other 
variables are taken into account. The square 
of the above, measures the proportion of 
variation in one variable that would be 
accounted for by linear regression in 
another, although neither variable can be 
singled out as causative, or dependent. The 
necessary computations can be found in any 
statistical text book, or results may be 
obtained using statistical computer pack-
ages. 
Calculating and Interpreting Correlation Coefficients 
Calculating coefficients of correlation between prices has usually only been used to test the spatial 
integration of markets, and economically efficient price formation in spatial arbitrage. This type of 
analysis is focused on below to illustrate the technique. Bivariate correlation or regression coefficients 
are estimated between the time series of spot wholesale or retail market prices for otherwise identical 
goods, at different locations. The computations are simple, and can be found in any standard 
statistical text book. Alternatively, calculations can be performed on micro-computers using a 
statistical analysis software package. 
A coefficient of 1.00 indicates identical price movements in two markets, but this never obtains in 
reality due to imperfect resource mobility, resulting from transport, storage and/ or processing costs; 
imperfect information, and, in some cases, product differentiation. As Lele (1971, p.23) points out, 
transport costs mean that prices for a commodity in two markets can vary within a range of plus or 
minus the transport costs without there being any transfer of commodities between them. The 
greater the transport costs, the greater the range of price movements possible without any physical 
transfer of goods, and the lower the correlation between prices. In addition, there may be errors in 
price measurements. Therefore findings of coefficients close to 1.00 have been used as evidence of 
spatial integration. 
A correlation coefficient of 0.8 suggests that 64% (0.8 squared) of price variation in one market is 
associated with that in another. In spatial analyses, lines can be drawn on maps between pairs of 
markets, or towns, which exhibit high correlations, to graphically illustrate inter-connectedness. For 
example, lines can be drawn between places which exhibit price correlation coefficients equal to or 
exceeding 0.8 or 0.9 for the period under study. 
Given that the direction of trade has been established, low correlation coefficients suggest that 
either (a) information on prices, supply and demand at various points in the system is lacking, and 
therefore traders are unaware of profitable alternatives, or that (b) the ability or motivation to 
respond to market opportunities thus revealed is lacking. Therefore market information or market-
ing resources may be the constraint. For example, transport bottlenecks of various types, including 
lack of vehicles and fuel, and impassable or insufficient roads, are very common in some LDCs. 
Problems Related to Correlation Analyses 
Using secondary data Because this technique analyses price movements over time, secondary 
sources usually have to be relied upon, and thus the perennial difficulties of using secondary price 
data have to be addressed. Some means of assessing the quality of such data were provided in 
Chapter 2. It is important in this instance to be aware, for example, of the following: 
• average prices may not be means, but random samples of spot prices recorded sometime during 
a month or week; 
• temporal, volumetric and weight dimensions may not be standardized; and 
• prices may not refer to the same quality or grade of product. 
Therefore, attempts should be made to establish when, where and how monthly /weekly prices were 
collected and calculated; what grading system was used, and how far this reflects trader's own 
differentiation between qualities and grades; and what weights and measures were used in 
collection. 
The technique has been included here despite the data demands, because there are countries 
where the required data will be available; there are means of working with such data even if its 
quality is dubious, and it is expected that, particularly post-liberalization, price data collections will 
be improved and extended. 
Inferring market characteristics The danger of leaping from correlation results to market charac-
terizations is illustrated by various possible market situations. For example, in spatial analyses, time 
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series prices may be independent, yet synchronously and similarly affected by another variable, like 
the price of a related good traded in a common market; a shared dynamic seasonal structw·e of 
production, or prices in a shar d destination market. It is possible then for two price series to exhibit 
high correlation coefficients in the context of market segmentation. 
Conversely, monopoly control of prices, or pr curement at fixed, pru1-territorial or pan-seasonal 
prices, will result in high correlation coefficients. Spatially or seasonally integrated markets therefore 
do not have to be competitive or economically efficient. High coefficients indicate table margin , and 
by themselves are not indicative of monopoly or competition. 
Alternatively, markets may be spatially or seasonally integrated and highly competitive, but 
exhibit low price correlation coefficients, due to multi-directional trade which has not been taken into 
account. For example, markets may function simultaneously, and/ or sequentially, as centres of 
supply, intermediate and final demand. Therefore, determinating the direction of product flows, and 
hence of price formation processes, at particular times of year, is a minimum requirement for 
meaningful interpretation of results. 
Other influences on price series Correlation coefficients between price series are influenced by 
inflation and large seasonal price movements. If the prices being correlated were collected during a 
period of substantial inflation, the coefficients may reflect eo-variations between prices in the series, 
which are due to their being equaJ1y affected by inflationruy forces. As Haniss (1979a, p.202) points 
out, 'ceteris paribus, in a time of secularly rising prices due to population growth and increased 
efiective demand relative to supplies, the coeificient will rise because absolute distru1ces from the 
tre1d line will b relatively less deviant if marketing costs remain constant'. Similarly, the necessity of 
working with price averages, may influence results. 'Ceteris paribus, the longer the time period and/ 
or the wider the range of varieties over which price series variates are being averaged for correlation, 
the higher the coefficient, the lower the significance level and the greater the likelihood that the day-
to-day fluctuations which provide traders' profits are smoothed away'. 
Using Price Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
Selecting and pre-treating the data There ru·e ways of addressing some of these constraints. For 
example, Blyn (1973) sugge t that long price series should be deflated and deseasonalized, and then 
the series resulting from these residuaJs correlated. This would remove time trends, due to rising 
demand as population and income increase affect whole regions, ru1d seasonal trends, to control for 
common supply patterns. However, this is more cUificult where only urban deflators are available, 
and price series are short, which is often the case in LDCs. It is also les meaningful where short and 
easonal trends are not spatiaJly or temporally synchronous. Alternatively, periods over which 
inflation was moderate can be used (Tinuner et al., 1983, p.l76). 
Combining different analyses As noted above, high coefficients of correlation between prices may 
co-exist with physically unconnected or monopolized markets, and low coefficients with intense 
trade between markets and/ or highly competitive conditions. No simple relationship between 
integration, competition and economic efficiency can be assumed. The need to combine correlation 
analy es with others, in attempting to characterize markets in terms of their degree of integration and 
competition is therefore cleaT. This type of analysis can only provide stronger evidence oi market 
performance characteristics if combined with an understanding of how markets operate and are 
organized on the ground, and how U1e costs ru1d return t spatial and temporal arbitrage a11d 
processing compare. It should therefore only be used as an indicative m.easure and combined with 
oU1er types of anaJyses, and researcher should always question the reasons for the results. 
On a local scale, other problems with this tecluuque can be overcome through collecting one's wn 
data and compru·ing th se with econdary ource ; e tablishing trading routes, both current and past, 
and through understanding more about the exact proces es of price formation. For example, Harris 
(1981, pp.136-140) calculated the correlation coefficients for five varieties of paddy and rice 
wholesale and retail prices between ten towns, known to be physically connected. Combining the 
results of this ru1alysis with an w1derstru1ding derjved from trader interviews about the primary 
influences on the determination of these various prices, she was able to suggest that the paddy 
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wholesale and rice retail trade were likely to be more spatially monopolistic, on a localized scale, than 
rice wholesale trade. Such conclusions are important in ordering policy priorities. 
Other means of addressing the shortcomings of the technique have also been devised (see Box 4:5), 
but tend to lead to highly complex forms of analyses which would probably not be possible under 
rapid reconnaissance conditions. 
Box 4:5 Further Means of Overcoming the Problems 
The most comprehensive work done to date 
on the inferential problems posed by price 
correlation coefficient analyses in LDCs is 
that of Ravallion (1987). He argues that (a) 
'by permitting each local price series to have 
its own dynamic structure (and allowing for 
any correlated local seasonality or other 
characteristics), as well as an inter-linkage 
with other local markets, the main inferen-
tial dangers of the simpler bivariate model 
can be avoided' and (b) 'spurious correla-
tions can also be avoided by filtering the 
price series prior to calculating pairwise 
correlations; this can be done by testing for 
residual cross-correlations amongst uni-
variate ARlMA models of each price 
series ... or by similar Granger-causality 
methods.' 
MARKET MARGIN ANALYSES 
Defining Market Margins 
Another method, less commonly used, to 
test for spatial integration is to calculate the 
spatial variance of prices, and a long-run 
convergence towards zero. But it can be 
shown 'that if prices at different markets are 
generated by identical, but independent 
stationary autoregressive processes, then 
they will asymptotically converge to zero 
variance. Thus, nothing can be inferred 
about the interlinkage of markets from the 
results of such tests' (Ravallion, 1987, p.114). 
This author (p.104) also suggests that 
with the same data, the static bivariate cor-
relation method can be extended into a 
dynamic model of spatial price differentials. 
Market margins are the difference between prices at two market levels. The term market margin is 
most commonly used to refer to the difference between producer and consumer prices of an 
equivalent quantity and quality of a commodity. However, it may also describe price differences 
between other points in the marketing chain, for example between producer and wholesale, or 
wholesale and retail, prices. 
Margins represent the price charged for one or a collection of marketing services. For example, the 
difference between producer and consumer prices is the amount charged for all the marketing 
services rendered between production and consumption, including buying, bulking, transport, 
storage, processing etc .. Under competitive conditions, the size of market margins would be the 
outcome of the supply and demand for marketing services, and they would equal the minimum costs 
of service provision plus 'normal' profit. The latter is not a clear concept, but can be defined as 'the 
least payment the owner of an enterprise would be willing to accept for performing the entrepre-
neurial function, including risk-taking, management and the like .. .it is the payment the owner must 
receive in order to keep him from withdrawing his capital and managerial effort and putting them 
into some other alternative' (Spencer, 1971, p.395). 
Market Margins and Economic Efficiency 
The formation of marketing margins, through their influence on price levels, is a major determinant 
of the efficiency of resource allocation in production, distribution and consumption. Productively 
efficient and low-cost marketing, together with efficient pricing of services, provides the market with 
its potential for co-ordinating production and consumption, and allocating resources in a way which 
maximizes output and satisfaction, and signals to producers and consumers the opportunity costs of 
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their decisions. Therefore analysing market margins is an important means of assessing the efficiency 
of price formation in and transmission through the system. 
The Formation of Market Margins 
The size of market margins is largely dependent on a combination of: 
• the quality and quantity of marketing services provided; 
• the costs of providing such services; and 
• the efficiency with which they are undertaken and priced. 
The quality and quantity of marketing services provided will depend on the demand and supply 
of marketing services and/ or the degree of competition in the market place. 
The costs of providing such services, are influenced by: 
• factors exogenous to the marketing sub-system, like government policies; the price of fuel; the 
condition of roads; vehicle supply and demand; competitive conditions in factor markets; and 
• endogenous factors, in particular the technical and operational efficiency with which marketing 
functions are carried out, including the realization of potential scale economies. 
The efficiency with which marketing functions are priced, in the absence of scale economies, will 
be largely determined by the extent of competition between marketing enterprises at each stage of 
the marketing chain, since this is the dominant factor in limiting levels of profit. 
Gross and Deconstructed Market Margin Analyses 
Gross market margins cannot be treated as indicators of economic performance because (a) 
economically efficient markets also necessitate productive and exchange efficiency, and (b) gross 
market margins represent the sum of costs incurred by, and the returns to, market participants. 
Large gross margins may obtain under widely varying circumstances. They may be associated 
alternatively with high costs and low profits; increased quantities or qualities of service; or high rates 
of profit. Similarly, large margins can be associated with low capital, labour or management 
productivity as a result of either monopoly control, and hence lack of incentives to reduce costs or 
increase productivity; absence of profit-maximizing behaviour and/ or with risk-reducing market 
strategies. For example, wholesalers buying solely from their home villages or regular suppliers, may 
lead to increased costs and consumer prices; lowered producer prices and an economically inefficient 
allocation of resources. Conversely, small gross margins may co-exist with inefficient use of 
resources; poor co-ordination and consumer satisfaction; and disproportionate profit elements. Thus, 
higher marketing margins resulting from increased ervice , including better co-ordination, may 
leave producers and consumer better off, and low margins may be due to low productivity. 
Therefoxe, in using market margin analyses to assess the economic performance of markets, it is 
always preferable to deconstruct them into their cost and return elements. Despite the above caveats: 
• a low distributive margin is often assumed to work to the economic advantage of producers and 
consumers in LDCs; 
• it is often not possible to deconstruct margins due to lack of data on costs; and 
• the analysis of gross margins, or absolute margin sizes, can provide insights into some aspects of 
markets and marketing, and therefore both types of analysis are discussed here. 
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Box 4:6 Small Gross Margins and Numbers of Middlemen 
That small gross margins are assumed 
always to be beneficial is presumably 
because it is thought that increased services 
are not in demand by the mass of consumers 
in LDCs, and that they would have a higher 
preference for cheaper staples. 
For example, Timmer et al. (1983, p.209) 
argue that the lowering of marketing costs 
potentially provides the most efficient and 
sustainable short-run means of addressing 
the dilemma between producers' desire for 
higher and consumers' for lower food 
prices. Similarly, Harrison et al. (1987, p.l8) 
argue that lower marketing (and pro-
duction) costs would lead to reduced food 
prices; increased demand for both food and 
non-food commodities; increased pro-
duction of and demand for inputs, and 
therefore more income and employment 
generation in both the food and non-food 
sectors. From the discussion on gross mar-
gins above, however, it is obvious that, 
Measuring and Analysing Market Margins 
unless marketing is competitive, lowering 
the costs of marketing will not necessarily 
benefit producers or consumer . Similarly, 
unless consumer preferences are responded 
to, towering the gross market margin will 
not necessarily benefit them. Thus, improv-
ing technical or operational efficiency, with-
out simultaneously addressing exchange or 
economic efficiency, prevents such potential 
from being realized. Further, Mellor (1970, 
p.333) argues that where margins are 
already very small, reducing them further is 
unlikely to affect producer prices, whether 
they are the result of efficiency, or monopoly 
and inefficient marketing. 
Another common fallacy is that margins 
are determined by the number of traders in 
the chain. A division of labour between 
merchants, resulting in greater specializa-
tion, may increase the efficiency of market-
ing, as may increased competition resulting 
from a greater number of participants. 
Measuring and deconstructing market margins needs much data and time, but provides a more 
accurate means of analysing the economic efficiency of markets than previous analyses, and it is 
important if profits and/ or costs are thought to be excessive. 
The most accurate means of calculating marketing margins is through detailed analyses of the 
accounts of trading firms, noting in particular the precise costs incurred, and value added, at each 
stage of marketing, and the prices charged for services rendered. However, not only do many traders 
not keep such records in LDCs, but where such data are recorded they may be inaccurate if, for 
example, levels of taxation are thought to be based upon them. This, together with research resource 
constraints, mean such analyses are often not possible, and secondary and interview data have to be 
relied upon. 
Most LDC marketing margin analyses to date have been concerned with gross margins, and have 
provided simple computations of the share of the consumers' unit price obtained by producers and 
traders at each stage of the marketing chain. Thus, the part of the consumer price received by 
farmers, assemblers, wholesalers, processors, transporters and retailers is calculated. However, 
because costs are not calculated separately, these measures can only provide indications of the prices 
charged for marketing services, not of whether these result from efficient operations and/ or pricing, 
or the ability to make large profits. Nevertheless, analysing gross market margins can provide 
insights into other aspects of marketing and can lead to the formation of initial hypotheses 
concerning economic efficiency. 
GROSS MARKET MARGIN ANALYSIS 
Data Requirements 
In order to measure gross market margins, data on prices obtaining at different stages in the 
marketing chain are required. To interpret the results, information on the way the market operates on 
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Box 4:7 Market Margin Measures used in Industrialized Market Economies 
In industrialized economies two commonly 
used measures of agricultural market mar-
gins are the food marketing bill and farm-
retail price spreads. The former is calculated 
as the difference between total annual con-
sumer expenditure on domestically 
produced foods, and total farmer receipts 
for the equivalent farm products. However, 
this reveals nothing about farm prices rela-
tive to the costs of production, or to the 
returns to other economic activities, which 
are important in assessing production 
incentives. Nor does this measure provide a 
means of comparing the costs of, and prices 
charged for, marketing services and hence 
assessing the relative economic efficiency of 
the sub-sector. 
Unit farm-retail price spreads are computed 
as the difference between unit retail prices 
and the farm value of an equivalent amount 
of raw product. These allow a more detailed 
analysis of the division of consumer expen-
diture between farmers and traders, for 
individual food product . The spread rep-
r er1t the gro s unit returns to mark ting -
i.e. costs and pr fits. Again, little is revealed 
ab ut ab olute farm prices and .incomes, 
since falling farm shares in the spread do 
not necessarily mean falling farm prices. 
Similarly, because marketing costs and 
profits are not differentiated, price spreads 
do not allow for an evaluation of the com-
petitiveness and economic efficiency of the 
marketing system. 
the ground, in particular on the temporal, spatial and institutional flow of goods is necessary. This 
can be obtained either from secondary sources, or through surveys and interviews, depending on 
data availability; the scale of the project; and research resources. 
Price data should be as disaggregated as time, resources and secondary data allow. Simple 
attempts to calculate margins by subtracting average annual urban retail prices from average annual 
farm-gate prices will probably be misleading. For example, this approach assumes that the rural and 
urban markets are always connected by a flow of goods; that the flow is always from the rural to 
urban areas; that the commodity is marketed through the whole chain; and that there are no seasonal 
differences in trading patterns and margins. Hence there is a need to use monthly or weekly price 
data, and to find out the main direction of commodity flows. In addition, the nature of the 
relationships between marketing participants, and between them and consumers and producers, 
and the various price setting procedures in operation are instructive in explaining these margins. 
Limitations of Gross Margin Analyses 
Although gross margin and share computations reveal little about the economic efficiency of, or net 
returns to, farming and distribution, they have been used to compare margins for the same product 
in different times, regions and countries, and between product types in the same or different times 
and places, to suggest relative efficiencies of different markets. However, as Harriss (1981, p.140) 
points out, in attempting such comparisons it is necessary, though difficult, to take account of 
differences in product perishability; in the number of services necessary, or actually rendered; in the 
levels of capital intensity between firms; and in factor costs in different countries. 
An additional weakness in these margin calculations is their static nature. They are often 
calculated by noting price differences between different levels of the market, for example between 
wholesale and retail prices, in the same town and at the same time. Therefore they do not allow for 
the temporal realities of storage, or the spatial implications of inter-market transfers (Harriss, 1979, 
p.79). These can, however, be incorporated, as will be seen below. 
Uses of Gross Margin Analyses 
Despite the limitations on the use of margins computed in this manner, analysing market participant 
shares of consumer prices, and the size of gross margins, may provide insights into other important 
market characteristics, and can aid the formation of hypotheses concerning market efficiency. The 
latter can then be tested through margin deconstruction, if data on costs are available or can be 
collected. 
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Changes in gross margins over time The size of different gross margins can be assessed over time 
to see if any patterns can be observed, and any e. planations offered. It may also be important to 
assess who gains and loses if and when marketing margins do change. 
Attempting to explain changes in particular gross margin sizes over time can lead to the formation 
of hypotheses concerning the efficiency of marketing. Under competitive conditions, marketing 
margins should change with shifts in the demand for and supply of marketing services, the latter 
depending on factor costs and technological changes, and the former on consumer income and 
preferences. In uncompetitive situations, changes in the size of the gross margin will be less 
determina te, since factor costs, the quality and quantity of services r ndered, and the efficiency with 
which fw1ctions are undertaken and priced, will all be subject to forces other than supply and 
den1and. For example, sticky market margins are very common in industrialized market economies, 
and Kohls and Uhl (1985, p.217) attribute this to a combination of the high proportion of margin 
accounted for by labour costs, unionized work forces, and a failure to increase labour productivity in 
line with wage increases. 
Under the conditions of rapid reconnaissance research, analysts will probably not be able to assess 
the relationship between gross margin sizes and changes in demand and supply for marketing 
services, but it may be possible, depending on secondary data availability, to formulate hypotheses 
by analysing the relationships between various time series data, and through reference to economic 
theory. 
For example, Timmer (1974) demonstrates that simple modelling exercises can reveal much about 
likely directions of commodity flows and price formation between markets (see Box 4:11). Goetz and 
Weber (1987, p.49) suggest that regressi n analyses can be used to determine the relationship 
between primary levels of supply, the consumer price index and market margins, as well as that 
between different market margin , over time. Harriss (1981, p.140) argues that, if markets are 
efficient, margins should move independently of raw product prices. However, it could also be 
argued that (a) in providing a marketing service, raw materials represent a factor cost, and (b) 
because the demand for marketing services increases with increased product supply, such shifts in 
the margin may form the basis for hypothesizing that conditions are competitive. Alternatively, if 
gross margins decline with increased raw material supply, economies of scale may be a factor, and if 
they rise with farm production, bottlenecks or constraint in the provision of marketing services may 
be implied. Similarly, with reference to economic theory, researchers could propose that, as demand 
for marketing services has a positive income elasticity, one would expect real gross margins to 
increase with development. Conversely, increased technical and operational efficiency and techno-
logical innovation may lead to reduced real margins. 
The size of different participants' margins The relative size of various market participants' gross 
margins can indicate where in the marketing chain value is added and/ or profits are made. 
Deconstructing the margins is then required to establish the part each of these plays, but gross 
margin analysis can be undertaken to form hypotheses about the relative productive efficiency, or 
bargaining positions, of different categories of ma-rket participant. For example, Harrison et al. (1987, 
p.43) argue that where wholesalers' gross margins are grea ter than those of retailers, a lack of 
competition, or a greater degree of tmcertainty, spoilage, and/or cost inefficiency, is likely at the 
wholesale level, because one would expect higher volumes of turnover to compensate for smaller per 
unit costs and returns. 
Similarly, changes in the ratio between various participants' shares in market margins over time 
can provide the basis for hypotheses. For example, changes in wholesaler and retailer shares of the 
consumer price, over time, may be the result of either (a) increased or decreased costs in one, or both, 
of these functions, with or without changes in services rendered, or (b) shifts in participants' relative 
market power. D construction of the margin is needed to ascertain whether such changes are 
primarily due to changes in the cost or the profit component, which in turn will reveal which is the 
probable primary cause of the change. 
Additionally, the difference in variability of market participants' gross margins over a certain 
period of time, measured through coefficients of variation (calculated by dividing the standard 
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deviation by the mean, and multiplying the result by 100) can be indicative of the locus of instability 
absorption in the marketing chain, and therefore of relative bargaining position . For example, 
comparing the magnitude of variation in consumer prices, with that of the total marketing margin, 
will indicate whether the market is operating to increase consumer price stability i11 the hort-run, or 
the reverse. Some or all of the market participants may reduce their margins when the prices they 
face rise and vice versa. Harriss' (1981, p.144) analysis of variation of wholesale and retail prices 
suggested that retailers in deficit areas were relatively passive in price formation, whereas most 
worked towards ironing out minor pric fluctuations. This is important in raising the possibility that 
relatively high averag margins may co-exist with intermittent trader losses. 
Identifying apparently negative market margins can also be instructive. These may result from 
variou factors, including inconect assumptions about the directions of commodity flows; data 
errors; the combii1ation of several functions withm single enterprises; and losses on the part of 
traders. 
Producer prices and the gross margin Farm rs' share of the con u.rner price can similarly be 
analysed over time in order to assess their relative bargaining position in the market. There are a 
number of possible explanations for uch hlfts, and margins will have to be deconstructed m order 
to assess their relative importance. For example, changes in world prices for related final products, 
and/ or in markem1g costs, may;. or may not, b passed on to producers. This will, to some extent, be 
determined by farmers' relative bargaining position in the market. If an increased share in consumer 
prices is the result of an improved bargaming position, it could be th consequence of producer co-
operation and organization, and/ or of increas d competition in the marketing sub-sector. If farmers' 
share of the consumer price is taken a an ii1dication of their relative bargaining position, it can be 
compared with that m other countries and regions to provide relative evaluations. For example, price 
differences at the point of sale may den1onstrate that rurally elling farmers are disadvantaged, 
relative to those selling in towns. However, the fact that lower farmer prices may indicate greater 
profits for traders, or disguised interest rates on loans, means such measures should not be treated 
conclusively (Harriss, 1981, p.143). 
DECONSTRUCTING MARKET MARGINS - COSTS AND 
RETURNS 
Having reviewed the problems encountered in attempting to a11alyse the economic efficiency of 
market functions, through correlating prices in different space, time and fom1 dimensions, and 
through analysing gross market margins, we now turn to a more direct means of evaluating the 
efficiency of marketing and price formation. 
Much more can be learned about the efficiency of marketing through deconstructing gross margins 
into their cost and return components. Because the sum of costs and returns in the market margin 
tells us little about the efficiency of marketing in a11y of its dimensions, it is always preferable to 
deconstruct the margin into its component parts, in order to analyse economic performance. But this 
necessitates data on marketing costs, and it is more time-conswuing than gross margil1 analyses. 
Holtzman (1986, p.30) argues that decon truction is too time-consuming in rapid reconnaissance 
projects, and that only gross margins should be calculated. An attempt to account for apparently high 
gross margins can then be made by observing the conditions of marketing. For example, they are 
often the result of inadequate transport systems, and/ or the small-scale, isolated and dispersed 
nature of food production in LDCs. In such cases, investment in transport infrastructure should 
lower marketiilg costs, but, if the market is uncompetitive, this may not benefit producers or 
consumers. Where there are grounds for believing high gross margins are the result of oligopoly and 
barriers to entry, improved market information, and other means of enhancing competition, would 
reduce costs. 
However, it is difficult to assess whether gross margins can be characterized as high in the absence 
of cost data, and where obvious explanations for seemingly large gross margins are not apparent, 
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Box 4:8 Market Margins and Consumer and Producer Prices 
There are two ways of theorizing the 
relationship between changing market mar-
gins, and consumer and producer prices. 
Retail food price formation may be domi-
nated by the costs of production, and hence 
the farm price, plus the costs of marketing. 
Alternatively, retail prices may be more 
determinate of farm prices, which are then 
conceived of as the residual of the retail 
price, net of marketing costs. In a competi-
tive market, if the cost-plus price of food is 
more accurate, changes in either pro-
duction, or marketing, costs will be passed 
on to consumers. If farm prices are residual 
however, changes in the costs of marketing 
would be more likely to be passed on to the 
producers. 
In the long-run, at equilibrium, the two 
concepts are identical. However, this is 
never obtained. Khols and Uhl (1985, p.229) 
suggest that the cost-plus theory is more 
accurate in the medium term, when all pro-
duction and marketing costs must be paid 
for by consumer, but that the derived 
demand theory is more realistic in the short-
run world of economic activity, where there 
will be periods when farm prices do not 
exceed the costs of production. This theory 
is also more useful in that it recognizes that 
the market will distribute increased market-
ing co ts between producers and consumer 
according the alternative opportunities both 
f<lce. For example, if there is intem_ational 
food trade, and the consumer price is deter-
mined by the world price, then it will not 
shift in the face of changed marketing costs, 
and the burden of adjustment will fall on 
marketeers and farmers. 
Alternatively, it can be argued that under 
conditions of competition, the effects of 
changes in the margin on producer and 
consumer prices will depend on the origins 
of such change (Tomek and Robinson, 1981, 
p.129). Where costs are reduced in supply-
ing existing services, both producers and 
consumers should benefit, but the incidence 
of the benefits will depend on elasticities of 
supply and demand. Where margin 
changes are du · to additional ervices, or 
products, being added, calculating the rela-
tive effects on producer and consumers is 
more difficult. There is, however, a ten-
dency for farm prices to remain static, and 
for retail prices to rise, under these circum-
stances, since returns flow to the increased 
or value-added service, which occurs 
beyond the farm-gate. 
However, as Timmer (1974, p.149) argues, 
in agricultural markets characterized by 
constant demand and seasonal supply, one 
price should never be assumed to be func-
tionally dependent on another. This is par-
ticularly the case where markets are not 
competitive. For example, in the absenc of 
i i'1ternationaJ influence , urban retail prices 
may be determined by rural producer prices 
plus marketing costs in the post-harvest 
season, whilst, when commodities are more 
scarce in the pre-harvest period, demand 
may be more determinant, and trrban retail 
prices may draw rural supplies into towns . 
In the latter case p roducer pric s will b 
more dependent on retail prices and mar-
keting costs. 
and time and resources allow, market margins should be deconstructed to better evaluate sizes and 
likely causes. 
Uses of Margin Deconstruction 
Operational efficiency Deconstructing market margins can provide information on the costs of 
particular marketing functions, which can then be compared with estimates of possible minima, or to 
the costs incurred by other enterprises, to assess operational efficiency (see Chapter 4, p.63-65). 
Market integration Knowing the costs of various market functions enables hypotheses to be 
generated about the direction of market connections and the size of the margin necessary to establish 
such connection. It can be hypothesized that markets are connected in space, time, and/ or form 
when prices in destination markets exceed those in origin markets by the costs of storage, transport 
and I or processing. Most commonly, each of these functions has been studied separately, but they can 
be combined. For example, Harriss (1981, p .153) forms the hypothesis that two markets are 
potentially connected, when rice wholesale prices in destination X exceed paddy prices in Y by the 
milling conversion ratio, plus milling, storage and transport costs. (The milling conversion ratio 
determines the quantity of end-product obtained from a given volume/weight of raw material. It is 
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important to include it in the calculations, to ensure unitary prices, for example rupees/kg, between 
particular forms and grades of commodity are comparable.) If physical flows cannot explain the 
margin sizes, then other bottlenecks, or non-price constraints, can be sought. 
Economic efficiency Through comparing costs and prices, more can be revealed about the 
economic efficiency of marketing, exchange and price formation. Under competitive conditions, 
returns to economic activities should be just sufficient to reward the investment of resources, and the 
taking of risks. Therefore: 
• seasonal price differences should approximately equal storage costs; 
• inter-spatial price differences, transport costs; and 
• the price difference between forms of the same product should equate with processing costs. 
Thus the relationship between the costs and returns involved in marketing activities has been used to 
test economic efficiency. This is important, since markets can be simultaneously high cost and 
efficient, and the possibility of such a combination may be overlooked where only gross margins are 
assessed. 
Limitations of Margin Deconstruction 
The main problems with this type of analysis are: 
• how to determine whether costs are minimized; 
• how to determine acceptable levels of return where margins always exceed costs and how to 
explain loss if they do not exceed costs, or oscillation between profit and loss (Harriss, 1981, 
p.145); and 
• how to assess unitary returns over a number of seasons and years in the absence of reliable 
secondary data. 
There are ways of addressing these problems. For example, the interest rate on credit markets to 
which traders have access, is usually used as an indicator of the opportunity costs of capital, and 
therefore of normal rates of profit, and acceptable levels of return. Likewise, rates of return to 
marketing activities can be compared to those of other economic enterprises. For example, the rates 
of return to storage can be compared with those to transport and processing. Alternatively, there may 
be secondary estimates of the rates of return to various agricultural enterprises, which can be 
compared with those of marketing firms of a similar size, in terms of capital investment. 
Apparent losses, or oscillations between profit and loss, (a) may be revealed as being false, if it has 
been assumed that there are uni-directional, and constant, flows of commodities and price formation 
(Timmer, 1974), or (b) may be pursued through interviews and observations. For example, it may be 
found that aversion to risk among traders is a common, and explanatory, factor in loss-making 
operations. In terms of attempting to analyse cost and return components over time, secondary data 
and I or oral history have to be relied upon. 
Data Requirements 
The data required to deconstruct market margins can be sought through both secondary sources and 
primary collection. If available, reported prices at different stages in the marketing chain and official 
estimates of costs can be used. More often, surveys of price differences between markets and market 
levels, observations of cash and commodity exchanges, and trader interviews or case studies to 
establish the costs of various market functions, will be necessary, and will provide more accurate 
estimates of the variables concerned. But in this case accurate historical analyses are not likely to be 
possible. 
Informants on these matters may over-estimate costs and under-report returns. Multiple inter-
views are therefore crucial, and Holtzman (1986, p.30) suggests that some traders, from a pur-
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posively sampled homogenous group, can be asked about the costs, and others about the returns, in 
order to minimize such errors. Composite or synthetic budgets can subsequently be constructed. 
THE COSTS OF AND UNITARY RETURNS TO STORAGE, 
TRANSPORT AND PROCESSING 
The cost at which storage, transport and processing are undertaken, and the level at which they are 
priced, are both important in assessing the economic efficiency of the market. In an efficient market, 
costs will be minimal, and prices charged for various functions will lead to returns that are just 
sufficient to reward investment, risk-taking, management etc. at a rate of 'normal profit'. The 
productive and economic efficiency of storage and transport also play an important role in food 
security, since they have the potential to influence the level and stability of consumer prices over time 
and space. 
Although the efficiency of these three functions is addressed separately here, they can and should 
be combined in an analysis of overall market performance. Harriss (1981, p.152ff) provides a good 
example of such a combination. To look at the transport and processing functions together, and 
account for time lags in transfers, she formulates the hypothesis that markets are connected in one 
way or another if the difference between the price of a specified product variety in town X, in week n, 
and the price of the same variety in town Y, in week n + 1, multiplied by the milling conversion rate, 
is greater than the costs of milling and transport. Storage costs can be added to this hypothesis by 
using the prices obtaining in other weeks, and including the costs of storage up to those weeks from 
post-harvest lows in town X. 
Such an analysis will indicate the potential connectedness of markets. However, if the objectives of 
the research are aimed at assessing economic efficiency, and determining sources of inefficiency, the 
costs and returns to storage, transport and processing will have to be undertaken separately initially, 
since, if prices greatly exceed costs, researchers will want to know if this is the result of inefficient 
pricing in all, or only one or two, of the functions. Therefore, unless the research is directed solely 
towards assessing h1tegration, it is necessary to calculate the unitary costs of and returns to the 
individual functions as detailed below. Following this, results can be aggregated to assess the 
economic efficiency with which the combination of functions is undertaken. In addition, the costs of 
and returns to buying, assembling, bulking, debulking and selling may have to be considered 
separately, if they are undertaken and accounted for as functions separate from these three functions. 
It is crucial that these analyses of costs and prices are combined with a qualitative understanding of 
the operation and organization of the market. This is not only to ensure that relevant costs and prices 
are compared, but also to inform subsequent explanations of results and policy decision making, and 
to avoid simplistic characterizations of markets as wholly competitive or monopolistic. 
The costs of and returns to various market functions are likely to be affected by differences in: 
• enterprise size and location; 
• combinations of functions; 
• the internal organization of enterprise operations; and 
• the nature of horizontal and exchange relations, particularly where the latter are linked with 
credit. 
Although it will usually not be possible to cover the entire range of trading enterprises, and means 
of market organization, an empirical understanding of the operation of the market on. the ground will 
ensure that analysts compare relevant costs and prices, and can be aware of and explicit about the 
implications for their research results. Therefon., the analysis of costs and returns should be 
combined with detailed information about who undertakes these functions, when, where and how. 
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Seasonality and Storage 
As noted above, in the absence of detailed accounting data, th conomic efficiency of temp ral 
arbitrage and storage can be evaluated through comparing seasonal price changes with the cost of 
storage incurred. If the model of perfect competition is bei11g used a an ideal s tandard agains t which 
to measure economic efficiency, off-season prices should be just sufficient to cover the costs of storage 
including an element of 'normal profit'. This analysis is not only important for assessing the 
efficiency of storage, and for identifying improvements, but also in understanding the incentives or 
disincentives to undertake storage. Where there is no correspondence between price differences and 
costs, research can be directed towards locating causes and posing policy options. 
Various techniques can be used to assess the relationship between costs and price changes, but the 
simplest is to calculate monthly price changes, and to compare these with monthly, unitary costs of 
storage. Other ways of assessing the efficiency of storage tend to be more complex, and are therefore 
not covered below. For example, Ravallion (1987) tests the efficiency of storage, in terms of its 
volumetric and temporal dimensions, by (a) calculating the divergence between actual price 
movements, and those predicted by rational price expectations formed in competitive markets, and 
(b) comparing mathematically calculated expected future prices, using all currently available 
information, with traders' price expectations. 
Measuring Seasonal Price Changes 
The way in which seasonal price changes are measured will partly depend on the quality, and degree 
of disaggregation, of the data being used. It is likely under rapid reconnaissance conditions that 
secondary price data will be relied upon, but their accuracy can be tested, particularly in local-scale 
studies, through trader interviews which cover recent seasonal price movements. 
The most straight-forward means of assessing intra-annual price changes is to calculate the 
difference between prices at harvest time, and those obtaining in each post-harvest month, or the 
percentage increase from the minimum to the maximum over the year. This allows for a subsequent 
comparison of price rises with unit storage costs either monthly or annually. This, in turn, will 
provide an indication of the unitary returns to storage over a specified period of time. It is a 
particularly useful means of calculating monthly price rises where releases from storage are 
distributed throughout the year, and where analysts wish to avoid techniques based on some form of 
averages. For example, Harriss (1979a, p.205) is critical of the measurement of price changes based on 
the variation around an average, because the highs and lows have contributed to this average. 
However, others argue that estimating seasonal price rises in this manner does not enable analysts 
to distinguish between trend, cyclical, seasonal and random components in temporal price changes. 
This may not be important for storage incentives or for efficiency tests, if the costs of storage are 
influenced by similarly diverse forces, but it may be important where this is not the case. Given 
adequate data, these various components of intra-annual price movements can be isolated, and 
seasonal indices calculated, as shown in Box 4:9. 
Using Seasonal Price Data 
Information on seasonal price changes, however calculated, can provide insights into the temporal 
dimensions of marketing, even if data on storage costs are unobtainable. For example: 
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• Correlation coefficients between prices in different seasons over several years can be calculated 
to indicate the degree of eo-variation. 
• Jones (1972, p.l22) argues that a preliminary investigation of the consistency between price 
movements and harvest times; the specific storage characteristics of different commodities; and 
the seasonality of supply of substitutes, can provide an indication of the impact of economic 
forces on the market. 
• The relationship between the magnitude of intra-annual price rises with, for example, changes 
in government marketing policies, or in levels of production, or marketed surpluses, can also be 
analysed. For example, where the data are available, prices and quantities produced over time 
Box 4:9 Moving Averages and the Grand Seasonal Index 
The most common means of isolating the 
seasonal component in intra-annual price 
movements is to: 
• calculate a 12-month moving average 
series, which isolates the trend; 
• divide monthly time series observa-
tions by the moving average, or calcu-
late the difference between the two. 
The ratios of time series observations to 
the 12-month moving average are equiva-
lent to dividing the trend, cyclical, seasonal 
and random components of the price series 
by the trend and cyclical ones, to leave 
seasonal and random elements. The latter 
can then be removed by simply averaging 
the monthly ratios to, or deviations from, 
the moving average, over a specified num-
ber of years. Alternatively a' grand seasonal 
index' can be calculated, as described 
below. 
A seasonal index, calculated as the ratio 
of the time series observation to the moving 
average, of 1.06 indicates that the relevant 
price is 6.5% above the trend in the period of 
analysis, or visa versa for results below 100. 
The computations required for calculat-
ing moving averages can be found in most 
standard statistical text books, but many 
micro-computer packages will also be able 
to provide them, for example the Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). 
'In the n-period moving average tech-
nique, individual observations in a time 
series are replaced by the average of n/2 
values in the preceding periods and the n/2 
values in the subsequent periods. Therefore 
any observations will depend on some of 
the _Previous and subsequent values of that 
vanable, or the observation will carry a 
weight of 1/n instead of 1. This means that 
if an individual ob ervation is tmusually 
la~ge or small, the averaging procedure will 
brmg that value more in line with the other 
values in the series and the short-term fluc-
tuations will be eliminated' (Goetz and 
Weber, 1987, p.69). 
Twelve-month centred moving averages, 
because 12 is an even number, are calculated 
tluough (a) adding 24 consecutive monthly 
observations, for example those reported 
for January to December and February to 
January the following year; then February 
to January and March to February the fol-
lowing year etc. and (b) dividing these urns 
by twenty-four and allocating the re ulting 
value to the middle month of the two sedes. 
Alternatively, 12 monthly observations can 
be summed, and the average between con-
secutive pairs of these can be calculated to 
centre the moving average. 
Random elements can, if necessary, be 
removed by constructing a grand seasonaJ 
index which 'is calculated by finding the 
average season a I index for each month over 
the period of analysis, and then adjusting 
those averages o U1at they sum to 1200. 
Bec:ause of Utis averaging procedme, the 
GSI should in principle be purged of all 
random variations in the time series data' 
(Goetz and Weber, 1987, p.74). This can also 
be used to test the statistical significance of 
the seasonal index and to forecast seasonal 
patterns. However, it is more often assumed 
that random variations cancel themselves 
out. 
can be plotted on the same graph to establish the nature of their relationship, or correlation 
coefficients between price and quantity data over time can be calculated (Goetz and Weber, 1987, 
p.97). 
• Jones (1972, p.125) also suggests that the strength of seasonal forces, or their domination over 
other influences on price changes, can be assessed by the degree to which annual highs of the 
ratios between reported prices and the seasonal indices occur in the same month as the index 
high. In doing this, Jones uses the averages over several years of the ratio of reported prices to a 
twelve-month centred moving average as a seasonal index (see Box 4:9). This analysis suggested 
that seasonal variation in prices was greater in producing than consuming centres in Nigeria. 
Various explanations are offered including the ability of the latter, but not the former, to obtain 
supplies from elsewhere with different harvest dates; the wider range of incomes, and staples 
consumed, in urban areas and the greater volumes of storage undertaken in towns. 
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Calculating Unitary Storage Costs 
If data on storage costs are available, further insight can be gained into the technical, operational 
and economic efficiency of storage, and the role storage costs play in n1ark ting decision-making. For 
example, if prices rise rapidly above the costs of storage, current allocation of commodities to future 
times could be inhibited, which may lead to later scarcity. If pric s fail to rise above torage costs, or 
only do so to a minimal extent, storage may not be undertaken at all. For er ps which are seasonal in 
production, and have constant demand throughout the year, explanations for such relationships will 
have to be sought. 
Cost categories The costs of storage can be categorized in several ways, and it is important in 
calculating total unitary costs to be clear about the nature of each item. Total storage costs consist of: 
• costs that vary with the volume of stocks, and/ or length of storage time, and those that are 
relatively independent of these; 
• operating costs; and 
• costs associated with quantitative and qualitative product losses, which are important to the 
extent that they reduce the value of the produce. Operating costs and crop losses may increase or 
remain relatively constant over the time of storage. 
Examples of costs which vary with the volume of stocks include those of borrowing finance; 
materials used in storage and weight reductions due to drying or pest attacks. The costs of store 
maintenance or rental, salaries of permanent employees and of obtaining market information will 
not vary with the size of stocks except for those on a per unit basis. Similarly, handling and overhead 
expenses will not vary with the length of storage, whereas interest charges will. 
Data requirements Timmer et al., (1983, p.l74) suggest that the opportunity cost of tied-up capital; 
interest on loans; commodity losses; payment for labour and facilities used; and normal profits, 
including payment for risk-bearing, are the most important cost elements in storage. Therefore, 
unless secondary estimates of the total, average costs of storage are being used, data are required on 
the following costs, where available: 
• compound interest rates on loans; 
• the opportunity costs of capital tied up in inventories; 
• weight losses, due to pest or rodent attacks, or to drying; 
• rates of quality deterioration; 
• warehouse rental, or depreciation, rates; 
• depreciation on bags if reused; costs of bags if used only once; 
• labour costs - both piece rates for carrying and stacking, and payments to temporary and 
permanent employees; 
• the price and rate of application of pesticides and other chemicals, if used. 
Sources of data Estimates of some or all of these data may be obtainable from secondary sources. 
For example, there may be government or academic estimates of the rates of quantitative storage 
losses. Measuring physical losses and quality deterioration and their associated costs is very difficult 
though and, if secondary sources are used, the means of estimation should be established and 
described. Moreover, in understanding storage incentives, and assessing the efficiency of storage at 
different points in the marketing chain, it is crucial that costs are calculated according to where, when 
and by whom storage is undertaken. For example, labour and building materials may be cheaper in 
rural than urban areas. This means that trader interviews are often necessary, especially when data 
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listed above are not available from secondary sources. Where they are available on storage costs, 
initial evaluations of the returns to storage could be compared with those calculated from a few 
detailed case studies, to determine how much primary data collection should be undertaken. 
Unitary cost calculations Various assumptions may have to be made in these cost calculations. For 
example, it can be assumed that bag depreciation declines with time, and increases only slightly with 
length of storage (Lele, 1971, p.137), and that labour for carrying and stacking will be charged only in 
the first month of storage. Similar assumptions may have to made about the life expectancy of stores 
in calculating rates of depreciation, or about rates of depreciation per se. For example, in calculating 
enterprise level profitability among various types of trader in South India, Harriss (1981, p.74) 
assumes depreciation rates of 10% for all buildings, and of 5% for all machinery. 
Where time, research resources, data and terms of reference allow for more detailed calculations, 
the following equations indicate how costs of storage/commodity unit / month, can be calculated 
(Goetz and Weber, 1987). 
(a) Store depreciation/commodity unit (for example a bag)/month 
Original price of building/Current value of store 
"" Total/ current life expectancy x No. of units stored x No. of months stored · 
Monke and Pearson (1989, p.180) suggest that the current value of buildings or vehicles can 
be obtained from suppliers and/ or purchasers, or that an index of inflation can be applied to 
historical purchase prices. 
Where stores are leased rather than owned, depreciation costs are not included in the costs 
of storage, but those of renting are. Rental charges may be made on a per unit basis, or for 
whole stores. Similarly, the costs of managing the store may be undertaken by the owners of 
the store, or by the renters of the store. Usually, where stores are rented, whole buildings are 
paid for on an annual basis, and the individual or firm renting the store is responsible for its 
management and for operational costs. In this case, the unitary costs of renting storage 
facilities per commodity unit per month are: 
Annual rate of rent 
- No. of units stored x No. of months stored · 
(b) Interest on investing in a store, or the opportunity cost of investment capital, per commodity 
unit per month 
Value of investment x Participants' prevailing annual interest rate 
No. of units stored x No. of months stored 
The costs of storage, and hence the relationship between seasonal price rises and storage 
costs, are very sensitive to the interest rate used, and that chosen must be justified. 
If the store is rented, the opportunity cost of the capital invested in renting storage 
facilities can be calculated and allocated on a unitary basis, using the same equation, by 
replacing the value of investment with the annual rental charges. 
(c) Interest on borrowed and/ or the opportunity cost of own working capital per unit per 
month 
(Unitary harvest price+ Handling costs) x Annual interest rate 
12 
This, and the following costs, may be incurred by all those undertaking commodity storage, 
whether they rent or own stores, unless the renting of storage facilities is combined with the 
buying of a complete storage service, including the operation and management of invent-
ories. In the latter case, operational costs are covered by the rental charged, but the owner of 
the produce is likely to bear the burden of qualitative and quantitative crop losses. 
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(d) Handling and treatment costs per unit per month 
_ Total handling and treatment costs per year 
-No. of commodity units stored x No. of months stored· 
Handling and treatment costs include the costs of all types of labour and chemicals used. 
Crop losses in handling will be included in the overall losses experienced between buying 
and selling and are thus incorporated in the equation below. As noted above, where storage 
facilities are hired, inventory management costs may either be paid for by the owners of the 
store, in which case a per unit fee for a complete storage service will be paid by traders, or, 
more commonly, traders will rent a building and assume all other costs of storage 
themselves. 
These costs, added together, represent the unitary capital costs of storage. Cumulative 
operating costs can then be calculated by multiplying the former, by the number of 
volumetric units stored and the number of months over which they are stored. 
(e) The value of quantitative and qualitative crop losses per unit per storage period 
=Release price x (%Weight loss+% Quality loss)/100. 
Often very little is known about physical crop losses in storage and their valuation and 
assumptions will be unavoidable but should be made explicit. 
The above account for the most important operational and crop loss costs. In subtracting these 
costs from selling prices, to indicate returns, and embarking on an evaluation of such returns, a rate 
of 'normal profit', and a risk premium should be permitted, since the returr/s to storage are always 
uncertain. 
Box 4:10 Two Summary Equations 
Goetz and Weber (1987, p.125) suggest the 
following summary equation can be used to 
calculate total per unit storage costs: 
(r + i) Ph 
-'----'------'----"'- + s 
12 
where: 
r = rate of crop loss in storage over a year 
i = the annual rate of interest 
Ph = the unit market price at harvest time 
(including handling costs) 
s =unit operating costs of storage per month 
These authors also suggest that the follow-
ing can be calculated to determine whether 
overall, storage is profitable: 
Post-harvest release price 
- -------'-------- = 1 
Harvest price + Costs of storage till 
release 
If the left-hand side of the equation is 
greater than 1, a storage gain has been 
obtained and vice versa. The unitary returns 
to storage are dealt with in more detail 
below. 
The Relationship Between Storage Costs and Intra-Annual Price Rises 
In order to calculate the returns to storage, and thus assess the economic efficiency of temporal 
arbitrage, costs must be compared with seasonal or monthly price changes, over the same period. 
There are various ways of analysing this relationship. The simplest and most commonly used means 
is to calculate the unitary returns to all resources used in storage. These can be represented either as 
an absolute measure, through subtracting costs from the selling price, or as a ratio of, for example, the 
original buying price, or the returns that would have been obtained without undertaking storage. 
However, although these unitary returns are indicative of efficient or inefficient storage, a more 
accurate assessment of this characteristic can be obtained by calculating the returns to storage, in 
combination with other functions, at the firm level. This is dealt with at the end of this chapter, in the 
section on profitability. Here, only the unitary returns to resources used in storage, and later 
transport and processing, are considered. 
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Assumptions and specifications In any of these calculations, significant as umptions may have to 
made about when, where and by whom transactions are undertaken, particularly where secondary 
data are used. These assumptions can be verified through interviews with those undertaking storage 
or with knowledgable observers. The interviews hould help to establish the timing and location of 
such transactions. Such assumptions must always b · made explicit so that the accuracy of the results 
can be assessed. Lele (1971, p.146), for example, assumes that all stocks are bought 4:-8 weeks after 
the harvest, and that they are sold at the pre-harvest high prices. ln th" case, it is likely that tmit 
storage costs are underestimated, and that returns ar overestimated. 
Similarly, a distinction between producers' and wholesalers', or owners' and renters', returns to 
storage should be made. For example, the buying price would be included in the storage costs of 
wholesalers, but not in those of producers (farmers). In addition, in the former case, the role of 
transport in price formation should be distinguished from that of storage. If, as is commonly the case, 
traders buy crops in one location and store, and/ or sell, them in another, isolating the returns to 
storage from those to transportation means that the price in the selling, rather than the buying, 
location should be used as a base line. 
Care should also be taken in generalizing from results, particularly if calculations are based on 
primary data. Storage may be highly competitive in one area, but monopolized in another. This is 
particularly the case with market functions which utilize fixed facilities and require lumpy 
investments. Likewise, the returns to owning a store may be excessive, where as those to renting one 
may be 'normal'. 
Calculating, and representing, unitary returns The following equations aid the calculation, and 
representation, of the unitary returns to storage. The simplest means of indicating the absolute, net 
unitary gains from storage, and of distinguishing between the gains from storage and those from 
transport, can be estimated by calculating the following: 
where: 
PSm =post-harvest selling price (monthly average or actually obtained, depending on data) at time 
and place of release; 
PBh =unit purchase price at the time of harvest/purchase and at point of sale; 
Cm = unit storage costs, including handling costs incurred in buying and selling transactions, but 
excluding transport costs. 
Where an historical element is included in the research, current costs can be deflated in comparison 
with past price series data, if a relevant deflator is available. However, this absolute measure of the 
returns to storage does not reveal the rates of return to total, or specific, resources used in the 
function. Calculating rates of return to such resources is useful in assessing economic efficiency, 
because it allows comparisons to be made between the returns to this, and other economic activities, 
and between those to different types of enterprise undertaking the same function. 
Total and gross returns to all resources used in storage can be estimated per unit, assuming traders 
have to buy their stored commodities, and do not grow them themselves, by calculating the 
following: 
where: 
PSm = post-harvest selling price in the month in which the crop is sold. 
PBh =the unit purchase price at time of harvest/purchase and at point of sale. 
This equation can be used to provide an indication of the size of gross rates of return to storage, per 
unit of commodity, where data on storage costs are unavailable. If storag co ts are largely accounted 
for by the opportunity costs of capital, rather than by operational expenses, this calculation can also 
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be used to indicate the returns to capital in storage, and hence, assuming economically efficient 
storage, shadow interest rates (Goetz and Weber, 1987, p.l22). It can, additionally, be used to indicate 
the optimal lengths of storage, based on past experience. More accurate estimates of returns require 
the inclusion of costs in the equation. 
Another means of evaluating and representing the net unitary rate of return to all resources 
employed in storage is through comparing the net return which could have been obtained if 
commodities were sold at harvest time, with that actually obtained from the later release of stocks 
(Goetz and Weber, 1987, p.126). This rate of return to storage, expre sed as a ratio to the potential 
returns of immediate sale, indicate th opportunity costs of storage. Assuming that (a) buying and 
selling at the time of harvest and in the post-harvest period are undertaken in the same location, and 
that therefore any returns to traders are the result of storage and/ or breaking bulk, rather than 
transport, and (b) that all crops were purchased at harvest time, this ratio can be calculated as 
follows: 
where: 
Urn = the net rate of return to storage until month m, including that to capital, management, own 
labour, risk etc.; 
PSm =post-harvest selling price prevailing in the month in which the crop is sold; 
PBh = the price paid for the crop at harvest time; 
Cm = the costs of storage up to month m, including buying, selling and handling costs; 
PSh = the price which would have been obtained on selling the crop at harvest time; 
Ch = the costs of the buying and selling transactions at harvest time. 
Calculating returns to specific resources None of the above calculations provides an indication of 
the rates of return to particular factors of production. Estimating the rate of return to capital invested 
in storage is particularly important, since one means of evaluating the economic efficiency of 
marketing functions is comparing the rates of return to capital invested in them, to prevailing interest 
rates. Moreover, for example, the returns to labour provide a measure of the technical and 
operational efficiency of storage, as well as of the 'fairness' of labour remuneration rates. This will be 
returned to in more detail in the section below on profitability, but one example of the way in which 
the returns to specific factors of production can be estimated is provided here. 
Lele (1971, p.141) calculates the unitary rate of return to variable capital in storage per quintal of 
grain as follows: 
Off-season price - (Purchase price + Variable costs of storing from harvest to off season) 
. X 100. Purchase pnce + Total storage costs 
She ignores fixed costs because of the difficulties of allocating these between functions, and of 
accounting for economies of scale. This may be reasonable in comparing costs and prices over a 
single year, but is less justifiable for longer-term analyses. 
Results and implications Once estimated, the causes of high or low returns need to be investi-
gated, if marketing policy is to be better informed. For example, if returns are small relative to other 
economic activities, it is possible that: 
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• storage is highly competitive and/ or economically efficient, and profits and costs are low; 
• storage is motivated by a desire to ensure regular business, rather than to maximize profits per 
se; 
• there is market dissociation in time; 
• there are multiple harvests of the product annually; 
• the product is substituted in consumption later in the year by another product, and/ or 
• government policies place effective ceilings on intra-annual price rises. 
Conversely, where returns to storage are high relative to those to other economic activities, there may 
be a monopoly on access to storage facilities, related to inadequate capital, stores, or information 
concerning future supplies. Alternatively, there may be high levels of crop losses in storage, and 
technical and/ or operational inefficiencies. Where unitary returns to storage vary widely between 
firms, there may be economies of scale in storage, such that large firms have much lower costs but 
face the same product prices. 
It is important to recognize that storage costs are only one input into storage decisions. South worth 
et al. (1979) suggest that the importance of prices and speculative storage for producers, can be 
illustrated by comparing the timing of farmer sales (possibly reported in farm surveys), with the 
seasonal behaviour of wholesale prices. But these authors also stress that there are likely to be many 
other factors affecting the decision to sell, including the following: 
• government price, storage, marketing or food-aid and import polices; 
• the production and marketing of cheaper substitutes later in the year, all of which may make 
storage unprofitable; 
• price expectations; 
• inflation; 
• risk aversion; 
• the quality of information on supplies; and/ or 
• access to storage facilities. 
For small farmers, decisions as to whether and when to market their crops may also be influenced by: 
• own consumption needs, particularly where food markets are less than reliable; 
• timing of cash needs; 
• the inability to sell at harvest time, and 
• fears of theft. 
Thus, storage decisions are influenced by a complex set of forces, and the importance of assessing 
qualitative market characteristics through primary research is stressed. For example, it was found 
that in both Tanzania and Malawi in 1988/9, most wholesalers were unable to build up stocks, in the 
context of substantial seasonal price increases, due primarily to limited working capital 
(Scarborough, 1990). These types of constraint will usually only be established through fieldwork. 
Spatial Price Differences and Transport 
In a competitive and economically efficient market, at any one time, differences between prices 
obtaining in spatially separated markets for otherwise identical commodities are a function of 
transport costs, including normal profit. Therefore, as with storage, in assessing the economic 
efficiency of spatial arbitrage and transport, inter-spatial price differences can be compared to the 
costs of transport. Again, various techniques of comparison are possible, but the simplest is to 
calculate unitary transport costs, and to compare these with price differences between two spatially 
separated market places. 
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The computations and processes necessary to undertake such an analysis are similar to those 
involved in assessing the unitary returns to storage and readers are referred to the previous section. 
Measuring Price Differences in Space 
Obtaining the difference between two prices separated only by space is usually easier than 
attempting to isolate the seasonal component of price changes over time, depending on specific 
research objectives and the availability and quality of secondary data. 
Most assessments of the economic efficiency of food markets are concerned primarily with the 
relationship between rural producer and urban consumer prices. A transport service may also exist 
between the farm gate and assembly, parastatal, redistributive or other markets, and to and from 
stores and processing plants, but the focus is usually on that between rural and urban markets. 
Though often assumed, these are not always, respectively, centres of supply and demand. 
When secondary price data is being used to analyse the efficiency of spatial arbitrage, it is usually 
assumed that crops bought in one place are sold in another, in the same form, and within the same 
week, or month. Therefore time series pric s in two market places, relating to the same varieties, 
grades, we.ights and type of commodities, within the same month, week or day, can be directly 
compared. B aring in mind the common problems associated with such data, analyses would be 
improved if they are (a) subject to the cousistency and plausibility tests reviewed in Chapter 2 and (b) 
combined with information on: 
• prices in different places, collected by analysts; 
• transport networks to check that the market places are physically connected; 
• the lengths of time taken to provide commodity at a place useful to consumers, and 
• the actual direction of physical flows at different times of year. 
Box 4:11 Modelling Gross Market Margins 
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In analy ing the relationship between 
mm1thly prices of prime quality paddy, in 
eight Indonesian provinces, and the retail 
price o.f medium quality rice in their capital 
cities, Timmer (1974) initially undertakes a 
direct compad on using the official Indone-
sian conversion ratio of 0.52, and assuming 
the transformation from rural paddy, to 
uiban rice, takes place within a month. In 
doing this, he constructs several models of 
expected price behaviour, an'd price 
relationships. Here 011ly transport and pro-
cessing are consider d, but similar models 
may be constructed through plotting inter-
ternpora.l price differences, or other combi-
nations of the above. 
In the first, and simplest, of Timmer' s 
models it is assumed that rice flows from 
rural to urban areas throughout the year, 
and that therefore storage is undertaken 
rurally; the marketing margin (here includ-
ing transport and processing costs and 
prices) is constant, and that rural and urban 
prices, separated by thi margin, rise in 
uni on from the end of the harvest until the 
beginning of the next as follows. 
Rice j 
prices 
Time-
In this instance, the size of the transport and 
processing margin can be calculated by 
solving: 
where: 
M is the marketing margin; 
P u the urban retail price of rice; 
PP the rural price of paddy, and 
c the milling conversion ratio. 
Box 4:11 continued 
However, where the above simplifying 
assumptions concerning the continuity and 
direction of commodity flows cannot be 
made, this model would be unrepresenta-
tive of the relationship between rural and 
urban prices. For example, Timmer argues 
that a government policy of floor and ceil-
ing pricing in Indonesia, effective in the 
urban areas only, can lead to seasonal dis-
connection between rural and urban mar-
kets, and possibly even reverse flows of rice 
from the urban to rural areas, as illustrated 
below. 
Rice j 
prices 
Time-
Because placing a ceiling on rice prices is 
only effective in urban areas, rural prices 
continue to rise throughout the post-harvest 
season reflecting the costs of storage, and 
rural demand for rice, until they exceed the 
urban price by the marketing margin, when 
shipme11t of rice from urban to rural areas 
may begin. This pattern of price relation-
sltips may occur under a variety of circum-
stances, which make it profitable for the 
urban area to obtain supplies from places 
other than the rural region under analysis, 
or to export to that region. For example, 
storage costs may be lower in the urban area 
or the urban area may be able to obtain 
supplies from regions with lower costs of 
production, and/ or lower paddy purchase 
prices, and/ or different harvest periods, 
wltilst the rural region is unable to obtain 
supplies from these areas. 'Thus, all that is 
required is that rice be available from 
sources other than the currently available 
supplies in the rural areas for the model...to 
become operative' (Timmer 1974, p.151). 
This model illustrates the meaninglessness 
of comparing average annual urban and 
rw:at yric.es, and assuming con tant and 
uru-duect10naJ commodity flows, in an 
attempt to mea ure the size of market mar-
gins, and analyse the econontic efficiency of 
spatial arbitrage. 
Tim~er al. o p~ovides a third model rep-
reseutmg a srtuation between the above two 
extremes, in which the price difference 
between urban and rural markets never 
becomes reversed, but is considerably 
reduced dming the pre-harvest sea on, and 
the two markets are disconnected in terms 
of physical flows of commodities. Timmer 
then calculates monthly transport and pro-
cessing margins between reported rural 
paddy prices and urban retail prices, for 
four seasons, in 8 provinces over 1969-1972, 
using the equation 
where: 
Mi is the measured margin for month i; 
P ui is the urban retail rice price for month i; 
P pi the rural paddy price from month i, 
and 0.52 the standard Indonesian rice mill-
ing conversion ratio. 
These margins varied considerably 
between seasons and provinces, but this 
variation more closely resembled the pat-
tern illustrated in his second and third 
models of price formation than the first, 
except when the size of the harvest was 
large enough to maintain urban prices 
below the official ceiling level. 
Harriss (1981, p.154), in testing Timmer's 
models, compares weekly price data for 3 
varieties of paddy and rice in 10 markets, 
known to be connected, in Tamil Nadu, 
South India, between 1972 and 1974. She 
found that price levels for paddy and rice, in 
large consuming centres, fell below those in 
rural markets, in both regular and random, 
short-term, ways. She similarly explains this 
in terms of urban centres having spatial 
monopoly control of trade, because of their 
exclusive conb·ol of imports from areas out-
side the local system, where prices are 
cheaper, to export to rural markets within 
the local system. 
Similar modelling exercises could be 
undertaken with reference inter-seasonal, 
and/ or inter-form price differences. 
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Using Inter-Spatial Price Data 
In the absence of data on transport costs, the differences between prices in space over time can be 
subjected to correlation coefficient analyses, and graphically plotted to illustrate the nature of the 
relationship between them, and to formulate initial hypotheses about market connections and 
commodity flows. For example, Timmer (1974) suggests that simple models of market connection 
and margin formation can be constructed through the combination of price data and an understand-
ing of how the market functions on the ground (see Box 4:11). Once again, however, more can be 
learnt about the technical, operational and economic efficiency of the function if data on transport 
costs, and the direction of actual product flows, is obtainable. 
Calculating Unitary Transport Costs 
As with storage, because of the difficulties of calculating enterprise level profitability, the economic 
efficiency of transport j often assessed through compa1"ing the unit costs of moving commodities 
with the price dHfere11ces per unit of the same commodity in different places. Thus analysts may 
need to calculate unit transport costs. 
Cost categories By Distance: Using this system, the costs are divided into a fixed element, related to 
handling, ins urance and taxes and a variable one which increases with distance, including, for 
exampl , fuel and wear and tear. Furthermore, variability in road conditions will affect the per 
kilometre tran por t costs. Transport cost increase with distance, but not in direct proportion. 
By Numbers of Units of Commodities: Here again, there is a fixed element in the costs, but, in this case, 
total fuel, tax, and insurance are constant, while handling costs, often paid on a piece-rate basis, are 
variable. 
Using either of the above systems, the actual costs will differ according to the mode of transport 
and, because economics of scale in transport are common, with the size of vehicle and rate of capacity 
utilization (see Box 4:13). 
Data requirements Unit transport costs will also vary according to the source of the transport, and 
detailed data will be necessary when investigating more that1 one type of transport. When only a 
rough indication of the costs and returns to transport is needed, for the com1h·y generally, secondary 
price data can be compared to official estimates, but otherwise, the way of organizing transport will 
have an effect on the data needed to assess the unit transport costs. 
Three forms of organizing transportation are common in LDC agricultural markets. The first is that 
the owners of vehicles engage in buying and selling commodities, and use their vehicles, exclusively 
or otherwise, to transport their own goods from market to market. In this case, the cost incurred by 
those undertaking the transport function are the actual, or factor costs, of transportation. The most 
important of these are: 
• depreciation of the vehicle; 
• the opportunity costs of investment and working capital; 
• interest charges on any money borrowed; 
• fuel and oil; 
• maintenance and spare parts; 
• road, or vehicle, taxes and insurance; 
• possibly a driver's wage and other labour costs; 
• tarpaulins, roping etc.; 
94 
• crop losses; and 
• the operational costs of buying, loading, unloading and selling commodities. 
With reference to the latter, Lele (1971, p.lOO) includes, for example, unloading, cleaning, 
weighing, cartage, loading, filling bags, stitching and twine, in-kind payments to labourers; 
payments to commission agents or local wholesalers; market fees; sales tax; illegal gratuities; and 
market and handling expenses at destination markets. 
As with storage, some of these costs will be easier to estimate than others. For example, although 
handling costs will probably be widely known, and can be discovered through interviews, 
assumptions about the opportunity costs of capital invested in vehicles, and the latters' rates of 
depreciation, will often have to be made. In subsequently calculating the unitary returns to 
transporting commodities in this manner, data on the following is also essential, in order that fixed 
costs can be allocated, and relevant costs and prices can be compared: 
• volumes of commodities bought, carried and sold, over the period under consideration; 
• numbers of kilometres travelled over the same period; 
• the gross returns to each unit of commodity bought, transported and sold, or the price 
differences over the time period and geographical area under consideration. 
Alternatively, if researchers cannot obtain such data, or if they are only interested in the returns to 
transport for a particular route, the returns to working capital used in specific trips can be examined 
in isolation. 
A second way of obtaining transport is by whole vehicle hire. This is usually at a fixed cost for a 
certain number of days or a specified journey, or, less commonly, on a per kilometre basis. In this 
instance, the costs incurred by the trader are likely to include: 
• the rental; 
• fuel; 
• commodity handling; 
• tarpaulins and rope; 
• crop losses; 
• possibly lubricants, repairs and a driver's wage; 
• possibly interest on borrowed finance. 
In all these, except handling, the number of commodity units carried, or the rate of capacity 
utilization, will affect the level of unitary costs, and therefore must be established. If the vehicle is 
hired on a per trip basis, the per kilometre unit costs need not be calculated since, unless storage is 
simultaneously undertaken, there will probably be only one buying and one selling price. 
The third common means of obtaining transport is hire of the service. In this case, the trader and 
his or her commodities are transported for a fee usually based on the number of commodity units. 
Only the following cost data are required: 
• the per unit commodity fee charged for the transport service; 
• loading, unloading and handling costs; 
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• the rate of crop losses; 
• possibly interest rates on borrowed finance. 
The first two of these cost items will be paid for per commodity unit, and crop loss rates are likely 
to be estimated in percentage terms. Therefore, in calculating unitary costs, data is only needed on 
volumes handled if the traders concerned have borrowed money, and are paying interest on it. 
Researchers may also be concerned with the rates of return to the owners of vehicles in hiring them 
out, either to one trader, or on a per commodity unit, per trip, basis. Ideally, in analysing the economic 
efficiency of the transport function, data which enables researchers to calculate both the returns to 
owning vehicles, and to various means of hiring transport service.s, should be collected. This is 
because, although the returns to wholesaling, and to moving commodities from one area to another, 
through hiring transport services, may imply economically efficient spatial arbitrage, the transport 
industry itself may be oligopolistic and the price of transport services, and the returns to owning 
vehicles, may be very high as a result. 
In this case, rather than comparing the costs of owning and running a vehicle with price differences 
in space, the former have to be compared to the gross returns to renting the vehicle out. It is likely that 
the latter will be highly variable according to seasons; location; type of vehicle etc. and therefore, in 
the absence of detailed accounts, it will only be possible to obtain rough indications through 
interviewees' estimates of, for example, annual average total costs and returns. 
As stressed previously, obtaining qualitative data on the organization and operation of the various 
market functions is necessary. In this instance, the main forms of transportation used, and how it is 
obtained, need to be established, together with the relative importance of each form, in terms of 
volumes of commodities transported. The owners and users of the means of transport need to be 
identified; how transport services are hired; prices agreed and payments understood. The implica-
tions for capacity utilization; and the ability to engage in, and the costs of spatial arbitrage need to be 
assessed. For example, where vehicles are rented out to a number of traders, there may be 
transportation brokers, in which case, the way in which they organize and allocate space, and the 
level and source of their payment, will provide insights into their impact on the operational and 
economic efficiency of the transport functions evaluated. As Harriss (1981, p.40) notes 'centralization 
and fixed rates reduce competition, but speed the allocation process and secure supplies of both 
lorries and of commodities'. 
Sources of data In the absence of enterprise accounts, information on the costs of hiring transport 
services, either through renting a whole vehicle or through paying for shipment on a per commodity 
unit basis, is usually easy to obtain through interviews with wholesalers, since these services are 
often paid for with out-of-pocket cash. 
Gathering data on the costs of, and returns to, owning a vehicle, whether used for the trader's own 
buying and selling operations, or for hiring out to other traders, may be more difficult. Rates of 
vehicle depreciation and the opportunity costs of capital are likely to be uncertain, and running costs 
will be highly variable, depending on road conditions, the type of vehicle, and the uses to which the 
vehicle is put. Moreover, sampling and interviewing the owners or operators of vehicles is often 
more difficult than collecting information from traders, largely due to the transporters' greater 
mobility. 
Aside from interviews with vehicle owners, various estimates of the costs of transport, rather than 
the price charged for buying a transport service, can often be obtained from government, academic 
or parastatal agencies, or large haulage companies. For example, governments often set minimum 
transport rates, and parastatals, or other companies, may hire transport services at a fixed rate. It may 
be necessary to rely on these indicators for any historical, or time series, analyses, but their relevance 
to particular contemporary situations needs to be assessed. Initially, this can be approached through 
establishing traders', or transporters', current attitudes to official rates, and by observing the ease or 
difficulty of obtaining transport at such prices. In particular, economies of scale, in terms of the size of 
vehicles used and distances travelled, are likely to be realized by larger organizations, and this will 
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reduce their costs relative to those of smaller concerns. Alternatively, the latter may overload vehicles 
more often, and be able to evade taxation, licensing and other legal costs more easily than the former. 
For example, authors' interviews with Co-operative Union managers in Tanzania revealed that they 
thought that private traders could undercut the co-operatives' transport costs in this manner. 
Similarly, costs may vary in different areas and along different routes, because of local oligopolies, 
differing supply and demand conditions or variability in road conditions. Hence the importance of 
being wary of generalizations, of observing various transport functions in the field, and estimating 
transport costs for a number of types of operation. 
Unit cost calculations Calculating unit costs refers here to either per commodity units alone, or the 
combination of these with costs per unit of distance travelled. The combination is only required 
where research is on the economic efficiency of transport over a wide area (in which case an indicator 
of per kilometre costs will probably be obtained from secondary sources) or where it is concerned 
with the returns to owning a vehicle. 
Where transport services between two points in space are bought on a per commodity unit basis, 
as is often the case, per commodity unit costs, including crop losses, can usually be obtained directly 
from interviews with those hiring such a service. Only interest payments on borrowed finance then 
have to be allocated between commodity units. In such cases, it is also likely that research will be 
more localized, and that buying and selling prices obtaining in specific locations can be used to 
calculate gross returns. Thus per kilometre costs need not be calculated. 
Where whole vehicles are hired, the fixed costs the hiring individual or firm will probably be liable 
for, are those of fuel, tarpaulins, rope and possibly oil, repairs and driver's wage. Therefore these 
need to be allocated between the commodity units handled. It will probably be unnecessary to 
estimate per kilometre costs, since the vehicle is likely to be hired for a specific journey, and the costs 
of that particular journey should only be compared with the buying and selling prices relevant to it. 
Where analysts are concerned with the returns to owning a vehicle, and deploying it in the 
movement of own commodities, calculations must be done (similar to those outlined for storage) for 
the costs of transport per unit of commodity and per kilometre traversed. In subsequent comparisons 
with geographical price differences, the costs per kilometre travelled will have to be multiplied up to 
account for relevant distances, or estimates of average numbers of commodity units and kilometres 
travelled will have to be used against those of annual gross returns. 
For example, in allocating the annual costs of vehicle depreciation incurred by the vehicle owners, 
between units of commodities and kilometres travelled, the following equation needs to be solved: 
Current value of/ original investment in vehicle 
Current/ original life expectancy of vehicle (years) x average No. of units of commodities carried 
annually x No. of kilometres travelled annually 
However, unit costs are likely to be highly variable depending on the vehicles used; rates of 
capacity utilization; differing road conditions and conditions of competition along particular routes 
etc., and therefore generalizations will be difficult. Decisions concerning the focus of research 
according to the size of vehicle, types of usage, and routes travelled, will often have to be made. 
These will usually be based upon relative importance in terms of the quantity of commodities moved 
through each system, or upon perceived problem areas. In either case, preliminary fieldwork aimed 
at identifying these differences is likely to be necessary. 
Comparing Costs of Transport and Inter-Spatial Price Differences 
As with the other market functions, comparing the costs of transport with inter-spatial price 
differences can provide insights into the economic efficiency of the function, and into the degree of 
integration of markets separated by distance. In terms of the efficiency of transport, transport costs 
can be compared with spatial price differences, and/ or the returns to owning vehicles, however 
deployed, depending on the focus of the research. To assess the degree of potential integration, the 
hypothesis that if markets are economically efficient the price difference between two markets that 
trade will approximately equal transfer costs, and between two that do not trade will be equal to, or 
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less than, the latter, is used. If markets are some distance from each other, or trading transactions 
occur over more than a week for example, time lags can be built into the comparison of prices 
obtaining in the two markets. 
Economic efficiency Where transporters specialize in providing a service, and are not themselves 
involved in buying and selling, only the returns to owning a vehicle, and renting it out to traders, will 
indicate the efficiency with which the service is priced. Conversely, where transport is hired, 
comparing the costs of hiring the service, with inter-spatial price differences will be indicative of the 
efficiency of spatial arbitrage. Lastly, where vehicle owners are also engaged in buying and selling, 
comparing the costs of owning and deploying a vehicle in this manner with inter-spatial price 
differences will be revealing. As with correlation coefficient analyses however, qualitative data 
should be combined with these calculations, in particular the direction of physical flows at different 
times of year. 
The simplest, and most commonly used, means to compare costs with commodity or hire prices is 
through calculating the unitary net returns to all resources invested in the function. These can then be 
represented as either absolute values, or as ratios to the value of all, or one, of the resources invested, 
or to the opportunity costs of buying and selling more locally. Equations similar to those given in the 
section on storage can be used for these calculations. 
Depending on the data available, it is likely that the calculations will involve some assumptions, 
for example concerning annual volumes handled and kilometres travelled; the temporal dimensions 
of transport; the most common means of obtaining transport; vehicle depreciation rates etc .. Again, 
these assumptions should be made explicit and justified. 
Market integration Although price incentives are important in transport decisions, the ability to 
respond to such incentives in the form of, for example, the availability of vehicles and fuel and the 
passibility of roads, also has to be assured if a physical flow of goods is to ensue. In addition, prices 
may be even higher elsewhere; information about price differences may be unavailable, and traders 
may have risk-reducing, long-term contracts (Ravallion, 1987). 
Therefore, in forming hypotheses about market integration through comparing costs and prices, 
computing, for example, average weekly price margins between towns alone will only demonstrate 
the potential for markets to be connected. Such an analysis will demonstrate where and when 
profitable trade is possible, but it will not show (a) whether price incentives are actually responded 
to; (b) how high profits have to be to ensure such trade; or (c) whether the means to respond to such 
differences, including information, are available. For instance, it is possible that although the price 
difference between two markets exceeds transport costs, physical flows of produce between the two 
are insufficient to reduce the disparity, due to monopoly control of commodity flows, or the means of 
transport; insufficient supplies of vehicles, labour, capital or fuel and spares; inadequate allocation of 
transportation services to this particular function; lack of information about such price differences; 
greater differences existing elsewhere or other factors. It is, therefore, possible for price differences to 
greatly exceed transport costs without there being any trade between the two markets, and data on 
actual flows are necessary to test the integration hypothesis. 
Results and implications Once calculated, the returns to transport need to be explained, whether 
they appear to be high or low relative to those to other economic activities. For example, low returns 
may be the result of poor information; risk aversion or poor managerial decision making, rather than 
highly competitive conditions. High returns may be the result of poor information on the part of 
buyer and sellers, or they may be due to a shortage of vehicles relative to demand; the high risk of the 
operation; higher rates of depreciation than a sumed; oligopolistic market structures or other 
imperfections. Such explanations can be sought through reference to secondary data, but, in most 
cases, interviews with participants and knowledgable observers will be more revealing. 
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Box 4:12 An Example of the Analysis of Transport Costs and Inter-Spatial Price Differences 
Harriss (1981, p.148) provides a good 
example of the complexity of comparing 
spatial price differences and b·ansport costs, 
and of the need for disaggregated data . 
She analyses transport co ts and inter-
spatial price differences ove1· 3 years, for 3 
varieties of rice and paddy, between 10 
towns of varying size in South India, using 
official weekly price data and per kilometre 
minimum tran port rates, by calculating for 
each pair of towns the following: 
Mw = pwx- (Pwy- Tcxy), 
where: 
Mw = the weekly price margin, 
P wx = the weekly average price for a 
specified form of a sp cified variety 
in town x, 
P wy = the same for town y, 
Tcxy =the total transport and handling costs 
between towns x and y. 
This analysis illustrates when, and in 
which direction, profitable spatial arbitrage 
is possible. The results suggest that Tiro-
mer's second and third models may be 
insufficient to explain patterns of price for-
mation and inter-spatial price relations in 
some instances (see Box 4:11). 
'Out of 102 pairings, there are 3 where 
markets are always connected (but in two 
directions). There are no cases at all where 
markets are always connected in one direc-
tion only (Timmer's Model1). There are 14 
cases where markets veer between discon-
nection and dissociation and trade in one 
direction only (Timmer's Model3) and the 
remaining 85 pairings oscillate between 
profitable trade in both directions and dis-
sociation (Timmer's Model2).' 
Various market imperfections can be 
argued to cause some of this uncertainty 
and irregularity. Harriss (1981, p.150) 
includes for example long time lags in mar-
ket connections; imperfect systems of 
Processing and Inter-Form Price Differences 
market contacts; movement restrictions, 
and the government taxation system. 
Whatever the precise causes, the result is 
an extremely complex pattern of spatial 
trade in which towns are related to each 
other in various ways, depending on time, 
commodity form and variety, and commod-
ity flows and price formation are multi-
directional. 'We have here a regional system 
of producer centr s of supply of paddy and 
of non-final demand for paddy and rice and 
final demand for rice; intermediate centres 
where both paddy and rice are supplied for 
non-final demand, and rice for final 
demand; and centres of final consumption 
with supplies of paddy and rice and final 
demand for rice' (p.lSO). Harriss suggests 
that in such a system the process of price 
formation and the potential pattern of trade 
might be as follows: . pnce 
rrz 
rrz rural rice prices in place x-a producer 
market 
urz,q urban rice prices in places z and q. 
Timmer's Model2. 
ury urban rice prices in place y. Timmer's 
Model3. 
Spatial equilibrium models enable the 
determination of least cost spatial trading 
patterns under competition, and are useful 
in analysing spatial price relations where 
there are numerous consuming and produc-
ing regions within a single network, but are 
not covered here due to their complexity, 
and the likelihood of their not being poss-
ible under the conditions of rapid recon-
naissance. 
In a perfectly efficient market, the prices of raw materials and their processed products should be (a) 
perfectly correlated over time, and (b) differentiated according to the rate of conversion, the costs of 
processing, and normal profits. 
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As noted above, perfect correlation ov 1· time is inhibited by processing costs, which means that 
end-product prices can move within a range of +I- the costs of, for example1 milling, in relation to 
raw product prices, without any milling actually being undertaken. Therefore, the greater t11e costs of 
milling, the lower the correlation between raw material and end-product prices. High correlations 
between raw m.aterial and equivalent end-product prices may also be a result of vertical integration 
and monopoly power, the determination of the two prices being located in a single or a few firms, and 
thus this type of analysis must be combined with an understanding of the nature of the vertical 
relations involved. 
In comparing costs with the difference between raw material, and end-product, prices, there are 
again various possible techniques, but the simplest is to calculate unit costs and subtract these from 
gross unit returns. 
Data Requirements and Comparisons 
Data on physical volumes, and monetary values and/ or prices, of all inputs and outputs are required 
to assess the technical, operational and pricing efficiency of processing. As above, if the degree of 
competition in t11e industry is accepted as the primary determinant of ec0110mic efficiency, then the 
proximity between prices and costs, and the minimization of the lattet~ can be analysed to asses such 
efficiency. 
Before embarking upon a11 a11alysis of the efficiency of processing in any of its forms, a qualitative 
understanding of the operation and organization of the function is required to ensure that (a) 
relevant input and output, or cost and return, data are compared, and (b) explanations of apparent 
inefficiencies are better informed. 
Qualitative data Analysts will ne d to identify what proce sing functions are 11ecessary, and/or 
actually rendered, and by whom, and how and where are they m1dertaken. For example, in 
processing maize in Malawi, the raw product i often subject to drying; de-hulling; winnowing; 
soaking; washing; further drying; pounding and sieving. In some cases, all these processes, together 
with the treatment of by-products, is m1dertaken dom stically by consumers. In others th de-
hulling and final milling are carried out by specialist millers using mechanized technology (Kydd, 
1989). 
In grain marketing the focus in processing is usually in milling, and in this instance the following 
need to be defined, since all will be influential in determining costs and returns: 
• the types of technology used; 
• variations in management practices; 
• pre-milling processes; 
• the rate at which raw materials are transformed into various end- and by-products; 
• variations in the qualities of end- and by-products, and their respective monetary values; 
• rates of capacity utilization; 
• the ownership of mills; and 
• the way in which milling services are obtained by others. 
Owners of mills may operate as whelesalers, and only proce s their own produce, or they may hire 
out their mill , or milling ervices, in various ways. Differences in the organization of pr cessing will 
have ·implication fo1· the costs of milling and the incidence of t11ose costs. Th refme, as with the 
transport fwtction, the distinction between the p rformance of the mill-owning industry, and that of 
buyers o.f grain and seller of t1·ansfo.rmed products, needs to be made. 
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The types of technology used will, in part, determine the rates at which raw materials are 
converted into end- and by-products, the qualities of those products and the factor costs of milling. 
'For example, techniques for processing paddy rice vary from hand pounding with a pestle and 
mortar to processing a few hundred kilograms per hour with small mills, to dehusking, c_leaning and 
bagging several tons per hour with large mills' (Monke and Pearson, 1989, p.174). Variations in 
management practices will also affect these variables and, like the transport function, rates of 
capacity utilization will vitally influence the level of unitary fixed costs. 
Because milling markets may be segregated along technological lines, with small mills being 
unable to meet the demands of very large consumers, it is likely that analysts will have to categorize 
enterprises into two or more groups, and analyse the conversion rates, and costs and returns, in each. 
Box 4:13 Capacity Utilization 
Capacity utilization is important in that it is 
a prime influence on the level of unit fixed 
costs, and thus the operational efficiency, of 
milling. The same is true of the storage and 
transport functions. Under-utilization will 
increase unit costs, since fixed costs are 
allocated proportionately. 
Lele (1971, p.188) distinguishes between 
the following: 
• engineering capacity - the maximum 
number of working hours possible, 
based on mechanical feasibility; 
• effective capacity- the maximum num-
ber of working hours possible given 
social, physical and environmental 
constraints; 
• optimum capacity utilization at which 
the difference between total revenue 
and total costs is greatest. 
In assessing the economic efficiency of 
processing it is the latter which should be 
used as the standard against which to com-
pare actual utilization rates, but policy can 
also be directed at closing any gaps between 
engineering, and economic, capacity utiliza-
tion rates. 
Cost and price data and comparisons Establishing unit milling costs is relatively easy where the 
service is paid for on a per unit basis, by buyers and sellers of grain and its products. However, there 
is likely to be considerable variation in these unit costs related to the volumes of commodity being 
processed, and to the technologies used. Thus, a range of milling service cost data should be collected 
on the different types of mills and consumers of this service, unless analysts are only concerned with 
one such category. 
These costs can then be compared with the price difference obtaining at the same time and place 
between, for example, specified varieties and qualities of paddy and rice, or maize grain and maize 
flour, using the conversion ratio appropriate to particular technologies and qualities of end-product. 
Where data on various conversion ratios are unavailable, or unobtainable through fieldwork, official 
or standard estimates can be used. 
The costs incurred by the mill owners may be more difficult to obtain and calculate, but, in order to 
assess the economic efficiency of the milling industry, these need to be compared with the prices 
charged to clients for milling. Unless secondary sources are available, interviews with the owners 
and operators of mills will be necessary. The most important costs which vary in relation to the 
quantity of commodity milled, include: 
• oil, diesel and/ or electricity; 
• salaries of temporary workers; and 
• possibly packaging materials and chemical additives. 
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Fixed costs include: 
• depreciation on buildings and machinery, which may have to be assumed; 
• interest on capital borrowed and/ or invested, which also may have to be assumed; 
• insurance; maintenance, repairs and spare parts; 
• salaries of permanent employees; and 
• in some instances, storage facilities and costs. 
It is important to distinguish between these two categories in calculating unit costs. In addition, as 
Lele (1971, p.191) points out, if variable costs form a major part of total milling costs, increased 
capacity utilization will not lead to a significant decline in average costs, and therefore incentives to 
increase such utilization will be less. This may also imply that management and operation are 
efficient, and that any inefficiencies suggested through subsequent comparisons of prices and costs, 
lie within the technical or economic, rather than operational, realm. 
As well as exhibiting different qualitative and quantitative conversion characteristics, various 
processing systems will have different capital and labour requirements. Therefore, data on the costs 
of operating different sizes and types of mill are required. If costs are highly variable within similar 
ranges of technology, this variation must be explained. For example, it may arise from miscalcula-
tions, such as over- or under-estimates of labour requirements, or from differences in managerial and 
operational efficiency. These variations may also provide clues as to the competitiveness of the 
milling industry in particular areas, since competition is a major force in motivating cost 
minimization. 
To calculate the unit costs of owning and operating a mill, data on the volumes of commodity 
processed need to be obtained, in order that fixed costs can be allocated between them. In the absence 
of reliable records, interviewees' estimates of average annual costs, and average annual throughput, 
can be used. Monke and Pearson (1989, p.178) argue that expected annual throughput may be a 
better measure to use here, because this is the level of demand that motivates investment in 
processing, and because actual throughput in any one particular year may be unrepresentative for 
various reasons, including the age of the enterprise; infrastructural or agricultural bottlenecks; 
business cycles etc .. In addition they suggest that, where time and resources allow, 'visits to a large 
number of enterprises and time-series data can be helpful in the formation of an estimate of expected 
annual throughput. When capacity utilization rates vary widely and chronically, multiple processing 
budgets can be constructed to represent alternative scenarios.' The equations detailed in the section 
on storage may aid the calculation of unit costs. 
If whole mills are rented, and deployed either in processing own products, or in selling milling 
services, an intermediate level of cost and return calculations is required, as with the case of renting 
out a whole vehicle. If a mill is rented to process own products, the unit costs of renting and running 
the mill over the period during which it is hired must be compared with the price difference between 
raw and end- plus by-products, over the same time span. If the mill is rented over the longer term in 
order to sell milling services, then the costs incurred by the individual, or enterprise, renting the mill 
in hiring and operating the technology, must be compared with the prices received from selling the 
service. 
PROFITABILITY ANALYSES 
The profitability of marketing enterprises provides the most direct indicator of the degree of 
competitiveness in the system. It is hypothesized that if markets are competitive, profit levels will be 
'normal', since if they rise relative to other economic activities, new enterprises and resources will be 
attracted to the sector; the supply of goods, or services, will increase; prices will fall and profits will 
revert to a normal level. Conversely, in an oligopolistic or monopolistic market, it is possible for 
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enterprises to maintain profit levels at a higher level over a longer period of Otime. Aside from 
effective oligopolistic a11d/or collusive practices and barriers to entry, resource immobility may also 
allow 'super-normal' profit to be maintained. 
Leaving aside the problems of income distribution, technological innovation and dynamic growth, 
economies of cale and extemalitie , a11d hence this limitation on perfect competition in maximizing 
productivity and sociaJ welfare, analysing the profitability of enterprises remains the best means of 
asses ing the static economic efficiency of price formation and transmission. There ar no simple 
mean of directly relating private, or actual, prices to ocial costs and benefits, but by accepting the 
assumption that competition leads to the best allocation of resotu·ces 1.mder certain conditions, 
calculating levels of entel'prise profitabiUty can be u ed to provide indications of conditions of 
competition and the efficiency of price formation within the system. Subsequently, the stringent 
conditions of the perfectly competitive model, and those necessary for its resulting in optimal 
resource allocation, can be returned to and questioned. 
Limitations on Profitability Analyses 
There are however methodological and inferential problems in defining and measuring profitability, 
and in specifying an absolute standard against which to judge profits as acceptable or normal. 
Probably the most serious of these is data availability. In addition, calculating rates of profit is far 
from straightforwaJ·d, and the relationship between profit levels and economic efficiency is not 
unilateral. For these reasons, the less direct approaches to assessing competition and economic 
efficiency in the market are usually necessary, and the review on profitability analyses here is kept 
brief. 
Data availability and the use of secondary data To calculate enterprise level profits and 
profitability accurately, a detailed analysis of the quantities and values of inputs and outputs over a 
period of time, usually a year, is necessary. Not only does the common absence of accounting records 
make this very difficult, but research and analytical resources may also be limiting. 
In most marketing studies to date, firm accounts have not been used to calculate profitability. Often 
such records are unobtainable. Rather, secondary price data have been used to calculate average 
annual price differences between various markets, which are then compared with average transport, 
storage and/ or processing costs. The latter are obtained either truough surveys or from official 
estimates. However, such analyses assume constant and unidirectional market connection and may 
be highly unrepresentative of enterprise-level profits where there is multi-directional and intermit-
tent trade, and where enterprises are multi-functional, deal in a variety of commodities, and differ 
greatly in size, capital intensity etc .. Therefore, where secondary data is used, the following need to 
be defined: 
• the direction and timing of commodity flows; 
• the number of markets through which commodities flow; 
• the particular times of year over which costs pertain and profits are reaped; 
• the various functions undertaken by different enterprises and when and where they operate; 
and 
• quantities handled; technology used; numbers of labourers employed etc .. 
In addition, in using aggregated and averaged-out data, a low average rate of return may conceal 
large-scale accumulation by a few, in the commonly occurring combination of subsistence, and 
monopoly, trade (Harriss, 1978, p.33). Conversely, high average rates of profit may co-exist with non-
subsistence meeting operations. Thus, case-studies of enterprise-level profitability for at least a few 
types and sizes of enterprise need to be undertaken. 
Interpreting results Once again, a single cause cannot be assumed. For example, low rates of profit 
are not necessarily the result of economically efficient and competitive marketing, since monopolistic 
103 
conditions can lead to higher costs and prices through technical and operational inefficiency, rather 
than to excess profits. Thus the profit maximization a swnption may not be upheld. Low profits may 
also be due to risk aversion and pervasive uncertainty. The absence of a managerial profit 
maximization objective has often been the case with parastatal marketing boards, where objectives 
have been politically determined, and where employees have had no incentives to maximize profits. 
Conversely, seemil1gly high rates of profit may be the r ult of particular productive efficiency, short-
term luck, or monopoly power in factor mru·kets, rather than within the agricultural marketing 
system itself. Thus, as with other indicator of pelformance, profitability must be analysed in 
conjunction with additional phenomena, in particular the structure of the marketing system, and the 
technical and operational efficiem:y with which marketing functions are undertaken. 
Comparing results Cross-country comparison of profitability ar hard to interpret, due to 
differing labour ru1d capitaJ costs; varying degrees of horizontal and vertical integration, and 
different levels and types of service performed. Compari on between different firms' labour and 
capital productivity, within the same market or economy, for example between different-sized, 
functional, comm0dity and geographically located institutions, are more likely to be meaningful. 
Calculating Enterprise (Firm) Level Profits and Profitability 
Calculating enterprise level profits is highly complex, due to val'ious empirical, methodological and 
theoretical problems. There is a te11dency for merchants to overestimate costs and to underestimate 
retun1S and often trading enterprises deploy unpaid family labour and deal, concurrently or 
sequentially, in several commodities, and various functions and combinations of function. This 
necessitates a means of allocating fixed costs between commodities and functions, and. of determi11-
ing the degree to whicl1 vertical integration lead to higher profits. Moreover, the way il1 whicll 
profits and profitability are calculated depend on the precise definition of these concepts, which will 
be determined by different research objectives and the availability of data. 
In the absence of access to detailed accounts, the best means of collecting the data required on costs 
and returns is through xtended. case studies of a few representative types and sizes of firm. The 
latter can be identified through an initial survey; secondary sources or interviews with knowledgable 
observers. Measurements of current inputs and outputs, and costs and prices, can be supplemented 
with interviews concerning seasonal changes and annual values. 
Absolute net profit There are various ways in which profits can be defined, calculated and 
expressed. The examples below of various profit calculations are taken from Harriss (1981) and 
Monke and Pearson (1989). 
The return to all resources used -what Harriss (1981, p.74) refers to as absolute net profit- is 
calculated by subtracting total costs from the total gross value of output, usually on au annual ba is. 
This cannot be used to assess economic efficiency, or make comparisons between enterpri es, 
because of differences in resources invested in varying types and sizes of enterpris . Thus a rate of 
return to resources invested, i.e. a rate of profitability, has to be calculated. 
Profitability as a return to capital The standard convention in economics is to calculate 
profitability as the rate of return to capital invested in the firm. Thus, absolute net profits must be 
expressed as a ratio to, or percentage of, the total value of capital deployed. This allows comparisons 
to be made between u1arketing enterprises, and between the returns to capital invested in different 
sectors of the economy. Harriss (1981, p.74) defines this measme as: 
(0-C) 
(CS+ WC) I 
where: 
0 = total gross value of output, i.e. total revenue; 
C = total costs incurred; 
CS = value of capital stock, including land, buildings and machinery; 
WC = value of working capital. 
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In many cases this equation will provide a measure which will be sufficient to allow an analysis of 
economic efficiency, tlnough compari ons between enterprise , and between profitability and 
interest on credit. Howevet·, where wners of enterprises also rwt them, and where unpaid family 
labour is d played in them, further calculations may be necessary. This is because 'pure profits' are 
preferred in profitability comparison . 
Pure profits and profitability Pure profits represent dispensable income after own and family 
conswnption needs have been met. The rate of return to capital they imply is important in (a) 
analysing economic efficiency through comparing the profitability of different enterprises with each 
other, and with prevailing interest rates, and (b) determining potential levels of investment, and 
hence enterprise viability. In many cases the above equation will provide an indication of pure profits 
and profitability. Usually payments for management and labour are included in the costs. However, 
where owners are also managers, and where unpaid family labour is used in the enterprise, as is 
common in LDCs, particularly among smaller enterprises, imputed values for these factors have to 
be added to the costs to obtain a measure of pure profit. 
Management and unpaid family labour can be costed out according to relevant, observed market 
wage rates (which may exhibit a gender differentiation). Alternatively, shadow or minimum wage 
rates can be used. Harriss (1981, p.74) calculates unpaid family labour costs by using a hypothetical 
minimum subsistence budget for each family interviewed, including the costs of food, clothing and 
housing. This may provide a better indication of the pure return to capital, and of investible 
surpluses, where not all members of the family work in the enterprise, but is dependent on greater 
research time and resource availabilities, since family size is crucial. Also, because minimum 
consumption needs are income-elastic, these calculations will overestimate pure profit levels of 
wealthier enterprises. 
It is also important here to count consumption from own inventories as a benefit, or to subtract the 
value of such consumption from minimum subsistence budgets, since failure to do so would result in 
double counting. Similarly, a means of defining the contribution of marketing functions to family 
consumption needs, in the context of multi-enterprise family enterprises, needs to be found, or at 
least pure profit rates increased or decreased to take this into account. 
Other measures of profitability Depending on research objectives and data availability, absolute 
net profit can also be expressed as a ratio to, or percentage of, the following: 
• gross earnings, or sales value, in order to determine how much of the value added constitutes 
profit; 
• annual turnover, to provide an indication of the rate of profitability in the absence of data on 
capital investments, or to assess the differences between profit rates of various-sized enterprises, 
and thus the nature of economies of scale in the industry; and 
• wage labour costs, which provides an indication of labour productivity, and/ or rates of labour 
exploitation, within the marketing system. 
These measures cannot be compared between enterprises, or groups of enterprises, in an attempt 
to evaluate the economic efficiency of different parts of the marketing system, because of differences 
in capital and labour requirements; in the extent to which they employ own, or borrowed, capital and 
in rates of turnover and volumes of sales. 
Using and Interpreting Results 
In attempting to determine whether the returns to capital invested in trade represent 'normal' or 
'excess' profits, they can be compared to that invested in other economic activities, like different 
marketing functions or agriculture, and/ or to prevailing interest rates on the credit markets to which 
traders have access. Estimates of the returns to various agricultural enterprises may be obtainable 
from secondary sources, and normally public sector enterprise profits will be available. However, the 
ways in which the latter are defined and calculated must be ascertained in order to ensure 
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comparability. Moreover, comparisons with interest rates will not provide an indication of the static 
economic efficiency of marketing where, for example, the credit market is subject to monopoly 
control or other imperfections, and thus caution is needed in interpreting results. 
Alternatively Monke and Pearson (1989, p.19) suggest a private cost ratio can be estimated. This is 
calculated by dividing the sum of the cost of all factors used in marketing, by total revenue less 
traded inputs (ie. by value added). If the private cost ratio is equal to 1, 'normal profits' are being 
reaped. If it is less than 1 'super normal profits' are being made. This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
Comparing average rates of profit of different enterprises ca11 also provide i.nsights into the 
structure of trade; the locus of monopoly power and capital accumulation; and the implications for 
income distribution within the system. For example, Harriss (1981, p .73) suggests that profits, 
calculated by various methods, can be compared to determine whether they increase with the 
number and combination of services performed to provide an indication of the returns to vertical 
integration, which may be disproportionate and lead to oligopolistic concentrations of capital. 
Similarly, profitability differences between enterprises differentiated by size (defined by capital 
investment or turnover); age and geographical location can also indicate whether there are barriers to 
upward mobility in marketing, in terms of scale of operation or in time and space. 
Simpler, but less accurate, indicators may also be used where research constraints do not allow for 
the above. For example, average annual incomes from different types and scales of trade can be 
compared with various official or observed wage rates. However, the effects of incomes policies on 
the latter should be taken into consideration. Per capita income of the commercial population can be 
compared with that of other sectors, if the necessary data is available. But, the limitations noted 
above in relation to averaged and aggregated data also apply to both these exercises. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysing Marketing Policies 
• defining agricultural marketing policy 
• policy objectives and instruments 
• the neo-classical economics approach to policy analysis 
• social prices 
• divergences 
• market failures 
• distortions 
• policy hierarchies 
• nominal protection coefficients 
• effective protection coefficients 
• domestic resource costs 
• the policy analysis matrix 
This chapter provides a guide to the analysis of agricultural marketing policy. The discussion opens 
with the question, 'what is agricultural marketing policy?'. 
Neo-classical, partial equilibrium analyses of policy are then discussed and presented. This is a 
theoretical framework rooted in the belief that, broadly speaking, free competitive markets serve 
society well, but, nevertheless, there are a range of circumstances in which government intervention 
ca11 serve to advance economic efficiency goals. Partial equilibrium theory considers individual 
markets in isolation: where there i a d1ange in the market under analysis, partial equilibrium theory 
ignores any feedback effects on this market which may be transmitted though the wider economy 
Thus, in contrast to general equilibrium approaches, which aim to model the main feedback effects, 
partial equilibrium theory has substantial limitations. On the other hand, it is more readily 
comprehended and applied. 
Basic concepts from economic theory of policy are set out, and the application of these concepts to 
agricultural marketing policy is considered. It is unlikely that most researchers will wish to 
undertake partial equilibrium analysis of markets (indicating equilbrium levels of price, supply and 
welfare), due to data limitations. Therefore a num"ber of indicators are explained, which can be used 
in a rough and ready way to assess the effects of government interventions on the economic 
efficiency of marketing. These indicators point to appropriate directions for government intervention 
or policy change, but do not indicate with any precision what the outcome of particular intreventions 
maybe. 
Finally, a number of spreadsheet-based examples examined to guide readers in the estimation and 
interpretation of policy indicators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government Intervention in Agricultural Marketing 
Having discussed various ways of analysing the economic efficiency of marketing operations, we 
now turn to ntarketing policy. Governments intervene in agricultural marketing at a number of 
1 vels; in a variety of ways and for a wide range of reasons. This chapter begins by providing some 
examples of the influences on the policy decision-making process and the objectives of, and 
instruments used in, agricultural marketing policy. 
Influences, Objectives and Means 
Government r gulation of market is often shaped by the political action of interest groups which 
may gain or lose. But it Js also influenced by theories about the consequences of particular 
interventions and non-interventions in. Ute market. These theories afi et the sphere of political action 
by providing ideas to govenunents and to interest groups, about the likely consequences of 
interventions for the 'national interest' and for particular sections of society. If new U1eories of the 
effects of various market interventions grow in popularity, reducing the influence of previously 
dominant ideas, this may have a major impact on policy because the consequences of particular 
policies come to be understood differently. 
Economic efficiency versus monopolies and free-trade Quite contrary theories can be encoun-
tered . For example, the proposition that free competition is necessa1·y for ec nomic efficiency may be 
opposed with arguments that monopoly may be required to justify desirable, but risky, or lumpy, 
investments in capital assets. Monopolies, controlled by government or by producer interests, may 
be advocated on the growlds that they will make it possible to protect the intere ts of producers and/ 
or consumers from factors such as price instability; private trader monopolies and/or damaging 
government intervention in linked markets. 
Similarly, interventions which restrict or tax interprovincial and international trade may be 
justified on the basis that they protect producers, consumers, or both. Producer protection results 
from interventions rendering outputs more expensive, and/ or inputs cheaper, than would oilierwise 
have been the case. Consumer protection results from rneasures which hinder exports from a 
province or country and which cause local price to be lower and (possibly) stocks to be higher. 
Contradictions in food security policies Food security objective may be furth red by interven-
tions which have the effect of lowering food prices, and nsuring that these lower prices can be 
sustained even when supplies are affected by such developments as a shortfall in the local food 
harvest, or a surge in prices in a linked food market. For a number of governments, tariff or quota 
interventions in interprovincial and international trade a1·e only part of the range of instruments 
which may be used to provide food security. 
To make it po sible to sustain lower prices in the face of market pressures for price increases, 
governments may hav a policy of holding high stock levels, to be released onto the market while 
awaiting a new harvest or while securing imported supplies. But, holding large food security tacks 
is expensive, aud, if the costs of this are passed on to consumers, food security obj ctives may be 
compromised. The alternative of passing the costs on to producers may be po sible, but courts Ute 
danger that incentives may be reduced to the point that supplies become inadequate and farm 
incomes lowered unacceptably. For these reason it is often found that a substantial part of the costs 
of holdll.1g food security stocks is borne by the government. 
Reducing transactions costs Governments also intervene to directly reduce the transaction costs 
(i.e. those of exchange) experienced by participants in the market. Generally, tran actions costs are 
raised when U1ere is (a) doubt about tlle enforceability of COllh·acts, and (b) limited infom1ation 
available to contracting parties about general market conditions, and about specific matters such a 
U1e quality of the pr duce being exchanged. A specific equity concern arises when there is a sharp 
asymmetry in the availability of information to parties to an exchange. For example, larger traders, 
with good market intelligence, may be able to exploit this in transactions with producers and small 
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traders. Thus governments often provide rules concerning standards of quality and grading, product 
handling and hygiene. 
The inadequacy of market information, as a result of the lack of development of transport 
networks; communications and of specialized marketing information services, has been used as an 
argument to justify the public provision of market information. This is normally collected by 
observation of prices and quantities in different places, by obtaining intelligence about anticipated 
developments in connected markets (e.g. size of harvest), and by the timely dissemination of this 
information in mass media. 
An additional approach to reducing transactions costs is for governments to set the temporal and 
spatial dimensions of marketing by specifying places and times at which marketing should take 
place. Temporal regulation (e.g. ordering that there will be a 'Monday market' for potatoes every 
week from March to May) may be justified on the grounds that it makes marketing more predictable 
for producers, traders and consumers. In the absence of an imposed framework of temporal 
predictability, it is argued that a satisfactory matching of supplies and demand in the system, with 
damaging effects on economic efficiency, would result. 
Spatial planning and competition It is often argued that intervention through spatial planning is a 
critical function for government. Left to themselves, private individuals may not be able to obtain 
sites which provide good access to producers, wholesalers, consumers and storage facilities. There 
may be links between spatial planning and the competitiveness of the market, as highly concentrated 
private control of key marketing sites may be conducive to monopoly. This problem may be 
addressed not only by spatial planning to ensure that marketing sites contain adequate space for a 
number of competing participants, it also may be held to provide a justification for government 
ownership and management of marketing sites (which may be rented or leased in sections). 
DEFINING AGRICULTURAL MARKETING POLICY 
Government intervention in agricultural marketing can have effects which are similar to non-
marketing interventions. Conversely, government intervention in other areas of the economy can 
influence the conditions under which marketing is undertaken. Therefore marketing and non-
marketing interventions can often be evaluated as alternative means of achieving particular 
objectives of policy. 
The Problem - Comparing Three Policies 
For example, assuming markets are competitive, if private traders normally find it profitable to 
export a staple food from a province, but the government limits such exports, by quotas or bans, then 
prices for producers and consumers within the province will fall. Facing reduced incentives, 
producers will be likely to undertake a degree of substitution into other products, increasing supplies 
of these products to provincial markets and, perhaps, to export markets. 
Comparable results could have been achieved by a policy of taxing the export of the staple food, by 
applying an export cess which would lower the price marketeers obtained for exports and hence the 
price they were prepared to pay producers. As long as it remains profitable to export, i.e. that the 
export cess does not rise to the point that there ceases to be a market connection, the prices that 
traders obtain for exports will determine the prices which they pay to producers. In this case, the 
export price to traders would represent the opportunity costs of the staple food, and thus consumer 
prices within the province would also fall. 
A further possibility is that the government might intervene by announcing that a per-unit subsidy 
would be paid to all marketeers purchasing the staple food within the province, and then selling this 
on to consumers within the province. Sales to markets outside the province would not receive a 
subsidy. Here the effects of the subsidy would be only partially analogous to the two earlier 
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Box 5:1 The Economics of Export Quotas; Export Taxes and Consumer Subsidies 
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D d = domestic demand chedule 
Sd = domestic supply schedule 
I= the export parity price from the province 
or country 
Qd = domestic consumption 
Q5 =domestic production 
ln this case, the export parity price is the 
opportunity cost of the taple food and 
there is no div rgence between the export 
price and the domestic price. The quantity 
exported is QdQs. 
A quota on exports, fixed at NM, reduces 
exports below the free-market level. 
Because of the reduced size of the market, 
prices to producers fall to L and total pro-
duction fall to M. With lower consumer 
prices, domestic consumption is able to 
expand to N. The export parity price 
remains 1, but whether exporters will be 
paid this, or the domestic consumer price], 
or a price m-between these, WiJJ depend 011 
how the government allocates the quota. A 
total'quota rent', equivalent to rectangle R 
is availabl . Thi may only benefit 
exporters, if it is allocated to them free of 
charge. However, if it is sold by auction, or 
by tender, then most or all of R can accrue to 
the government. Another po sibility is that 
the public officials responsible for the allo-
cation, may seek to obtain a private share of 
R, thr ugh soliciting bribes. 
This diagram looks similar to the case of a 
quota on exports, but th sequence of mar-
ket shifts is different. An export tax, or tariff, 
at th rate IT, reduces the opportunity cost 
of the staple f od toT, lowering both con-
sumer and producer prices. Thus pro-
duction decfu1es to Y, but con umption 
expands to X. Export are now XY and, in 
this case, the government obtains a revenue, 
R, equivalent to the tarif_f rate multipli d by 
the quantity exported. 
Assuming the subsidy is a fixed monetary 
sum, S, then prices to domestic consumers 
_fall to P 5 . However, the opportunity cost for 
producers, and traders, is still given by I. 
The consequence is that producer incen-
tives, and therefore production, remain 
unchanged, while lower prices cause 
domestic consumption to expand to A, thus 
squeezing exports which decline to ZQ .. 
The costs of the subsidy to the government 
will be IS multiplied by Z, shown as the 
shaded area in the diagram. 
examples, as producer prices would be unaffected, but consumer prices in the province would be 
lower. 
The distributional effects of these alternative policies also differ. The export quota hurts producers, 
but benefits consumers and, to varying degrees, may benefit export traders, raise government 
revenue and serve the private .ll1 terests of public officials. Thus there is scope for a coalition of 
consumer, public sector and, possibly, export marketing interests to co-operate in lobbying for the 
introduction/preservation of export quota arrangements. The case of the export tax is simpler. 
Consumers and the government (or taxpayers) gain, while producers lose. In the case of the 
consumer subsidy, producers are unaffected (exports are simply diverted to the domestic market), 
consumers gain, but government (taxpayers) pay. The political-economic possibilities for support for 
a consumer subsidy are likely to turn on the relative powers of, and perceived costs and benefits to, 
consumers of the product in question versus taxpayers. 
Market, or Non-Market, Interventions? 
Which of these three types of intervention, namely, (a) quotas on exports, (b) taxes on exports and (c) 
subsidies for marketing to domestic consumers, may be described as marketing or non-marketing 
interventions ? In a general sense, all three involve interventions in markets which may alter the 
volume and direction of flows, and the prices at which exchange takes place. However, further 
consideration does provide a basis for making distinctions. 
The quota achieves its effects through a direct intervention into marketing by denying traders the 
option of exporting at will, and instead setting up procedures for applying for the right to undertake 
strictly limited exports. Clearly, this is a marketing intervention. On the other hand, the export tax 
amounts to a change in the environment in which ·marketeers operate, because, in assessing their 
options, they now have to take into account that they have to pay a tax on exports and, possibly, that 
their activities may be impeded by new administrative requirements necessary for the administra-
tion of the tax. However, marketing activity is less directly controlled, because traders are free to 
export without reference to the government, as long as they pay the tax. Finally, the consumer 
subsidy option can be thought of as the mirror-image of the export tax as it is applied to the domestic 
market rather than the export market, and it is a negative rather than a positive tax. Again, 
administrative procedures will be necessary for the government to verify sales onto the domestic 
market, and to subsidize traders for these. 
If it is accepted that the quota is an example of a marketing intervention, while the tax and subsidy 
are not marketing interventions but changes in the market environment, what is the significance of 
this distinction? From the broader perspective of policy analysis, the distinction does not seem very 
useful. It can be argued that alternative interventions which have similar consequences, in terms of 
their effects on prices and volumes traded, should be analysed and compared together? The 
separation of 'marketing policy' and 'tax and subsidy' policy as discrete fields of analysis is likely to 
obstruct understanding, because policy analysis is essentially a matter of simulating the outcomes of 
alternative policies, and assessing the relative desirability of these outcomes. 
Marketing Policy Defined 
Thus marketing policy analysis is approached here from the following perspectives: 
(a) It is appropriate to apply conceptual tools which have been developed for economic policy 
analysis more generally. 
(b) Marketing policy analysis should not be undertaken in isolation. Analysts should be aware 
that a particular intervention in marketing will often represent one of a number of options 
which may be under consideration for the achievement of a more general (i.e. non-
marketing) objective. Here marketing interventions should be analysed and compared with 
other interventions which have been proposed. 
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(c) Notwithstanding point (b), there will be circumstances where the objectives of policy are 
purely concerned with marketing objectives. In such cases, it is acceptable to restrict the 
analysis to a comparison of different interventions in the marketing system. 
USES OF POLICY ANALYSIS 
The analytical techniques described here could have a number of objectives. One may be to compar · 
the economic efficiency different in titutional struc;:tures, or channels, for marketing. From this a 
hierarchy of mark ting structure in terms of conomic efficiency may be derived. TI1e ordering of the 
hi rcu-chy could be examined by assuming different relative factor prices, different degrees of market 
failure and differing internal efficiency parameters for particular institutional structures. 
An example of this might be where there are two alternative systems for the production 8lld 
upply of a staple food crop. One might involve geographically dispersed production by small 
farmers, with bulking-up at village level, sales by farmers and small-scale trader to local markets, 
further bulking up at local markets as a result of purchases by larger traders, who then sell-on to 
wholesalers, who i.u turn deliver to millers. The other system might involve geographically 
concenh·ated production by large commercial farmers, with direct delivery to miller . Again, the 
initial task could be to asses and rank the efficiencies of these systems. Subsequently, the analyst 
would consider policy changes to make these systems more economically efficient and consider how 
th e systems would expand or contract, and change internally, in response to th proposed policy 
changes. 
A further objective may be to identify interventions which would enhance the efficiency of a 
marketing sub-system. For example, in a recently liberalized grain market, there may be a channel 
based mainly on small-scale tradeJ"s, who are shown to be incurring higl1 storage losses. The effects of 
possible technical improvements in storage efficiency on the overall efficiency of the system can then 
be modelled. By taking into accom1t estimates by grain storage dentists of the extent to which 
r ductions in storage losses are feasible, it may be possible to indicate the benefits of research and 
extension on grain storage and also the effects of this in the relative efficiency of alternative 
marketing channels. 
OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY 
A key distinction in policy analysis is made between the objectives of policy and the instruments 
which may be used in to achieve these objectives. Once objectives and instruments have been 
identified, it is possible to: 
• examine potential conflicts between objectives; 
• where conflicts exist, to consider the weights that should be attached to particular objectives, in 
order to devise optimal trade-offs; and 
• to consider the efficacy of individual instruments as means of realizing policy objectives. 
While the difference between objectives and instruments is conceptually straightforward, in practice 
there is often confusion. In addition, stated government goals may, in reality, be given little weight; 
there may be disagreements within government concerning objectives, and there will certainly be 
disputes over the relative weights to be assigned to different objectives. 
Problems in Identifying Policy Objectives 
The economist's approach to policy analysis, which entails the diagnosis and appraisal of the 
resource costs and distributional consequences of a policy instrument, may not be the dominant 
approach in the wider discussion of policy. 
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In lobbying governments, vested interests can have powerful reasons for concealing the effects of 
the interventions they advocate under attractive slogans, which decision makers in government may 
find more persuasive than purely economic goals. For example, food producers will tend to favour 
interventions which produce a substantial national food surplus, which may then have to be 
exported at a loss, or stored locally. The costs of exports and storage, likely to be paid by government 
and/ or food consumers, may be justified as a necessary cost for national food security, and the 
impact on the incomes of food producers may hardly be discussed. 
Another example might be that of parastatal crop marketing authorities, which justify their 
existence with reference to the development of marketing services and the protection of producers 
and consumers from, for example, price instability and long-term declines in prices. On the other 
hand, the parastatals may operate as instruments for taxation and/ or for expanding public sector 
employment. The question of economic efficiency losses due to the absence of competition would be 
unlikely to feature in the parastatals' lobbying of government. 
Ways of Identifying Policy Objectives 
The separating out of objectives and instruments is as much an art as a science. Statements of 
government objectives will almost certainly exist, for example, in development plans and election 
manifestos of the governing party. But it may be the case that some of these stated objectives are in 
practice given low priority and that other objectives, less frequently publicly articulated, are more 
important. 
The recommended approach to this problem is for the analyst to begin by developing a 'long list' of 
possible policy objectives derived from: 
• the official documentation; 
• discussions with civil servants and politicians; 
• the views of political scientists, economists and others who have observed the government in 
operation from a more detached perspective, and 
• the analyst's own appraisal of the actual distribution of the government budget, and of the 
effects of its price and trade policies. 
If circumstances allow, this 'long list' could be circulated for comment within the government and 
discussed at meetings. Out of this process a 'short list' of higher priority policy objectives should 
begin to emerge. There will never be total agreement on priorities, and thus the policy analyst, with 
the agreement of the policy makers at whom the advice is targeted, will eventually have to make the 
final decision on the composition of the short list. In circumstances where, initially, there is no 
agreement on objectives among policy makers and senior policy advisers (the distinction between 
these categories may in practice be blurred) then the analyst must seek to foster a consensus, and this 
may prove a difficult task. 
Primary Objectives, Subsidiary Objectives and Instruments 
As the identification of objectives and instruments proceeds, a hierarchy will begin to emerge. Some 
objectives are clearly major goals, but thers, while not being policy instruments, are subsidiary 
goals. Box 2 illustrates this with reference to the major objective of lowering food prices. Subsidiary 
objectives, the achievement of which will co11tribute to this primary outcome, are: 
• raising the efficiency of marketing; 
• undertaking additional research and development on food crops; 
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Box 5:2 An Example of a Hierarchy of Major Objectives, Subsidiary Objectives and Possible 
Instruments - Lowering Consumer Food Prices 
MAJOR OBJECTIVES 
Lower consumer prices for 
staple foods 
SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVES 
Raising the efficiency of 
output and input marketing 
Promoting increased tech-
nical research, to raise pro-
duction 
Improving the availability 
of credit to farmers 
Lowering transport costs 
Subsidizing (a) inputs; (b) 
outputs and/ or (c) trans-
port 
Restricting food exports, 
where an export surplus 
exists 
• improving the supply of credit to farmers; 
• lowering the costs to producers of transport services; 
• subsidizing inputs, outputs and transport, and 
• restrictions on food exports. 
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POSSIBLE INSTRUMENTS 
(which may be mutually 
exclusive) 
(a) support the develop-
ment of co-operatives; (b) 
set up a parastatal agency to 
develop marketing s r-
vices; (c) provide support 
services for the develop-
ment of private trade; (d) 
regulate the market to 
reduce anti-competitive 
practices; (e) set up publicly 
funded market information 
services; (f) improve spatial 
distribution of marketing 
facilities 
(a) funding to public 
research and development 
system; (b) remove impedi-
ments to the operation of 
private research and devel-
opment 
(a) establish and subsidize 
organizations supplying 
credit to farmers; (b) ident-
ify and change policies inhi-
biting the supply of credit 
to farmers by private finan-
cial institutions 
(a) public investment in 
roads and rail; (b) deregula-
tion of transport operators 
to encourage investment in, 
and better use of, existing 
stock 
(a) subsidize marketing 
parastatals; (b) subsidize 
private traders 
(a) impose quotas; (b) insti-
tute tariffs 
For each of these subsidiary objectives a number of possible policy instruments are shown. The 
lines between the three categories shown in Box 5:2 are, inevitably, somewhat arbitrary. Yet the 
process of categorizing policies in this way can be useful in bringing out important issues which need 
to be addressed. 
To take an example, government may support marketing co-operatives in a number of ways. These 
might include: 
• an advisory service; 
• arranging access to finance at preferential rates; 
• awarding co-operatives contracts for services which they would not win in open competition 
with the private sector; 
• protecting co-operatives by limiting or banning competition in certain activities, and/ or 
• subsidizing co-operatives for marketing services performed (where private competitors are 
either less generously subsidized or not subsidized). 
The central question, in deciding on instruments here, is why the government undertakes this 
support. Two broad types of answer may be forthcoming: 
(a) that in the longer run co-operatives can develop into the most efficient marketing service, 
and, therefore, they need temporary support through a development, or infant industry, 
phase; or 
(b) that although co-operatives may be somewhat less efficient than private traders (or 
parastatal agencies), the government places a higher value on activities which are co-
operatively undertaken, rather than performed by private business. In this case, co-
operation is an end rather than a means. 
If the first line of argument is felt to be dominant, then support for co-operatives must be a subsidiary 
goal, with the major one being marketing efficiency. The various ways of supporting co-operatives 
then comprise policy instruments. Thus the main policy questions are (a) how support for co-
operatives compares with other possible ways of promoting economic efficiency in marketing and, 
(b) the effectiveness of the various instruments which may be used to support co-operatives and/ or 
marketing efficiency. 
However, if policy makers lay stress on the value of co-operation for other reasons, and the analyst 
is persuaded that this is a genuine goal, then the promotion of co-operatives is the major objective. 
Whether the means of promoting co-operatives should then be elevated to the status of subsidiary 
goals, or remain as policy instruments, is a debatable point. The precise outcome of this debate is not 
crucial. What is important is that this categorization exercise has allowed the analyst to clarify the 
goals of policy, and to construct a framework in which different means can be compared as tools for 
achieving specified ends. 
Conflicting Objectives and Multiple Instruments 
As noted above, primary objectives are usually in conflict. Box 5:3 shows a simple example of 
possible major objectives of agricultural policy, and of how potential conflicts can be identified. 
The policy analysis literature contains a useful, though inconclusive, debate concerning the 
number of instruments which may be required to reconcile conflicting objectives. For example, 
consider the consequences of a policy of lowering consumer prices of food through consumer I 
marketing subsidies. As the subsidy is introduced, and then increased, the main objective of lower 
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Box 5:3 Agricultural Policy Objectives and Possible Conflicts 
MAJOR OBJECTIVES POSSIBLE 
CONFLICTS 
A Lower consumer prices for a staple food A, B, C 
B. Increasing farmer incomes A 
C. Increasing the supply of raw materials (e.g. fibres) to agro-industry D 
D. Increasing export earnings from high value cash crops (e.g. beverages) A, C 
domestic food prices is achieved. However, the subsidy has a budgetary cost (which will be an 
increasing function of the per unit subsidy, because the higher the subsidy, the more subsidized food 
will be consumed). Additionally, export earnings will be reduced, as food is diverted to the domestic 
market. 
These two by-products of the subsidy policy may well prove inconvenient. If the additional 
ubsidy costs are to be accommodated without increa ing the gove-rnment budget deficit, then new 
policy objectives a11d i:nstrume11ts will have to be introduced. If the objective is to keep the 
government budget deficit c011stant (on the ba i that othe1:wise additional government borrowing 
will be required and that this, other things being equal, will be inflationary), the instruments for 
achieving this could take the form of (a) increased taxation and/ or (b) reduced government 
expenditure. The fall tn export may also cause difficulties, and may require the introduction of 
policies to promote more exports from othru· sectors of the economy. Here the objective would be th 
majntenance of a given balance of external payments, and possible instruments would include an 
devaluation, export subsidies and import taxes. 
Killick (1981, p.29), in summarizing the literature on policy management in the face of conflicting 
objectives, describes two 'rules of thumb' as follows: 
• that, in general, each objective will require at least one policy instrument, and 
• when objectives are loosely formulated, there may be single policy instruments which can 
achieve multiple objectives. However, if objectives are tightly formulated it is unlikely that a 
single instrument will fully satisfy both objectives. 
Placing a tax on food exports, in order to reduce consumer prices, (Case 3 in Box 5:1) provides an. 
illustration of the latter 'rule of thumb'. An export tax 011 food, applied initially at a low rate, reduces 
food prices and raises governmentJ"evenue. Both cheaper food and higher government revenue are 
plausible objectives of policy, .and so it eems possible to conclude that we have here an instrument 
which is able to achieve progress in the direction of two objectives. The snag is that this happy result 
will only hold over a limited range of the application of th export tax. Beyond a certain point, further 
application of the policy instnunent will continue to achieve the objective of lowering domestic food 
prices, but will negate the revenue objective. Box 5:4shows that if the government was determined to 
pursue the food price objective through a higher export tax rat , then, beyond a certain rate, it would 
have to formulate a new objective, that of maintaining revenu , and to find a new instrument(s) to 
achieve this. 
THE NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH TO POLICY ANALYSIS 
So far it has been assumed that policy objectives arise out of the political process, reflecting soci tal 
values (or, more realistically, the consensus values of politically dominant ections of society). Thus, 
in policy analysis, the identification of objectives was described as the setting out of a list of major and 
subsidiary objectives which, in an approximate fashion, might be described a representing the 
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Box 5:4 Example of the Conflicts and Complementarities in Using a Single Instrument for Multiple 
Objectives - an Export Tax on an Exported Staple Food 
An export tax is initially applied at the rate 
IT1, which has the effect of raising govern-
ment revenue, and also reducing the con-
sumer, and producer, prices of food. The 
adjustment to equilibrium includes an 
expansion of domestic consumption, 
because prices are lower, and, for the same 
reason, a reduction in production. Revenue 
to the government is given by the rectangle 
R1 . Dct is the domestic demand curve and Sct 
is the domestic supply 
Now the export tax is increased to IT2 
and, as a consequence of further increases in 
domestic consumption, and reductions in 
production, the volume of exports is 
severely reduced. Although taxation per 
unit of export is higher, the fall in exports is 
such that R2 is less than R1 . If the tax is 
increased to IT3 then revenue falls to zero. 
In summary, over the range of possible 
values of the export tax up to IT3 , the effect 
is consistently to reduce the domestic price 
of food. However, although the revenue 
effects are initially positive, beyond a cer-
tain value of the tax (less than IT3 ) the 
revenue benefits will decline. 
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'goals of policy'. The analyst reaches a judgement as to the goals using approaches which include 
examining explicit policy statements, making inferences from actual behaviour and interviews and 
discussions with policy makers. Under this approach any ranking of policy goals is a matter of the 
analyst stating what appear to be the priorities revealed by the investigation of policy goals. Policies 
and instruments should then be judged with reference to these goals. 
The Role of Policy in Neo-Classical Economics 
Neo-classical economic theory takes a different approach to the assessment of policy objectives and 
instruments. As expounded by Corden (1974), the basic perspective is that, under certain assump-
tions, laissez-faire will optimize economic welfare. However, within this general perspective, it is 
acknowledged that there will be conditions under which laissez-faire will not produce optimal 
welfare. The most important of these are: 
• instances of market failure, 
• the presence of other government policies which create a divergence between social and private 
costs and benefits, and 
• when laissez-faire fails to result in a 'socially desirable' distribution of income. 
The first two of these will be discussed before we turn to specific techniques of policy analysis. But 
to summarize the neo-classical economists' basic approach to policy objectives and policy analysis 
Cordon (1974, p.4) notes that 'one can believe that there are many reasons for the government to 
intervene in the economy - to maintain full employment, to bring about a desirable distribution of 
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income, to adjust resource allocation and consumption patterns in the light of external economies 
and diseconomies, and so on- and yet one can also believe that, broadly, 'free trade is best". 
Divergences, Market Failures and Distortions 
Cord n' neo-classical analysis of policy starts with the concept of a divergence, defined as a 
divergence between private and social cost . Social costs are equivalent to s cial prk s, and they 
represent the costs to the community as a whole, rather than to particular individual incurring them. 
A divergence belvveen private and ocial co ts and prices implies an economically inefficient 
allocation of resources. 
Market failure lead to a particular sub-set of divergences, namely those which exist in the ab enc 
of any government intervention. Divergences, however, can also be created by govenunent 
intervention, and for the e Corden applies the term djstortion. Each of these concepts is discussed in 
more detail, before the uses to which such an analysis can be put are discussed. 
Social costs and prices 
Most textbooks on social cost-benefit analysis provide a guide to the measurement U1eory and 
practice of measuring social prices (often known in this literatme as economic prices or shadow 
prices). A recommended source is Gittinger (1982, Ch7) which provides advice relevant to the 
agric:ultural sector. Here we 011Iy provide some examples of the reasoning involved in developing 
appropriate conversion factors for calculating social prices from private ones. 
Foreign exchange Often, analy ts may observe that the exchange rate maintained by th govern-
ment is above a market equilibrium rate. Over-valuation can be effected through foreign exchange 
rationing, import licensing and the prohibition of foreign exchange transactions at any rate other 
than th official one. An illegaJ, or semi-legal, 'parallel market' for foreign exchange may exist, at 
which the national currency will receive a lower price in terms of foreign exchange. 
The implication of over-valuation is that the price of b·aded good in domestic currency 
understates their true scarcity value. To correct for this m any economic analysis, an adjustment must 
be made to the ~1ominal exchange rate, by a conversion, known in the project literature as the foreign 
e change premium, to produce a shadow exchange rate. The foreign exchange premium will be no 
more than a 'guesstimate', because the equilibrium exchange rate cannot be observed directly. The 
parallel market rate may be a useful gllide to the shadow rate only if this market is widespread and 
officially tolerated. Otherwise th parallel rate is likely to contain a substantial risk premium, 
reflecting the chances of pro ecution and the everityof the penalties applied. Essentially, the analyst 
has to make a judgement as to what exchange rate would allow U1e country to maintain a sustainable 
balance of payments position and an open trading system without rationing of foreign exchange. (A 
ustainable balance of payments does not imply any particular outcome on the balance of payments 
current account. Rather it implies U1at whatever the position is, it will be balanced by privately 
motivated capital inflows and outflows, rather than by government actions, such as borrowing for 
balance of payments upport). 
ft may be that tl1e government, or <m academic institution have developed a general equilibrium 
model which is able to make estimates of the equilibrium exchange rate. In the absence of Uus, cruder 
approaches may be adopted (Dornbusch and Helmers, 1988). One such approach would be to 
compare the basic agricultural wage rate of the country in question, expressed in dollars at U1e official 
exchange rate, with that of countries at a simllar stage of development, but known to operate an open 
trading system without foreign exdlange rationing. Thus, if in our country th wage wa the 
equivalent $6 per day, wlule in the comparator countries it was the eqllivalent $4 per day, then our 
exchange rate may overvalued to an extent indicated by this 6:4 ratio. 
Capital and labour In circumstances in which capital markets are distorted by government-
imposed lending rate ceilings and associated rationing of credit, difficulties can be encountered in 
determining the opportu11ity cost of capital. A short-cut method, often used h1 practice, is to 
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construct an interest rate from first principles. For example, one estimate of the social price of capital 
to a particular sector will be the sum of the following: 
• the risk-free price of capital (say, the current rate of inflation plus 4%); 
• financial sector operational costs (say, 2% for large borrowers up to 15% for small dispersed 
borrowers); 
• a risk premium (say 2% to 10% depending on past performance). 
The existence of minimum wage legislation may cause wages paid to exceed the social opportunity 
cost of labour. This has been a major theme in the social cost/benefit analysis literature. Here the 
analysts would be looking for indicators of wages paid (and implicit returns to family employment) 
in unregulated labour markets. 
Direct taxes (applied to labour) and indirect taxes (applied to goods and services) have a private 
cost, but, from the point of view of society, are simply a transfer, to which a conversion factor of zero 
will apply. 
Market failures Market failure, covered in more detail below, is the most difficult terrain of all. 
Some instances, for example, where pollution is imposed, are in principle measurable, although this 
may, in practice, prove too expensive. Others are more a matter of the subjective opinion of the 
analyst. For example, analysts may agree that there is a degree of market failure in agricultural 
marketing, due to a lack of information, but disagree on the importance of this. Another example is 
that of the weight to be given to infant industry arguments. Where a country has recently started up 
its first fertilizer factory, it may be argued that substantial learning costs are being incurred, which 
will eventually result in internationally competitive levels of efficiency. Here it might be justified to 
apply a conversion factor of, say, 1.2 to the import parity price of fertilizer in the first year of 
operation, scaling this down over a six-year period to 1.0. 
Divergences 
Some marketing examples of a divergence between social and private profitability can be given. 
Private traders, undertaking what is privately optimal, may operate a marketing system character-
ized by insufficient stock-holding, inadequate investment in transport and physical infrastructure 
and insufficient producer prices, relative to socially optimal provision,. The quantity of resources in 
the industry (in terms of finance and manpower) may not be socially optimal, and entrepreneurs may 
be excessively cautious. These characteristics might be explained by the existence of a number of 
divergences, falling into the categories of market failure and distortion. For example: 
• The private cost of finance may exceed the social opportunity cost (e.g. traders having to borrow 
at very high rates on thin informal credit markets). This could be the result of market failure, 
perhaps because appropriate financial institutions have not developed; the legal framework is 
inadequate (e.g. borrowers cannot recover debts effectively) or because credit markets are 
monopolized. Even if there is no market failure, interest rates in credit markets serving smaller-
and middle-scale traders will be likely to be relatively higher than in markets for larger-scale 
traders, due to the higher real transaction costs in lending and, probably, greater risk exposure 
by the lender. 
Additionally, or alternatively, distortions may be present in financial markets. A common example 
is where the government has imposed interest rate ceilings which means real lending rates are low, 
perhaps negative. Under such a constraint, rational lenders will concentrate lending on the safest 
borrowers, because they are unable to charge more risky borrowers an acceptable premium. The 
safer borrowers are likely to be large, formal sector firms with substantial collateral and/ or 
government guarantees. Lending to agricultural traders, other than the largest and/ or government-
backed ones, is likely to be avoided. 
• The marketing system may exhibit excessive consumption of resources which are tradable 
internationally (e.g. vehicles, prefabricated steel sections, energy, pesticides etc.) and make sub-
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optimal use of non- tradable resources (e.g. labour and land). This would reflect circumstances 
in which the private c st of tradables was less than their social cost. This is found where the 
exchange rate of domestic cttrrency for foreign exchange is overvalued, or there are subsidies for 
particular tradable inputs (e.g. vehicles and fuel). 
• The existence of a marketing monopsony allows traders to pay producers a price below the 
social value of their production. This situation may have its origin il1 government legislation, or 
may exist because of highly concentrated ownership of resourc s required for agricultural 
maJ:keting (e.g. finance aud storage facilities). 
Market failures 
The consequence of market failure is that, for the commodities or services in question, market prices 
do not accurately reflect the social costs of their supply. Well-known examples of market failures are: 
• The externalities which exist when the legal framework fails to require a polluting industry to 
compensate (in full or in part) for the costs imposed. External economie or diseconomies mean 
that the costs to a private decision maker of a particular economic activity may be more or les 
than those to society. The implication is that, in the absence of government intervention, the 
good or service m question will not be supplied i.n the socially optimal quantities and that 
therefore government intervention will be r quired to correct the mis-match in supply. 
• The infant industry case, which is the argument that pioneer industrie or institutions may, fron1 
a private point of view, incur some cost which, when viewed from the pou1t of view oi society, 
are not costs but benefits. The benefits created will be in the nature of learning about how to 
undertake the production in question in a particular country. These benefits, the costs of which 
will have been incurred by the pioneer industry, can then be transferred at below their real cost 
to new entrants to the industry by, for example, attracting away trained personnel, harjng a 
common service infrastructure, or simply avoiding costly errors wJtich the pioneer il1dustry 
may have made in its early phases. 
• The existence of monopolie , which allow sellers a degree of control over prices and the 
possibility of prices to consumers being higher, and quantities supplied lower, than would be 
the case under a competitive market. 
• The existence of public goods which confer general benefits in society, but which it is not in the 
interests of any private producer to supply. An xample of a public good is the legal system, and 
the linked activity of police services, for the enforcement of contract and regulations. The 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure are other examples of public goods. 
In the domail.1 of agricultural marketing, illustrations of these categories of market failure are 
plentiful. The infant u1dustry argument is often applied to private commercial sectors to justify 
public management of, and/or subsidies to, marketing services. Concern about monopoly may also 
justify public management of marketing, and/or regulatory activity by government. Further 
exaJnples of market failure in marketing are: 
• Where private action produces a weak and highly asymmetrical supply of market information, 
leading to economic inefficien.cy. Intervention by government to increase the supply of 
information may raise the efficiency of marketing, bringing benefits to ociety in excess of the 
costs incurred by government. 
• Spatial planning, which, when done well, can confer major benefits. This is an archetypical 
activity for government. Left to themselves private organizations are likely to undertake 
insufficient spatial planning because the perceived benefits to individual firms are below the 
social value of the activity. 
120 
Box 5:5 Assessing the Optimum use of Policy Instruments 
Corden (1974, p.9-14) provides a simple 
illustration of the analytical power of the 
theory of divergences, showing how it may 
be used to (i) examine the optimum appli-
cation of a policy instrument, and, (ii) to 
rank alternative policy instruments. The 
examples analysed are the optimum sub-
sidy and the comparison of subsidies and 
tariffs. The key point which the analysis 
makes is that, under certain restrictive 
assumptions, alternative policies designed 
to correct a particular instance of market 
failure can be ranked in order of desirability, 
with respect to economic efficiency objec-
tives. In this case, it is concluded that a 
subsidy is to be preferred to a tariff. The 
grounds for this are that while both instru-
ments successfully correct for market fail-
ure, the tariff has the disadvantage of 
creating a distortion, by raising the social 
costs of consumption above the private 
costs. 
The example is that of the market for an 
importable product, i.e., one which is traded 
internationally and, therefore, in which 
domestic producers face competition from 
imports from the world market. Market 
conditions on the supply and the demand 
side are competitive. The argument 
assumes that we start with a situation of 
laissez-faire, in which a single market failure 
exists, this being on the supply side. 
Because external economies attach to the 
supply of a particular product, say, for 
infant industry reasons, private costs of 
supply exceed the social costs of supply. In 
other words, private prices exceed social 
prices. This is illustrated in Diagram I by 
showing the curve of the social costs of 
supply, HH', to the right of the private 
supply curve, GG'. It is assumed that there is 
not a distortion on the demand side and, 
therefore, that DD' indicates both the pri-
vate and the social value of the various 
quantities which may be consumed. The 
international price, PP', indicates the pri-
vate and social costs of imports, and does 
not vary with the level of imports (the small 
country assumption). 
The socially desirable level of consump-
tion is at B, where the marginal cost of 
imports is equal to the marginal value of 
consumption. The socially desirable con-
sumption level is obtained without inter-
vention. The socially desirable level of 
domestic production of the conunodity is at 
C, w_here the marginal social costs of p~·o­
duction are equal to the marginal costs of 
imports. However, .in the absence of .inter-
vention, production is only equal to A. 
Production will expand from A to C if a 
subsidy is applied on output at the rate PS 
per unit. (This is because the price to pro-
ducers will be raised). This move to the 
socially desirable level of output has been 
achieved at a cost to the government of 
PSLJ. This subsidy produces a social opti-
mum only if three assumptions are made: (i) 
that the financing of the subsidy does not 
affect the structure of reward as and incen-
tives in the economy; (ii) that there are no 
collection or disbursement costs for the sub-
sidy; (iii) that it is possible to neglect the 
redistribution of income which will occur 
from taxpayers to the owners of the factors 
of production in this protected industry. 
The social gain is quantified in diagram 
5:51 as the difference between the oppor-
tunity cost of the imports which have been 
replaced by expanding domestic pro-
duction up to C and the social costs (i.e. 
costs measured by social prices) which have 
been incurred to produce the extra domestic 
production. 
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Box 5:5 continued 
In diagram 5:52 an alternative instrument 
for expanding output to the socially optimal 
level is illustrated, this being a tariff on 
imp0rt at the rate PS. Consequently, output 
expands to the socially desirable level of C, 
but there is now one other change, which is 
that consumer prices rise by the amow1t of 
the tariff, and therefore consumption falls 
from B to B'. This means a reduction in 
consumption levels below what is socially 
optimal The loss of welfare is represented 
by triangle EFT, whkh is a loss of consumer 
welfare. We now have an example of a 
divergence which has been created by 
government intervention1 i.e., of a distor-
tion. In fact, this is a particular kind of 
distortion, one that ha been created as a 
result of government policy which was itself 
designed to correct a divergence. Corden 
described these as by-product distortions. 
Distortions 
Price G' 0 
In Corden' s view, government interventions in the economy can be divided into two basic categories: 
• those which reduce or eliminate market failure, thus contributing to economic welfare, and, 
• those which actually create a divergence - i.e. are distortive. 
Distortions may be created either because the government has misunderstood the nature of market 
failure (i.e. bad design of policy instruments) or because the government is pursuing a non-economic 
objective. An example of the latter is the that of achieving food self-sufficiency in a country which, 
under laissez-faire, would be a food importer. 
This distinction between conomically ben ficiaJ government interventions (those which correct 
for market failure) and damaging government interventions (those which create distortions) 
provides a conceptual basis for appraising and ranking policy instruments. In Box 5:5, a simple 
example of this approach is explained. It is argued that, under certain assumptions, a market failure 
with re pect to the production of a particular commodity can be corrected either by use of a producer 
ubsidy, or a tariff. However, the producer ubsidy is preferred because, unlike the tariff, it does not 
cause any further divergences. The tariff, conversely, brings about a divergence on the consumption 
side, with the private cost of the commodity exceeding the social cost, and hence sub-optimal 
consumption occurs. 
The central point of the analysis in Box 5:5 is not that subsidies are always preferable to tariffs, but 
that it is possible to rank policy interventions through an approach which assesses their net effect on 
economic efficiency. This will apply irrespective of the motive for the intervention, which may be to 
achieve an economic efficiency goal or a non-economic efficiency goal. 
Limitations and Uses of Neo-Classical Analyses 
Analysis using the neoclas ical theory of policy is a mammoth task, impracticable for most situations 
of policy analysis. In the cas of the examples in Boxes 5:1 and 5:5, it would be necessary to have data 
to model demand and supply schedules, as well as the ability to quantify differences between private 
and social prices. 
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In addition, the discussion so ~a~ has be7n con~~rn~d with only one market ignoring connections 
t? o~~er _markets. In other words 1t lS a parti_al eqmlibnu~ approach, although conceptually a ge.J;leral 
eqmhbnum a~proach wot~ld be mo~e satisfactory. Usmg_ a general equilibrium ap proach is even 
more demandmg of ana1yhcal capaaty and of data, and ts only likely to be worthwhile for a few 
specific applications. 
However, the concepts deployed in partial equilibrium analyses are important and have been used 
to develop other analytical techniques which capture, in a rough and ready way, the effects of policy 
interventions on economic efficiency. Three of the most commonly used of these are those based on 
measures of: 
• nominal protection coefficients; 
• effective protection coefficients, and 
• domestic resource cost ratios (see pp.128-138). 
In addition, partial equilibrium analysis can be used to address the problem of policy optimization 
under constraints which rule out the use of the most preferred instruments, through developing a 
policy hierarchy. 
Policy hierarchies 
In cases where the analyst concludes that private and social prices diverge, the policy implications 
are varied. The obvious and direct solution is to redesign intervention in the economy to more 
effectively correct market failures and/ or to reduce distortions. However, two factors may stand in 
the way of such an approach. 
First, decision makers may not be willing to allow the economist's preferred solution, insisting on 
the continued use (or non-use) of a certain policy instrument, on political or ideological grounds. In 
this case, 'second-best' solutions will have to be sought within the existing political constraints. 
Second, there is the dimension of time. Past policies will have induced a particular pattern of 
marketing development, and, in some cases, governments will have directly created marketing 
institutions. Sharp changes in the private prices facing marketeers (e.g. large increases in interest 
rates and in prices paid for tradable resources) could precipitate a collapse of marketing services, 
which would be seriously disruptive to the economy as a whole. Here, rather than immediate and 
drastic changes to bring private prices in line with social prices, a planned sequence of carefully 
judged reforms is likely to prove preferable. 
Box 5:6 provides a simple example of a policy hierarchy taken from Cordon (1974). It is taken as 
given that the market failure on the production side, described in Box 5:5, cannot be tackled by a 
producer subsidy, because the decision maker will not countenance this. Instead, a tariff has to be 
used. The analysis shows that it is possible to apply this instrument at a level which is a second best 
optimum, by trading off the marginal benefits (in terms of market failure corrected) against the 
marginal costs (in terms of a distortion on the consumption side). 
Experience with policy reform in agricultural marketing has provided numerous examples of 
policy analysts being required to seek second-best solutions, i.e. to optimize under constraints, and 
some of these are provided below. 
Grain marketing policy constraints in Zimbabwe In Zimbabwe, grain marketing services have 
been provided by the parastatal GMB, which maintained a marketing network with a relatively 
dense geographical coverage and paid farmers the same price for delivery to GMB buying points, 
irrespective of the location of these points (pan-territorial pricing). By 1990, it was realized that, 
although this service was beneficial to many farmers, and may have corrected for market failures and 
distortions which existed before Independence, the budgetary costs of the service were in danger of 
becoming unacceptably high. In reviewing options for reducing the budgetary costs, while retaining 
socially efficient aspects of the system, policy analysts examined the possibilities of: 
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Box 5:6 Optimizing Policy Under Constraints 
This box presents the most straightforward 
example which can be devised to illustrate 
the basics of policy ptimization Lmder con-
straints. The example chosen is not taken 
from marketing, because to do so would 
involve a more complicated argument. The 
general principle is that, if policy makers are 
required to u e a second-best instrument 
(one which causes by-product distortions) 
then optimization is a matter of balancing 
the benefits gained from correcting market 
failure against the efficiency losses resulting 
from the by-product distortion. 
In Box 5:5 it was shown that a ubsidy 
was preferable to a tariff as a means of 
correcting an instance of market failure, as it 
did not itself create a by-product distortion. 
This finding was subject to certain restric-
tive conditions, which can be simplified as 
the assumption that the means of financing 
and administration of the subsidy did not 
create a distortion. In the case shown here, it 
is assumed that the policy maker is not 
prepared to use a subsidy, but that latitude 
does exist concerning the level of the tariff. 
The diagram shows that the second-best 
optimum tarnf will be at PP*. This is where 
the marginal benefit from correcting for 
market failure, N*K*, is equal to the margi-
nal cost of the consumption di tortion 
caused by the tariff, which is E*P. This can 
be understood by imagining the gradual 
application of a ta:riff, which has the conse-
quence, a the rate of tariff rises, of 
inducing expansiou in the pr ducti on of the 
importable from A to A*. At each stage the 
marginal benefit (in terms of market failure 
con cted) decline . On the other hand, the 
marginal co t (in term of the consumption 
distortion created) rises. The total welfare 
gain which is achieved by the optimum 
tariff is equivalent to th area NN*K*K less 
the a:rea F*E*T. This is th maximum welfare 
gain that is achievable, given the constraint 
that the tariff is the only instrument accept-
able to the policy maker. 
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• reducing the cost of the marketing network by closing certain low-volume purchasing points; 
• abandoning the principle of pan-territorial pricing, by paying a premium in areas in which 
marketing costs were lower; and 
• maintaining the principle of pan-territoriality, but lowering producer prices and accepting the 
consequence in terms of a smaller national grain surplus. 
Here the initial task of the policy analyst was to work with policy makers in an iterative way, 
setting out basic option and their likely consequences, and receiving guidance from policy makers 
as to which aspects of the policy framework might be subject to cl1ange. It appeared. to be the case that 
the principle of pan-territorial pricing was an immovable constraint. Tl1is was on the understandable 
non-economic efficiency grounds that the gainers from an abandonment of pan-territoriality would 
have been mainly European commercial farmers, while the losers would have been mainly African 
peasru1t farmers. There appeared to be more room for manoeuvre with respect to the density of the 
marketing network, and the level of the producer price. Thus, the subsequent tasks of the policy 
analysts were to devise optimal interventions using politically acceptable instruments. 
Co-operatives in Tanzania and Zambia In Tanzania and Zambia, governments responded in the 
mid-1980s to the perceived inefficiencies of parastatal marketing agencies by transferring some of the 
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assets and functions of the e agencies to co-operatives. Additionally, a degree of market liberaliza-
tion was allowed (private traders being permitted to buy and sell most crops) and government 
intervention in pricing was reduced (generally from specifying single buying and selling prices to 
setting floor and ceiling prices). 
Governments supported co-operatives in a various ways including channelling external aid funds 
to the development of co-operative infrastructure and allowing co-operatives relatively generous 
borrowing facilities in the banking system. In return, co-operatives were supposed to be responsive 
to governments' wishes, undertaking operations which private traders would have avoided, like 
crop purchases in high cost areas and the maintenance of high stock levels. 
Policy analysts had some difficulty establishing the precise reasons for governments' objective of 
providing substantial support for co-operative marketing. One possibility was that, on both 
economic efficiency and non-economic efficiency grounds, governments were sceptical of the case 
for unmodified private marketing, fearing that this could lead to a deterioration in the service 
provided to locationally disadvantaged producers, unsatisfactory quality control, an insufficient 
marketing effort and sub-optimal storage. Co-operative marketing may have been seen as an 
acceptable compromise, embodying a degree of social control of assets but also an operational 
flexibility and arms-length relationship with government more characteristic of the private sector. 
However, although governments' motives for supporting co-operative marketing remained the 
subject of some speculation, it was clear was that proposals for policy reforms had to be placed 
within a framework in which co-operatives were to continue to play a major role. Thus, the terrain for 
manoeuvre covered such matters as: 
• the scope for raising the operational efficiency -af co-operatives; 
• alternative disbursal mechanisms for, and the size of, subsidies to co-operatives; 
• the closely linked question of payments to co-operatives for undertaking uneconomic activities; 
• the interface between co-operatives and the private sector, and 
• the extent to which the private sector would be allowed to compete with co-operatives. 
Other Indicators of the Impact of Policies on Economic Efficiency 
In the real world, policy analysts have to study systems of production and marketing, the current 
shape of which has been determined, in part, by the presence in the economy of elements of market 
failure and of distortion. The question to which the analyst is seeking answers is that of how the 
quality of policy affecting a particular production and marketing system may be ameliorated. 
The guiding principle in preparing options for policy change will be to bring social and private 
costs (and therefore social and private benefits) more closely into line. It is therefore assumed that: 
• efficient allocation of resources is the primary objective, and 
• the production, marketing and consumption systems affected by recommended policy changes 
will, over time, adjust in such a way as to raise the social profits which they generate. The 
adjustment may involve expansion or contraction in the volume of the activity, in technology 
and techniques, and in the proportions in which resources are used. 
However, as the discussion earlier in this chapter has shown, policy recommendations will not be 
simply a matter of advocating more laissez-faire. For example, where market failure exists, interven-
tion may be recommended. 
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The three indicators of economic efficiency to be discussed here (the nominal protection coefficient, 
the effective protection coefficient and the domestic resource costs ratio) all rely on the same basic 
principle of comparin.g private prices and social prices. Titis raises the key question as to how 
divergences between private and social prices are measured, a matter which is passed over now, but 
taken up later. 
As is explained later, of the three indicators themselves, the domestic resource eo t ratio (DRC) is 
preferred on theoretical grow1ds, but is also the most data-hw1gry. Effective protection coefficients 
require less data, but are le s useful, while nominal protection coefficient are the least useful, but the 
least demanding in terms of data. 
Nominal protection coefficients 
The rtominal protection coefficient (NPC) of a commodity, or service, is the ratio of the private price of 
a commodity to its social price. Usually, world prices are taken as equivalent to social prices, and 
therefore the standard against wltich to compare domestic prices in terms of comparative advantage 
and allocative efficiency. This is because world prices represent the opportWlity costs of the 
production and consumption of tradable - i.e. the costs and benefits wl1ich would obtain if goods 
were imported or exported, instead of being domestically produced and consumed. 
Calculating NPCs Thus, if the commodity is normally imported into the country, import parity 
prices are found as the c.i.f. prices of imports delivered to a reference point in the country. Typically, 
the reference point is a major focu of consumptions. Alternatively, if the commodity is normally 
exported, then the export parity price, f.o.b., will be found. In practice, conversions to world prices, at 
the existing, official exchange rate, are often the only adjustments undertaken to convert from private 
to social prices. In this formulation, the NPC reduces simply to: 
the domestic price of the commodity I service 
the relevant parity price of the commodity I service 
Limitations and uses of NPCs This measure can be used to indicate how competitive domestic 
prices are relative to imports and exports and whether domestic prices favour producers or 
consumers. In addition, the size of the divergence between the two variables indicates whether 
government policy and/ or market failure are very influential in marketing and price formation 
(Timmer, 1987, p.73). 
In general, where domestic prices are higher than world prices it can be assumed that government 
revenues are being generated, and that consumers are being taxed and producers subsidized, and 
vice versa. Often producer prices are less than 1 in LDCs, implying farmer taxation. For example, an 
NPC of 0.8 suggests that a tax of 20% is being placed on the commodity. But the implicit assumptions 
in the equation are that: 
• free trade is the most economically efficient policy; 
• world markets are economically efficient; and 
• domestic policies will not influence world prices. 
In theory, other adjustments should be made. For example, for market failures of an infant 
industry, the social value of local production should be raised. Where this is not done, market failure 
may be considered in an indirect way, as a possible justification for the existence of a positive rate of 
protection. 
Other problems in using NPCs include: 
• choosing a world price reference point in the face of fluctuating prices; 
• calculating different parity prices for a range of domestic prices obtaining in different pro-
duction and consumption locations; 
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• using official exchange rates, since these may be overvalued, which will overstate internal prices 
and hence effective taxation may be greater than that indicated by resultant NPCs; and 
• understatement of rates of protection, or overstatement of rates of taxation, where inputs are 
subsidized. 
The value of the NPC is that it is not very demanding in terms of data and it is the easiest means of 
assessing whether government policy tends to tax, or protect, consumers and producers. But it is a 
poor comparative indicator, as different commodity systems will use different proportions of 
internationally traded inputs and non-internationally traded domestic factors of production. It is the 
margin between the costs of inputs and the value of outputs, known as value-added, which provides 
the return to factors used in production, including profit. A more useful measure of economic 
efficiency therefore is that which shows how policy interventions cause value-added at private prices 
to differ from value added at social prices. 
Effective protection coefficients 
The concept of effective protection was developed in the 1960s in response to the latter problem. 
EPCs are calculated as follows: 
value-added at private prices or EPC = V d = P d - Cd 
value-added at social prices ' V w P w - Cw ' 
where: 
V d is value-added at domestic prices; 
V w is value-added at world prices; 
P d is the domestic price of output; 
cd is the domestic price of material inputs; 
P w is the world price of output, and 
Cw is the price of inputs at world prices. 
(Note that in the above world prices are taken as representing social prices. In practice, world prices 
are modified to take into account transport costs. Importables are valued at import parity, and 
exportables at export parity.) 
Limitations of EPCs Effective protection coefficients do not respond to many of the other problems 
posed by NPCs. For example, Singh et al. (1985) are highly critical of their wide usage, because they: 
• remain static; 
• do not measure the costs of inappropriate pricing policies nor of the effects of non-tariff means of 
protection, and 
• provide no guidance on the effects of changes on other variables of interest to governments. 
In addition, as it is conventionally used, the EPC only takes into account the adverse consequences 
for efficiency of policy interventions (i.e., distortions), and not interventions with a positive impact 
on economic efficiency (corrections of market failure). However, EPC measurement can be based on a 
broader view of the effects on efficiency of government intervention and market failure, as the 
subsequent discussion of the policy analysis matrix will show. As has already been stated, the choice 
of indicators of the efficiency of policy must be a pragmatic judgment based on data availability, costs 
of further data collection, and an assessment of the importance of market failure. 
Both EPCs and NPCs are often very difficult to calculate in practice due to data constraints. Where 
data is prohibiting, Timmer (1987, p.73) suggests that an indication of effective rates of protection can 
be sought simply through comparing the domestic price of a commodity with the prices of key 
inputs, for example fertilizer for grains. This eliminates the need for exchange rate conversions and 
for data on measures of value added. It also provides a better insight into producer, or supplier, 
incentives than NPCs. Timmer also suggests that another rough indication of allocative efficiency 
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and comparative advantage can be found through comparing the domestic prices of pairs of 
commodities with the same relative prices in international markets. Potential substitution between 
commodities in production and consumption allows such price ratio comparisons to suggest 
whether certain commodities are being produced or consumed too much or too little, relative to the 
quantities that would be produced and consumed if world prices obtained domestically. 
Domestic resource cost ratios 
Definition and calculation In recent years, the domestic resource cost ratio (DRC) has come to the 
fore in policy analysis for developing countries, notably for agricultural policy analysis (see Masters, 
1989; Monke and Pearson, 1989). The most simple definition of the DRC is that it measures the ratio of 
the cost of the domestic factors used by the commodity (production or marketing) system (at social 
prices) to the value-added of the system (again at social prices). The value-added of the system is its 
total revenue less the cost of tradable inputs. They are calculated, using social prices, as follows: 
costs of domestic factors of production 
revenue - costs of tradable inputs 
Implications of results Where costs are exactly equal to value-added (i.e. DRC = 1) the system 
produces only normal profits. However, in cases where domestic factor costs are less than value-
added, ( DRC < 1), then super-normal social profits are earned. Systems in which DRC < 1, are said to 
have comparative advantage and the lower the DRC, the greater the comparative advantage. 
The interests of economic efficiency will be served by encouraging the development of 
commodity I marketing systems with DRCs which are low relative to those of existing systems (and, 
at least, having a DRC < 1). With respect to existing systems, policy analysts will be concerned to find 
ways of designing and implementing interventions which have the effect of reducing DRCs. Thus, 
policy analysts use DRCs for two broad purposes: 
(a) To compare social profitability (i.e. the underlying comparative advantage) of commodity I 
marketing systems with their relative competitiveness at private prices. The divergence 
between the ranking of systems via DRCs and the ranking given by its private price 
analogue [the private cost ratio (PCR), calculated using the same equation but private 
prices] can be attributed to the net effects of market failures, policies which reduce market 
failures and distorting policies. Useful insights can also be obtained by comparing DRCs 
with nominal and effective protection coefficients (see below under examples of uses of 
DRCs). 
(b) To inform investment policy. By identifying the comparative advantage of different 
commodity systems, DRCs can point to systems for which support through public invest-
ment should either be increased or run-down. 
Data requirements and currencies The data requirements for the calculation of DRCs are 
substantial, as is shown below. To calculate the numerator of the ratio (i.e., factor costs) it is necessary 
to have information on factor use at all stages in the system, and on prices which are paid for the 
factors. To calculate the denominator (i.e., value-added), it is necessary to know the total revenue of 
the system, and the use of, and prices of, tradable inputs. These then have to be converted to social 
prices by using conversion factors as described above under Social costs and prices. 
DRCs can be calculated in domestic currency or foreign exchange. The trend appears to be firmly 
towards using local currency for both numerator and denominator. Any distortion in the market for 
foreign exchange is taken into account by shadow pricing tradable inputs and outputs. However, 
some analysts have used a DRC formula expressed as the ratio of value-added at domestic prices in 
local currency (at social prices) to value-added in world prices in foreign currency. Assuming world 
prices are equivalent to social prices, the latter formula expresses the rate of exchange between the 
social value-added of the commodity system in domestic currency and the same value-added in 
foreign currency. Thus, the formula results in a rate of exchange which can be compared with the 
official rate of exchange. 
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For example, if the official rate of exchange is 300 francs-CFA per$, and a commodity /marketing 
system is found to have a DRC of 250 francs-CFA per$, then such a system is socially profitable. What 
thi implies is that a dollar's worth of imports of this particular commodity can be produced for 250 
francs-CFA, thus 'saving' 50 francs-CFA, which may be deployed elsewhere. Socially unprofitable 
systems would be those with DRCs in excess of 300 francs-CFA per$. In this case, resources may be 
saved by reducing support to the system and importing instead. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that, although it provides a ranking of commodity systems in 
terms of comparative advantage, if the exchange rate is distorted, it is not immediately clear where 
the cut-off lies between systems which produce a social profit and those that produce a social loss. 
H:;wever, identification of the distinction becomes possible by making an assumption about the 
equilibrium exchange rate. For example, if the equilibrium exchange rate was believed to be 425 
francs-CFA per $, then a system with a DRC cost of 400 francs-CFA per$ would be characterized as 
socially profitable. 
The strengths of the DRC An important feature of the DRC is that it is a ratio. It might be argued 
that it would be more straightforward simply to find the private profitability of the system, and then 
to recalculate this, making adjustments for social prices to indicate social profitability. However, the 
concept of social profits falls down when we compare dissimilar commodity systems. For example, 
'system P.: may produce social profits of $100,000, while 'system B' produces social profits of 
$120,000. In the absence of further information we might be tempted to prefer 'system B'. But if we 
are then told that 'system A' produces its profit from a very low cost base, while 'system B' has much 
higher costs, we might think again. The point is that to make a useful comparison of social 
profitability we need some index of the scale of the activity which has been producing these profits. 
DRCs provides this dimension by asking the question, 'what is the cost base in relation to value-
added?' 
Examples of the use of DRCs It is possible to undertake policy simulations in which various 
distortions or market failures are wholly or partially removed, and then to observe the extent to 
which the ranking of commodity I marketing systems derived from private cost ratios may change to 
reflect more closely the ranking given by DRCs. The results of these simulations may be useful in the 
design of a sequence of policy reforms. 
Another application of such findings is to help decide which systems ought to receive additional 
policy support, in the absence of changes to existing policies. This is the domain of the policy 
hierarchy and the preferred route to raising efficiency would be to remove policies which support 
commodity systems with high DRCs. If, for political reasons, this is not possible, then it is better to 
find countervailing policies to support systems with low DRCs than to do nothing. The result may 
lead to the creation of further by-product distortions, but the consequence will be that more resources 
will flow into systems with high comparative advantage than would otherwise be the case. An 
example of this would be where a government is not prepared to remove a parastatal from a central 
role in the marketing of staple food crops. Despite this, there will still be room for manoeuvre 
concerning the terms on which the parastatal obtains access to financial resources, its policy on 
producer and consumer prices and on sub-contracting to private traders. 
DRCs may also be used for the analysis of ways in which investment may be used to reduce the 
DRCs of existing commodity systems. Most investment analysts are likely to regard this as a 
somewhat esoteric application, and certainly not a priority. However, some policy analysts (Monke 
and Pearson, 1989) have ambitions to do more work on this topic and may be able to develop 
guidelines which project analysts can use. An example of this would be in the assessment (or design) 
of the public investment programme in a highly distorted economy, where the government is 
beginning a process of policy reform, aimed at improving economic efficiency through the 
progressive reduction and elimination of distortions. Here the DRCs help identify systems for which 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a comparative advantage existing at the completion of the policy 
reform process. The systems with low DRCs would be those to which public investment should be 
directed. 
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Another example of the use of DRCs in investment planning is where the components of particular 
commodity systems are studied in detail to determine how investment resources might be most 
effectively used to reduce DRCs. For example, what might be the effects of public investment in 
transport infrastructure, processing facilities, the development of new plant varieties and/ or in 
improved market informatiou? This approach is ru1likely to be u ed by consultants tmdertaking ad 
hoc appraisal of particular investment projects, but it is possible that it may be used in national 
planning, for the development of policy guidelines on public investment. These guidelines would 
indicate the categories of investment which would be expected to prove effective in reducing DRCs. 
ill highly distorted economies, there is a potential dauger in a policy of channelling investment to 
systems with low DRCs. If the anticipated policy reforms are not implemented, there will remain 
only investment in systems which, whil socially profitable, are not attractive at market prices. 
Production levels in these systems will be lower than a11ticipated, depressmg the returns on the 
investment. In these circumstance a second-best solution will be to persuade the government to 
brmg in policies which target support the systems which have underlying comparative advantage. 
But the government may prove resistant to such persuasion, while support measures will create by-
product distortions. 
Comparing DRCs and protection coefficients The example in Box 5:7 shows estimates for the 
nominal protection coefficient (NPC), effective protection coefficient (EPC) and the domestic 
resource cost ratio, m the case of the production and marketing systems for four staple food crops. 
For each commodity, the analyst has distinguished three or four distinct production and marketing 
systems. These systems ca11 be considered on a spectrum of intensity. 'System I' is 'low technology', 
making relatively high use of domestic resources such as land and labour, while the 'high 
technology' end of the spectrum is system m a.nd irrigated production. 
The interest m these estimates lies in their interpretation and the implications for policy. For 
example, in the case of maize, all systems have comparative advantage (DRC<l), although 'system IT' 
has the greatest advantage and irrigated the least. The estimates for the NPC and the EPC imply that 
policy towards maize systems is presently discriminatory, with the exception of irrigated production. 
Thus, in general, the analyst can recommend policy reforms to make government policy neutral 
Box 5:7 An Example of the Use of Domestic Resource Cost Ratios and Protection Coefficients 
INDICATORS OF POLICY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF FOOD CROP 
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING SYSTEMS BY TECHNOLOGY LEVELS 
Technology NPC EPC DRC 
level 
MAIZE I 0.89 0.89 0.55 
n 0.89 0.89 0.49 
m 0.89 0.91 0.53 
IRRIGATED 0.96 1.06 0.65 
RICE I 1.22 1.35 0.89 
II 1.22 1.35 0.92 
m 1.22 1.40 1.19 
IRRIGATED 1.22 1.70 1.50 
CASSAVA I 1.00 0.90 0.61 
II 1.00 0.90 0.63 
m 1.00 1.01 0.75 
SORGHUM I 1.05 1.10 0.80 
n 1.05 1.17 0.54 
m 1.05 1.25 0.65 
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towards maize systems (i.e. a position in which EPC = 1), knowing that these policy changes will 
improve incentives for systems which have comparative advantage. As 'maize systems I, II and III' 
are expanded, resources will flow into systems which have comparative advantage, and the overall 
efficiency of the economy will be enhanced. 
In Box 5:7, rice presents a more complex picture. Only two out of four rice systems have 
comparative advantage, but all systems are protected by policy. If protection were to be reduced by 
government reforms which made policy towards rice more neutral, then, as a result of declining 
incentives, there would be a reduction in rice output, particularly of the 'higher technology' systems, 
which do not have comparative advantage. 
The difference between the estimates of the nominal and the effective protection coefficients are 
because the former only captures the effects of intervention in output markets. The latter takes into 
account all policy interventions which affect value-added, (examples of which would be input 
subsidies/taxes). This point is amplified in the discussion of the policy analysis matrix in the next 
section. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the process of policy reform may induce managerial or 
technological innovation. For instance, if effective protection is gradually withdrawn from a system 
which presently has comparative disadvantage (DRC>1), entrepreneurs within the system may 
respond by increasing the efficiency with which they use resources and/ or by introducing new 
technology. 
The Policy Analysis Matrix 
The policy analysis matrix (PAM) is a logical framework for policy analysis developed by Scott 
Pearson of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, and explained in detail in Monke and 
Pearson (1989). The purpose of the PAM is to provide a means of integrating micro, sectoral and 
macro work 
'The study of agricultural economics spans three levels- micro-economic behaviour of producers, 
marketing and trade and macro-economic linkages. Practitioners of agricultural economics typically 
give different emphasis to these three topics; micro-production issues receive the greatest attention, 
marketing and trade get less, and macro-economic links receive little or no coverage .... excessive 
specialization precludes successful policy analysis: applied agricultural economists need to under-
stand all of the components of and links among farming systems, domestic and international 
markets, and macro-economic policy' (Monke and Pearson, 1989, p.16) 
Construction of the matrix The PAM is constructed through double entry book-keeping, with the 
purpose of ensuring complete and consistent coverage of all policy influences on the returns to, and 
costs of, agricultural production and/ or marketing. Indicators of the economic efficiency of policy, of 
which the DRC is one, can be derived from the parameters in the matrix. The main empirical task is to 
construct accounting matrices of revenues, costs and profits. A PAM is constructed for each system to 
be analysed, using data collected through the methods described in Chapter 3. Thus, the impact of 
commodity and macro-economic policies is gauged by comparing results in the 'presence' and the 
'absence' of policy. 
Entries into the PAM The matrix consists of revenues, costs and profits, at private and social prices. 
Revenues and costs are based on marginal prices, because these establish the opportunity costs 
which act as price signals. 
The top row of the matrix is a budget showing costs of production and marketing at market prices, 
the only unusual aspect being the division of cost elements into tradable and non-tradable, or 
domestic resource, categories. Tradables are anything which could be internationally traded, even if 
they are not currently traded. Domestic resources are the immovable domestic factors of production, 
namely labour, land, and (although this could be disputed in certain cases) capital. The market price 
of labour and capital is usually directly observable, but, in farming and marketing enterprises where 
there is some unwaged family labour, cost levels may have to be inferred. (Examples of tradable 
inputs in marketing include fuel, transport and processing machinery, energy and pesticides.) 
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The Basic Policy Analysis Matrix 
Revenues Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profits 
inputs resources 
Private prices RP TIP DFP [JP (market prices) 
Social prices Rs TIS DFS IIS 
(opportunity costs) 
Divergences and Rt Tit Dft IIt 
efficient policy 
(transfers) 
The second row in the matrix how the same cost elements expressed at odal price , Le., social 
opportunity costs. for tradable products, world prices are normally taken as social price , applying 
import or export parity measures a appropriate. The social price of domestic resources is taken as 
their opportunity cost, in other words, the r turn at the margin in the best available alternative. For 
unskilled labour, for example, the preferred indicator, on theoretical grounds, is often the marginal 
product of labour in small-scale agriculture. In practice, estimates of marginal revenues and costs are 
not widely available, and thus average prices are often are used as ru.1 alternative. h1 some cases, 
prices can be observed directly in empirical work, while in other ea es inference will be required. 
An important general point about the PAM is that the pportunity costs of domestic resources will 
be a function of current pohcy. Thus, strictly, these opportunity costs are only relevant under a 
particular set of policy constraints, i.e., they are constrained second-best equilibrium value . If policy 
were to change, so wouJd opportunity costs. For this reason, the PAM is not wholly satisfactory in 
terms of economic theory, being based on a partial equilibrium rather than general equilibrium 
approach. It is a pragmatic, indicative approach to policy, which recognizes that practitioners of 
policy analysis will only rarely have the data or the time to con truct a fully specified general 
equilibrium model capable of generating useful estimates of opportunity costs under different policy 
scenarios. 
The third row of the PAM is simply the first row minus the second. It shows the net impact of: 
• market failure; 
• distorting policies; and 
• efficient policies (those which correct market failure). 
The signs of the revenue and cost terms in the third row indicate whether the net effects of policy 
ru.1d market impe1·fections for these categories amow1t to an implicit sub id y or tax. If, for example, Rt 
were positive, the net effect of policy and/ or market failure is that the market price paid to the system 
is in excess of the ocial opportunity cost, i.e. output price are subsidized. On the other hand, if Tit 
were negative, then the market price of tradable inputs would be less than their social opportunity 
cost (a typical consequence of an overvalued exchange rate). The right-hand entry in the third row; 
fl1, summarizes the net effect of policies and/ or market failures on the profitability of the system, 
known as 'net transfers'. If HP> IT,;, then the net effect of policy is to subsidize the system. In this case, 
policy reforms to bring about greater conomic efficiency will reduce the gap between ITP and ll5 , 
and this will induce adjustments in the system in question, which may involve changes in the 
proportions in which resources are used, and, at least in the short term, some contraction in the scale 
of operation. 
As an aid to understanding the third row in the basic PAM, it can be disaggregated to three 
additional rows in an extended PAM, which shows separately the effects of market failure, distorting 
policy and economically efficient policy. 
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The extended policy analysis matrix 
Indicators in the PAM The basic PAM contains variables which . b . . for twelve 
· d" f · ff" · · f hi h · . prov1de the aSlS 
m Icators o economic e ICiency, six o w c are non-raho mdi a tors (l - 6 b ! ) d . ·e ratio-indicators (7- 12 below). As was noted above, ratio measmes are m.ore u fowl fan SIX ai. of 
h . h d. · ·1 · h 1 · ti. · 1 . 1 h e u or companson systems w Ic are Issimi ar m t e re ahve propor ons m w uc 1 t ey use inp t · 
us. 
1. Private profits: rrp = RP- TIP - DF p 
This is the measure used to compare the effects of changes in price and policy on the . 
profitability of the same system. However, for comparison of different systems, the Priva~~l~ate 
R . . . ost aho IS supenor. 
2. Social profits: rrs = Rs- TIS- DFS 
This is a measure of economic efficiency or comparative advantage. If social profits are negative, 
the system can only remain in production with transfers from the government. But economic 
efficiency objectives would not be served such transfers, as this implies producing at social costs 
in excess of the costs of importing. As is the case with private profits, a more sophisticated 
measure is required to handle changes in the relative efficiency of different commodity systems, 
namely the DRC ratio, which can also be used to calculate the cost of policies aimed at non-
economic goals in terms of economic efficiency losses. 
Private prices 
(market prices) 
Social prices 
(opportunity costs) 
Divergences and 
efficient policy 
(transfers) 
Effects of market 
failure 
Effects of distorting 
policy 
Effects of efficient 
policy 
Revenues 
RP 
Rs 
Rt 
3. Output Transfers: Rt = RP - Rs 
Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profits 
inputs resources 
TIP DFP rrP 
TIS DFS rrs 
Tit DFt rrt 
Timf DFmt 
DFdp 
Transfers resulting from distorting policy and/ or market failure in output markets. 
4. Input Transfers: Tit = TIP - Tis 
Transfers resulting from distorting policy and/ or market failure in input markets. 
5. Factor transfers: DFt = DFP- DF8 
Transfers resulting from distorting policy and/ or market failure in factor markets. 
6. Net transfers: rrt = rrp- ITS= Rt- Tit- DFt 
The net effects of output, input and factor transfers. 
7. Private Cost Ratio: PCR = DFP/(RP- TIP) 
The PCR is a ratio of factor prices to value added at private prices. The comparison of factor 
prices/ costs with value added, uses the latter, to show how variations in the former, affect the 
private entrepreneurs' profits from operating the system. If the PCR = 1 then the entrepreneur 
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makes only 'normal profits'. The behavioral point is that business will maximize profits by trying 
to hold down DFp and Tip. This may be achieved by: 
• seeking more efficient ways of managing the system; 
• political lobbying activity to obtain policy interventions (transfers) which lower DF P and TIP, 
while raising RP; and/ or 
• seeking monopoly control in factor and/ or input markets. 
8. Domestic resource cost ratio: DRC = DFj(Rs- Tis). 
This has been discussed extensively above. 
9. Nominal protection coefficient: 
(a) on tradable outputs is RP/ Rs; 
(b) for tradable inputs is TIPITis. 
10. Effective protection coefficient: EPC = (RP - TI~/(Rs- Tis); 
This approach to calculating the ERP is more satisfactory than the conventional one described 
earlier, because it recognizes that interventions to correct market failure can promote economic 
efficiency, and that what needs assessment is the net effect of market failures, interventions 
which reduce market failures and interventions which create distortions. 
11. The profitability coefficient: PC= liP/ lis 
12. The subsidy ratio to producers: SRP = (liP - lis) I Rs = I4/ Rs 
Cross-section and time series uses of tl1e PAM The simplest application of the PAM is to calculate 
.indicators for a single commodity system for a single year. This will give useful insights into the 
comparative advantage of the system, into the effects of government policy on incentives to operate 
the system and the scope for reform in government policy towards the system. A more ambitious 
application of the PAM_is to carry out a cross-section comparison (i.e., for the same time period) of a 
number of commodity systems, along the lines of the example in Box 5:7. 
A further possibility is to calculate a time series of PAM indicators for a range of commodity 
systems, in order to analyse the evolution of the comparative advautage of systems, and of 
government policy towards systems. This approach is becoming more common as governments set 
up systems to <malyse agricultural policy. Jtjs feasible for agricultural policy units to maintain a eries 
of annually updated PAMs for the major commodity systems in the sector. Normally the prices 
would be r vised annually, and the technical parameters re-estimated once every two to three years. 
Operationalizing tl1e PAM- an example The starting point is the collection and aualysis of data at 
private prices on revenues and costs of the system under study. Private costs are subdivided into the 
two broad categories- traded goods and domestic factors. Domestic factor costs cu·e then subdivided 
into capital services and lab ur, because different principles are applied in determining the 
conversion factors used to modify market prices to express social opportunity costs. The opportunity 
costs of capital are obtained by assessing its value in alternative investments, rather than in 
cousumption. The opportunity costs of labour are taken as the marginal productivity of labour 
elsewhere in the economy. (See the discussion above of social costs and prices.) 
Table 1 is an example of a spreadsheet-based PAM for a system which markets maize from the 
'farm-gate' to the capital city wholesale market. The great advantage of using spreadsheets is that 
variables can be changed with facility. This allows 'what if' types of analysis in which values of auy of 
the variables can be altered and the differences between results examined. For example, the effects of 
a fall in the world price, or farm' gate' price, of maize, on private and social profitability, and hence 
domestic resource costs and EPCs can be estimated. 
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Table 1 PAM Spreadsheet, The Base Example 
A B c D E F G H 1 J K L M 
I Policy Analysis Matrix of a Uni-Directional Marketing System (Provincial Farmgate to 
2 Capital City Wholesale Market) for maize, in the Republic of Lowinca 
3 
4 (For the 1990 harvest year; currency unit is the Lowincan dollar) 
5 
6 
7 Units Quantities Market Conversion Social Market Social Transfers 
8 A B Prices Factors Prices Values Values 
9 $ $ $ $ $ 
10 Revenue 
11 wholesale maize at capital city mt 1 1 342 342.00 375.00 -33.00 
12 import parity price (in capital) mt 1 1 300 1.25 375.0000 
13 
14 Non-Tradable lnputs 
15 assemblers' labour hrs/mt 20 1 0.2 1.00 0.2000 4.00 4.00 0.00 
16 wholesalers' labour hrs/mt 30 1 0.25 1.00 0.2500 7.50 7.50 0.00 
17 assemblers' .finance $/mt/week 179 2 0.016 0.28 0.0045 5.73 1.60 4.12 
18 wholesalers' finance $/mt/week 201 10 O.Oll 0.37 0.0041 22.11 8.18 13.93 
19 licenses, admin taxes & police $ 6 1 1 0.00 0.0000 6.00 0.00 6.00 
20 
21 Tradable Inputs 
22 assemblers' farmgate maize purchases mt 1 1 95 1.00 95.0000 95.00 95.00 0.00 
23 assemblers' gunny bags bags/mt 12 1 0.48 1.25 0,6000 5.76 7.20 -1.44 
24 assemblers' transport costs rnt/krn 55 1 0.9 1.25 1.1250 49.50 61 .88 -12.38 
25 wholesalers' transport costs rnt/km 130 1 0.49 1.25 0.6125 63.70 79.63 -15.93 
26 wholesalerft chemicals kgs/rnt 2 1 4 1.25 5.0000 8.00 10,00 - 2.00 
27 
28 
29 
30 Indicators 
31 
32 Private profits ($/rnt) 7470 
33 
341 Social profits ($/mt) 100.02 
35 
36 Private Cost Ratio 0.38 
37 
38 Domestic Resource Cost Ratio 0.18 
39 
40 Nominal Protection Coefficient 
41 (on tradable outputs): 0.91 
42 (on tradable inputs): 0.87 
43 
4~ Effective Protection Coefficient 0.99 
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Table 2 The Formulae used in the Spreadsheet (Table 1) 
A B c [ K L M 
I Policy Analysis Matrix 
2 for maize in Lowinca 
3 The formulae 
7 Social Market Social Transfer 
8 Prices Values Values 
9 $ $ $ $ 
10 
11 =Dll'Ell'Gll =Dl2'El2'Il2 =Kll-L11 
12 =Gl2'Hl2 
13 
14 
15 =G15'Hl5 =Dl5'El5'G15 =D15'E15'Il5 =K15-L15 
16 =G16'Hl6 =Dl6'El6'G16 =Dl6'E16'116 =K16--Ll6 
17 =GI7'Hl7 =Dl7'E17'G17 =Dl7'El7'll7 =Kl7-L17 
18 =Gl8'HIB =D18'E1B'G18 =Dl8'El8'Il8 =K18-Ll8 
19 =G19'H19 =Dl9'El9'G19 =D19'E19'119 =K19-L19 
20 
21 
22 =G22'H22 =D22'E22'G22 =D22'E22'!22 =K22-L22 
23 =G23'H23 =D23'E23'G23 =D23'E23'!23 =K23--U3 
24 =G24'H24 =D24'E24'G24 =D24'E24'!24 =K24-L24 
25 =G25'H25 =D25'E25'G25 = ms'E25'I25 =L25-L25 
26 =G26'H26 =D26'E26'G26 =D26'E26'126 =K26--U6 
27 
31 
32 Private profits ($/mt) =K11-SUM(K15:K26) 
33 
34 Social profits ($/mt) =Lll-SUM(Ll5:L26) 
35 
36 Private Cost Ratio =SUM(K15:Kl9)/ 
SUM(Kl1-K22-K23- K24-K25-K26) 
37 
38 Domestic Resource Cost Ratio =SUM(Ll5:Ll9)/ 
SUM(Lll-L22-L23--L24-L25-L26) 
$9 
~0 Nominal Protection Coefficient 
4'1 (on tradable outputs): Kll/Lll 
42 (on tradable inputs): =SUM(K22:K26)/SUM(L22:L26) 
43 
44 Effective Protection Coefficient =5UM(Kll-K22-K23--K24-K25-K26) I 
5UM(L11-L22-L23--L24-L25-L26) 
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Table 3 A Parastatal System 
Policy Analysis Matrix of a Uni-Directional Parastatal Grain Marketing System (Provincial Depot to Capital City Wholesale 
Market) for maize, in the Republic of Lowinca 
(For the 1990 harvest year; currency unit is the Lowincan dollar) 
.-----------------
Units Quantities Market Conversion Social Market Social Transfers 
A B prices Factors Prices Values Values 
$ $ $ $ $ 
Revenue 
wholesale maize at mt 342 342.00 375.00 -33.00 
capital city 
import parity price (in mt 1 300 1.25 375.0000 
capital) 
Non-tradable inputs 
hourly labour h/mt 28 1 0.2 1.00 0.2000 5.60 5.60 0.00 
salaries h/mt 11 1 0.6 1.00 0.6000 6.60 6.60 0.00 
building operation $/mt 4 1 1 1.00 1.0000 4.00 4.00 0.00 
costs 
building depreciation $/mt 2 1 1 1.00 1.0000 2.00 2.00 0.00 
borrowing $/mt/week 190 10 0.002 2.50 0.0050 3.80 9.50 -5.70 
Tradable inputs 
rural depot maize pur- mt 1 130 1.00 130.0000 130.00 130.00 0.00 
chases 
gmmy bags bags/mt 12 l 0.45 1.25 0.5625 5.40 6.75 -1.35 
transport outlays mt/km 185 l 0.9 1.25 1.250 166.50 208.13 -41.63 
machinery deprecia- $/mt 1.9 1 1 1.25 1.2500 1.90 2.38 -0.48 
tion 
chemicals kg/mt 3 1 4 1.25 5.0000 12.00 15.00 -3.00 
Indicators 
Private profits ($/mt) 4.20 1 
Social profits ($/mt) 
-14.951 
Private Cost Ratio 0.841 
Domestic Resource Cost Ratio 2.171 
Nominal Protection Coefficient 
(on tradable outputs): 0.91 
(on tradable inputs): 0.87 
Effective Protection Coefficient 2.05 
In this example, the marketing chain comprises sales by farmers to assemblers, who bulk and 
transport the product to sell on to private wholesalers. The wholesalers transport the produce to the 
capital city wholesale market. The example is simplified, in the sense that a real case would have 
more cost elements. A number of assumptions are also embodied to keep the example simple, 
including 
• that the marketing system is uni-directional; 
• that imports are banned (but that the potential price of imports is known), and 
• that the only storage costs are finance and chemicals and that there are no storage losses. 
The conversion factors (in column H) show an assumed foreign exchange premium of 1.25. 
Assemblers are found to be borrowing at a private rate of 1.6% per week, which is equivalent to a 
annualized rate of 228%. Following the method for determining the opportunity cost of capital 
outlined above, it is estimated that the conversion factor is 0.28, (so the social price of finance to 
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assemblers is 64%). In other words, there is massive market failure in the financial markets to which 
assemblers have access. The extent of market failure is somewhat less in the case of wholesalers, who 
are able to obtain funds at better rates, equivalent to an annual rate of 178%. Therefor a higher 
conversion factor is applied. The costs of payments for licenses, police road-blocks etc., are treated as 
transfers, having a conversion factor of zero. Farm-gate purchases of maize are given a conversion 
factor of 1, on the grounds that, for the area of purchase, transport costs make the import parity price 
irrelevant within the range of prices observed in villages. 
Table 2 relates directly to Table 1, and shows the formulae that have been used in constructing the 
spreadsheet for: 
• the intermediate calculations of social prices, market values, social values and transfers, and 
• the final indicators- social prices, social profits, the private cost ratio, the domestic resource cost 
ratio, the nominal protection coefficient and the effective protection coefficient. 
The estimates of the value of indicators in Table 1 show a system which is profitable at market 
prices, and substantially more profitable at social prices. The DRC value of 0.18 indicates that the 
system has a strong comparative advantage. With an effective protection coefficient of 0.99, the net 
effect of government policy on the system is nearly neutral. The reason for this is that the only form of 
protection which exists in this example, is exchange rate overvaluation, which applies equally to 
output and to traded inputs. 
Table 3 shows a contrasting case, this time for a parastatal grain marketing system operating in the 
same area of business as the private sector example in. Table 1. The public agency pays farmers a 
higher price, mainly because farmers have to bea1· the costs of delivery to the local depot. As the 
average transport costs incurred by farmers are not known, the system represented here begins at the 
'depot-gate' . Thus, compariso11 of the two systems, does not involve an exact matching of contrasting 
systems providing identical services. In real world applications, exact comparisons will be rare. Table 
3 shows a system which is profitable in private terms, which in this case means that the parastatal will 
realize a financial profit ou operating this system. However, social profitability is negative, and the 
DRC of 2.17 shows that the interests of economic efficiency would be favoured if this system were to 
be abandoned or, at least, substantially reformed. 
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Chapter 6 
Agricultural Market Liberalization in Africa 
THE BACKGROUND TO ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION 
At the ~nd of t~e 1970s,_ ~any Sub-Saharan ~frican (SSA) countries entered in to a prolonged 
econom1c recesston. Spectflcally macro-economic asp ects of this crisis were a growing d isparity 
~etwee~ natio~~l inco~e and expenditure: Internation~l ~rade m1_d payments were characterized by 
mcreasmg deficits, which became progressively more d1fftctllt to fma11ce. In the :internal economy, the 
imbalance emerged as increasing fiscal deficits. The financing of fiscal deficits was i11 many ea es 
inflationary, to which governments often responded by extending price controls. 
Initially, governments tended to deal with their balance of payments deficits by increased 
borrowing, taxing imports and rationing of foreign exchange. By the early 1980s, many countries 
were running out of options. Creditworthiness had deteriorated to an extent which made further 
international borrowing difficult, and restrictions on foreign exchange were already undermining 
economic performance. It was necessary to app~oach the international finance and development 
agencies for balance of payments support. This support was made available by the IMF, the World 
Bank and certain bilateral agencies, conditional on governments adopting economic recovery 
programs, designed to restore macro-economic stability and to address structural imbalances. 
In countries which have embarked on structural adjustment programmes the breadth of policy 
reforms, the pace of their implementation and the lack of data has been such that the possibilities for 
detailed analysis of policy options has been very limit~d. Furthermore, econometrics is least useful in 
predicting producer and consumer responses where major discontinuities in the economic environ-
ment are anticipated. Under these circumstances, a more useful starting point for policy analysts is to 
examine earlier experience of policy reform, which will provide insights into what are likely to be the 
salient issues in their current task. Therefore, this chapter provides a summary of the issues which 
have emerged for agricultural marketing policy from the 1980's experience of economic policy 
reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. It draws heavily on Kydd and Scarborough (1989) and Kydd and 
Spooner (1989). 
Structural Adjustment and Macro-economic Stabilization 
Macro-economic stabilization 
Stabilization measures aim to: 
• restore equilibrium in the balance of payments, 
• reduce the fiscal deficit to a manageable size, and 
• bring down inflation. 
Typically, this is done through policies which act mainly on the demand-side, reducing expendi-
ture and also switching expenditure towards domestically produced goods. Stabilization is achieved 
through three instruments: 
• exchange rate policy, 
• fiscal policy, and 
• monetary policy. 
These measures also act as catalysts on the supply-side, shifting the structure of production. 
Examples are the stimulus to the supply of traded goods provided by a real devaluation or the 
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increased investor confidence which will follow success in reducing the rate of inflation to 
sustainable levels. Nevertheless, stabilization programs are conventionally thought of as policies to 
reduce short-term expenditure. 
The defining characteristics of stabilization measures are thus, that they: 
• act on demand, 
• aim to restore macro-economic balance quickly, and 
• generally do not involve much concessional finance. 
In summary, stabilization measw·es reduce a cow1try's level of expenditure to its existing means. 
While they are not designed explicitly to increase the rate of growth, they do, however, create the 
economic stability which is the precondition for longer term growth. 
Structural adjustment 
The term structur-al adjustment has come into wide use in devel pment policy since the World Bank 
used it to describe the policy-based lending which has been an increasingly important aspect of its 
activities since the beginning of the 1980s. Structural adjustment measw-es are more explicitly 
growth-orientated, aiming to increase output in order to allow macro-economic balance to be 
achieved at higher levels of living. Structural adjustment programs are targeted at a broader set of 
objectives than simply the restoration of macro-economic balance. For example they may include the 
maintenance of higher real levels of pubJic spending than could otherwise be sustained, in order to 
reduce non-price con traints on the expansion of output; the continuation or introduction of various 
subs.idies t assist groups in society suffering acutely from the effects of poor economic performance 
and subsequent stabilization measures. It is argued that reliance on a s.ingle instrument (demand 
management) is incompatible with broader development objectives, since this may achieve macro-
economic balance at unacceptably low levels of income. 
Structural adjustment programmes attempt to achieve these objectives f stimulating growth and 
avoiding an unacceptable sque ze in expenditur in two ways. Firstly, by attracting additional 
concessionalbalance of payments support and, secondly, by policy reforms designed to allocate and 
manage resources more profitably. Policie which have been conducive to structural problems 
require to be changed, by reforms which improve resource allocation and economic efficiency and 
which, thereby, timulat growth on the supply-side. An additional objective is to make the domestic 
economy more flexible and thus better able to cope with changes in the international economy. 
Structural adjustment programmes pose extremely challenging tasks for policy analysts including: 
• the identification of an agenda of reforms in policies and institutions; 
• the design of a sequence of measures which is technically consistent and politically sustainable; 
and 
• the negotiation of these between governments and the lending agencies. 
Furthermore, the process can have unanticipated consequences, and the strategy needs to be 
regularly reviewed and modified. Initially, the World Bank believed that structural adjustment 
would amount to a temporary deviation from its main busi1,1ess of lendin.g for project : phases of 
about three to five years were mentioned. However, adjustment lending for SSA was intensifying up 
to 1988 (World Bank, 1988) and financial flows in support of adjustment we1·e competing, at least 
implicitly, with flows to support public sector spending. In it Long Term Perspective Study (LTPS), 
released at the end of 1989, the World Bank concludes that, in fact, structural adju tm.ent is 'not a one-
shot effort .. . but reflects the need for macro-economic and sector policies to be continuously 
appraised and modified' (World Bank, 1989b, p.181). 
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In the ea1·Iy years of adjustment, a division of labour existed between the IMF which dealt with 
demand management measures, ru1d the World Bank which worked on the suppl;-side agenda. This 
distinction has become increasingly blurred since the introduction, in 1988 of the IMP's Structural 
Adjustment Facility and Enhanced Sh·uctural Adjustment Facility (SAF and ESAF). These are longer 
term concessionallending instruments closer in c~aracter t? the policy-based lending facilities which 
have been offered by the World Bank. For countnes for wluch SAFs and ESAFs are platmed, a Policy 
Framework Paper, covering the short and medium-term, has to be developed, and then agreed 
jointly by the government, World Bank and the IMF. 
Of the 51 countries which had received World Ballk adjustment finance by the end of 1987,23 were 
in SSA (World Bank, 1988). These are lis ted below according to whethex the World Bank, at the 
beginning of 1989, classified their internal policy reforms as strong or weak (World Bank and UNDP, 
1989). As of 1985, only twelve countries, worldwide, had received three or more adjustment loans, 
and of these, five were in SSA (asterisked below) 
STRONG REFORMERS 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Ivory Coast* 
Ghana* 
Guinea 
Gambia 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya* 
Madagascar 
Malawi* 
Mauritius 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
An Overview of the Policy Reform Strategy 
WEAK REFORMERS 
Burkina Faso 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Uganda 
Zambia* 
Zimbabwe 
One of the main objectives of structural adjustment has been to reduce distortions through 
reductions in government intervention, a process referred to as market liberalization. A subsidiary 
goal has been to improve the management of those activities which remain with the state. Figure I 
illustrates, firstly, the relationship of structural adjustment to stabilization. Secondly, it shows how 
structural adjustment can be conceived of as having three major components as follows: 
• public sector management and resource allocation, 
• market liberalization, and 
• the reform of supporting institutions (those involved in economic planning, banking etc). 
Market liberalization will apply to the five markets shown below. Liberalization of any of these 
markets will require a series of actions as set out in the box. To take the action of price reform as an 
example: 
• in domestic goods markets it implies either new price setting methods, or the complete abolition 
of price interventions; 
• in international trade it involves correction of exchange rate over-valuation; 
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• in domestic financial markets it implies allowing markets to determine interest rates; 
• in factor markets it could refer to changes in government regulation of wages and land rents. 
Measures which may be adopted to liberalize any one of the markets shown in Figure 3 are 
categorized below, with examples of specific policy areas in which changes may be brought about. 
Figure 3 Schematic Representation of Economic Recovery Policies in Africa 
Structural Adjustment ------- Stabilization 
(supply side policies) (demand side policies) 
Public Sector 
Management and 
Resource Allocation 
I 
Monetary 
Policy 
Market 
Liberalization 
I 
Fiscal 
Policy 
I 
Devaluation 
Reform of 
Supporting 
Institutions 
Domestic Goods 
Markets 
International 
Trade 
Domestic 
Financial 
Markets 
International 
Capital 
Markets 
Factor 
Markets 
I I j_ J 
Removal of Quantitive Restrictions 
Price Liberalization 
Marketing Reforms 
Measures to reduce the role of government 
Actions to promote the private sector 
Price liberalization, for example: 
• agricultural producer prices increased where these were previously controlled by government; 
methods for price policy formulation improved; price relativities changed to reflect comparative 
advantage, (in agriculture, this implies the removal of price controls and pan-territorial prices); 
• interest rates raised to market clearing levels; 
• exchange rate adjustment; and 
• removal of subsidies. 
Promotion of the private sector, for example through: 
• improving the access to finance for commodity trade and agricultural marketeers; 
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• training and the pr · · f k . f · ov1s1on o mar et m ormatlon; 
• revisions of industrial investment policy and incentive development; and 
• improvement of transport and storage for marketeers. 
Reduction of the role of government, for example in: 
• privatization; 
• contracting out; 
• closure of public enterprise judged to have limited commercial or social benefit; and 
• provision of guidelines on the justification for the creation of new parastatals. 
Measures to raise the efficiency of state-owned operations: including for example: 
• performance contracts for state enterprises; 
• development of improved systems for budgetary allocations; 
• improved project appraisal and investment co-ordination; and 
• training. 
Removal of quantitative and administrative controls on trade, for example through the: 
• removal of quotas on crop purchase and movement; 
• abolition of licensing arrangements; and the 
• removal of restriction on internal and international movement of produce. 
Finally, it should be noted that market liberalization is not only a supply-side or 'structural' policy, 
it has the potential to assist macro-economic stabilization, because, if it succeeds in raising efficiency, 
it will be possible to reduce requirements for subsidies, without necessarily diminishing the welfare 
of the subsidy recipients. 
Sequencing and the Evolution of Marketing Policy Reforms 
Recent debates on adjustment policy have focused on the sequencing of reform measures (Spooner 
and Smith, 1989). Discussion of sequencing has revolved around the appropriate ordering for 
implementing structural measures vis stabilization; liberalization of domestic vis international 
markets; and, finally, the measures required for the liberalization of a specific market. With regard to 
the sequencing of liberalization in domestic and international markets, it is widely believed that 
priority should be given to the liberalization of domestic markets, especially in the agricultural sector 
(Spooner and Smith, 1989). This would create the preconditions for effective liberalization in 
international trade, since it would create a more flexible and resilient economy, able to earn more 
foreign exchange. 
Marketing reform under structural adjustment has evolved through a number of stages. Initially 
reform concentrated on raising the efficiency of parastatals. More recently, the emphasis has been on 
liberalization and privatization, as the World Bank has become less convinced of the possibilities 
inherent in parastatal reform. Examining the sequencing of marketing reforms, a first step has tended 
to be the removal of restrictions on traders, followed by the removal of price controls. Then 
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marketing subsidies and parastatal subventions are reduced. The final element is the lifting of 
controls on international trade in food. 
Marketing parastatals will continue to have an important role in liberalized economies in the 
importation of food aid, management of strategic stocks and price stabilization. It will be necessary to 
ensure that parastatals perform these functions efficiently, and that their cost levels are wound down 
to reflect tl1e reduced level of their operati ns. Careful consideration will have to be given to conflicts 
which may emerge in parastatals' performance of these 'social' functions, bearing in mind the need 
to encourage traders to invest in marketing and stock holding. 
ARGUMENTS FOR STATE PARTICIPATION IN MARKETING 
As the thrust of economic liberalization is to reduce the role of the state, it is useful briefly to review 
the arguments which have been advanced over the years to justify the prev·ious situation, one of very 
substantial state participatiou in agricultural marketing. These arguments p int to issues of 
efficiency, equity and social cohesion that will still have to be addressed in the post-liberalization era. 
The agricultural marketiJ1g systems of many dev 1 ping cmmtries have been characterized by 
state-administered prices and a major role for state marketing boards (parastatals) although not in 
every country and not for every crop. Generally, SSA governments have intervened less in food 
marketing relative to export crop marketing. Nevertheless, SSA has a number of examples of major 
intervention in food marketing (e.g. Mali, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique). Even Kenya, with its 
generally 'free market' reputation, has maintained restrictions on inter-district movement of maize. 
The justifications adva11ced for the maintenance of a leading role for the state in agricultural 
marketing can be reduced to two basic lines of argument. First, that the private sector is weak, and 
incapable of supporting the rate of agricultural growth which is planned. Second, that the social 
consequences of unco11strained private sector marketing conflict with social objectives by inducing 
unbalanced regional development, and socio-economic differentiation. In more detail, argmnents 
advanced to support state participation in agricultural marketing have included: 
• The observation that adequate finance is not available to the private sector. Commodity trading 
requires seasonal finance for crop purchases, and capital for investment in transport and 
infrastructure. Banks are often reluctant to lend to traders (who have few bankable securities) 
and are rarely attuned to the loan and rescheduling requirements of the trading sector. Thus, a 
major (if not often cited) reason for the creation of the parastatals has been tl1eir ability to 
manage llie large seasonal borrowing which is required to finance crop purchases: the 
government and/or the banking system have been willing to advance funds to parastatals that 
they would have been reluctant to lend to smaller-scale private traders. 
• The perception that traditional traders tend not to be active contributors to the co-ordination of 
the system. It is argued that traders live in a world of uncertainty and limited resources, and 
behave passively, accepting ilie marketed surplus rather than identifying potential marke ts and 
promoili1g production to supply them. Because of this background, they lack the spirit, skills 
and knowledge to be active co-ordinators. 
• The belief that, because private agricultural marketing is presently highly underdeveloped, a 
laissez-fah·e approach by government would result in market domination by the few entrepre-
neurs with access to finance, knowledge and skills. These entrepreneurs would then be in a 
position to exploit their market position. 
• A fear that the private sector, unaided, is incapable of achieving necessary quality standards. 
• Doubts about the ability of private sector marketing to provide services in remote areas, because 
of the low profitability of such operations. 
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• The apparent inability of the private sector to offer guaranteed producer prices, which are 
believed to reduce risk and thereby to represent an incentive to producers. 
• The attendant fear that the private sector would not offer stable consumer prices, and would 
exploit consumers in times of shortage, sometimes with serious consequences. 
• The possibility that the private sector would not be able or willing to maintain sufficient reserve 
stocks, and therefore that there is a need for state control over the marketing of strategic food 
crops. Under a system dominated by private enterprise it is more difficult for the government to 
monitor food production and supplies, and to make appropriate arrangements to import. 
• The problem of achieving minimum viable scale. The marketing and processing of export crops 
may require large investments in transport, processing and communications infrastructure. 
Further, the presence of scale economies in many areas of agro-processing necessitates vertical 
integration with marketing, and frequently with production. 
Finally, there are a cluster of political economy arguments explaining the attraction to governments 
of intervention in agricultural markets (Bates, 1981). Control over marketing gives control over prices 
and prices determine income and the inter-sectoral terms of trade. An aspect of this is the potential 
for extracting a financial surplus from export agriculture through the pricing policy cf state 
marketing boards. 
The Performance of Marketing Parastatals 
The marketing parastatals which were set up or expanded by African governments on the basis of 
these arguments have performed very poorly, many were so inefficient that their performance 
constituted a key constraint on agricultural progress. Typical weaknesses included: 
• inadequate and untimely supplies of production inputs, 
• unreliable access to produce marketing facilities, 
• late payments to farmers (typically in situations of high inflation, which rapidly erodes the value 
of payments), and 
• poor quality control. 
Marketing parastatals obtained few of the benefits of being government departments, while 
suffering many of the disadvantages. Control by governments has often been detailed and obtrusive, 
while at the same time ignoring major issues of policy and strategy. Governments have lacked 
effective mechanisms to make parastatal marketing boards accountable for their performance. 
Together with salary controls which aimed to keep remuneration at the same level as in government, 
this meant that there were weak incentives to operate efficiently, or to actively work to co-ordinate 
the market. Additionally, parastatals have been subject to political control to an greater extent than 
the private sector, by virtue of their location within the public sector. Parastatals have been part of the 
system of political patronage, and this has been conducive to over-manning at all levels. 
Continuing Roles For Parastatals 
Marketing parastatals will continue to have an important role in the liberalized economy. Four areas 
where there is likely to be need for public sector involvement (on grounds of 'public interest' or 'lack 
of private sector capacity') are: 
• the importation of food aid; 
• the closely linked activity of importing food on commercial terms; 
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• the management of strategic stocks; 
• price stabilization, through acting as the buyer I seller of last resort. 
Governments are likely to wish to retain a role in guaranteeing to buy crops at a minimum price. 
This has an economic cost (it encourages an inefficient structure of production) but it may have 
economic justification in term of risk reduction. If public sector marketing is successful in reducing 
risk, then this will enhance farmers' willingness to innovate. Probably, the most effective form of risk 
reduction which the public sector can undertake is to make available a floor price for produce, acting 
as buyer of last resort. However, it will not be until at least the end of this decade that there will be 
sufficient data to test this hypothesis with respect to Africa. 
A further important reason for governments' continuing involvement in food marketing is that, in 
the short term, it will b difficult to supply the finance necessary for food trading and stocking, except 
via the existing larger scale organizations (sud1 as parastatals and co-operative unions). Policies for 
privatization t date have tended to focus on the smaller scale local trade. Sud1 traders do not have 
the capacity to borrow the finance necessary to purchase and store more than a small proportion of 
the national marketed food crop. On the other hand, large-scale private organizations, able to 
undertake the necessary levels of borrowing may be slow to enter the foodstuffs trade on an 
adequate scale. For example, they may regard food trading as risky, subject to unpredictable 
government intervention and providing a lower return on capital than oU1er available activities). 
Managing the Parastatals' Transition to a Liberalized Economy 
If parastatals are to play a continuing role, this will be as agencies which seek to intervene to 
influence and supplement market outcomes, rather than to replace them. With fo d aid imports as a 
possibility, and parastatals responsible for holding strategic food stocks and for acting as a buyer of 
last resort, a level of uncertainty could be introduced into the system which discourages traders from 
investing in marketing and stockholding. Continual liaison between the governm nt, the parastatal 
and the private sector will be required, in order that traders are able to formulate expectations on 
future scarcities which are rationally based, and which induce socially beneficial actions by traders. 
Measures will be needed to ensure that parastatals are technically and operationally efficient in 
performing the reduced agenda of tasks. There should be an emphasis on efficiency, even when 
carrying out social functions. This will involve the development of: 
• improved management within the parastatals; 
• measures to prevent their continued use as mechanisms of political patronage; 
• improved systems of operational and financial performance targeting and monitoring, and 
• the linking of management remuneration to performance. 
In this way, the pressures of a competitive market may be partially reproduced for the parastatal. 
There will be a need for clear policy tatements regarding future activities. The aim must be to avoid 
imprecision which leads to parastatals continuing more or less unchanged, despite public announce-
ments to the contrary. Failure to do this will result in a lack of confidence in the reform by the private 
sector and unwillingness to invest in infrastructure and transport and to hold stocks. 
A related danger is what Reusse (1987) has called institutional resilience. Because of the failure to 
define clearly the new role of the parastatal in the liberalized economy, parastatals have, in some 
cases, continued to operate as before, only with a much reduced throughput which has raised unit 
marketing costs and increased the operating deficits. These deficits continue to be funded by 
government amidst confusion over the future role of the parastatal, and disappointing progress in 
reducing the parastatals' contribution to the fiscal deficit. Solutions probably lie in governments 
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pressing for tight management of overhead costs and for rapid transfer to the private sector of 
operations which have low profitability under parastatal management. An important exception to 
this being the activity of holding food security stocks. This is a loss-making function for which the 
parastatal should negotiate a government subsidy. 
Governments have in the past used parastatals to perform commercial functions and to achieve 
social objectives. The costs of social objectives have often been hidden, through cross-subsidies from 
commercial activity. In an economy undergoing structural adjustment and liberalization, the scope 
for such cross-subsidies is much reduced because: 
• price reforms in the early stages of structural adjustment have involved paying higher farm-gate 
prices, notably for export crops, thus reducing the margins available to parastatals; 
• liberalization has meant exposing parastatal marketing to competition, and this has been 
another mechanism for squeezing margins; and 
• privatization has stripped parastatals completely of some of their commercial functions. 
As structural adjustment proceeds, the costs which parastatals incur to achieve social objectives 
will become more transparent. To the extent that transparency stimulates a debate about the 
efficiency of current policy instruments for achieving social objectives, it is much to be welcomed. An 
explicit line in the national budget will be required, to pay for the loss-making activities to achieve 
social objectives. Both governments and the World Bank may find the necessity for some additional 
government spending unpalatable in the environment of stabilization and structural adjustment. Yet 
failure to take the necessary action may lead to highly undesirable outcomes (e.g. continued 
unplanned deficits by the marketing parastatals, thus.compromising fiscal objectives; or a collapse in 
the parastatals' ability to meet social objectives (such as holding sufficient stocks in a season of 
shortages, or being able to buy from farmers in a glut). 
Finally, the government's commitment to liberalization must be clear or traders' response may be 
weak, particularly as regards investment in fixed assets (storage) and transport. Monitoring of the 
implementation and adjustment process is crucial. Delays, obstacles, sabotage and planning errors 
can thus be detected and remedial measures applied. Because privatization is so sensitive and 
potentially in conflict with social goals, the early indications of failure may result in governments' 
losing their nerve, and reverting to a state-controlled marketing system. 
Promotion of an Efficient Private Sector 
Once restrictions on the private trade have been relaxed, activities to support the development of an 
active and competitive private sector become of central importance. In general, it seems that 
government agencies will have a role in: 
• encouraging and policing competition, 
• promoting wider availability of information, 
• maintaining appropriate quality standards, 
• strengthening the legal system to ensure enforceability of contracts, 
• providing an adequate infrastructure transport infrastructure, 
• undertaking spatial planning to allow appropriate access by marketeers and consumers to 
central places, 
• supporting the development of credit, 
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• research into the technological problems in storage and processing experienced by the private 
sector (which will be likely to be operating on a smaller scale, and facing different relative factor 
prices than parastatals), and 
• training in technical and managerial aspects of marketing, processing and storage. 
Inadequate availability of finance for private traders has been recognized as a particular difficulty 
post-liberalization. In the pre-liberalization era, parastatals obtained relatively generous borrowing 
facilities, while the private sector was starved of funds (and therefore operated with very high 
interest costs). The challenge is to bring about a convergence in the terms on which the private and 
public sectors are able to borrow. 
Experience has shown that governments' commitment must be clear and close monitoring of the 
cons quences of policy change is cmcial. Final!.>" an issue of considerable developmental and social 
significance is inter-regional equity, which governments have attempted to promote through pan-
territorial provision of marketing services and prices. Liberalization implies a withdrawal of the 
subsidies to disadvantaged areas, and thus the search is on for alternative policies to promote 
development in these areas. 
Financial Liberalization and Agricultural Marketing 
An aspect of structural adjustment which has received increased emphasis in very recent years is 
liberalization of internal financial markets. It is believed that this will achieve a number of objectives: 
• improving allocational efficiency by ensuring that finance is priced at its true scarcity cost (the 
implication is that interest rates may rise considerably); 
• allowing financial institutions to play a more effective role in mobilizing savings, by offering 
more attractive deposit rates; 
• reversing a pattern of preferential allocation of credit to the public sector, freeing up more funds 
for the private sector, and especially for the traded goods sector, the growth of which will have 
been stimulated by devaluation and other price policies. (This works by making borrowing 
much more expensive, and thereby, so it is hoped, stiffening the government's resolve to cut the 
fiscal deficit); 
• turning financial sector personnel (e.g. bank managers) into active and competitive business 
intermediaries, rather than passive, resource-rationing bureaucrats. It is hoped that they will 
actively seek out good business opportunities in the sectors of the economy where there are 
firms which are able to make an acceptable return on the expensive funds which they have 
available to lend. 
For agricultural marketing, financial liberalization is likely to result in some convergence in the 
terms on which the parastatal and private sectors are able to borrow. Typically, the pre-liberalization 
situation was that the parastatals obtained relatively generous borrowing facilities at controlled 
interest rates, while the private sector had difficulty in getting access to bank funds. Under this 
fragmentation of financial markets, the opportunity cost of funds to the private sector was often 
much higher than was the case for the parastatals, and this severely constrained the scale and quality 
of marketing services which the private sector could offer. 
The potential efficiency gains from financial liberalization will not be fully realized unless 
government and private institutions act to seize the opportunities, and also to deal with the 
problems. In the short term, the major problem will be the additional costs of parastatal operations 
stemming from higher finance charges. In particular, the costs of stockholding will rise, representing 
a further unwelcome addition to the transparent costs of marketing interventions to achieve social 
objectives. On the opportunity side, it will be necessary for financial institutions to be innovative in 
seeking to support private traders, especially smaller traders. Major changes in lending procedures, 
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and requirements for security will be required. A promising approach (following the Grameen Bank 
of Bangladesh) would be to start lending very small sums to clients, with minimal investigation of 
their business plans a1.1d assets. The volume of lending to clients would then be built up on the basis 
of their past repayment performance. Banks may seek government subsidization of their lending to 
small traders. It may be justifiable for government to offer some subsidy, but only on a risk-sharing 
basis. 
Transport Costs and Inter-Regional Equity 
In the 1970s, quite a number African governments introduced pan-territorial pricing for certain 
agricultural outputs, on the grounds that this would promote balanced regional development. This 
amounted to a transport subsidy to producers in areas remote from the main centres of demand, (the 
locationally disadvantaged areas). Structural adjustment policies have entailed the winding down of 
these transport subsidies, through mechanisms which range from complete price decontrol to 
making 'floor prices' applicable only for deliveries to depots in major centres. The phasing out of 
transport subsidies has been lent additional urgency in cases where there have been large currency 
devaluations and where, prior to the devaluation, rationed foreign exchange had been preferentially 
allocated to agricultural marketing (for vehicles, parts and fuel). This has increased the real cost of 
transport to parastatal operators (and, probably, also to the private sector). 
The effects of the abandonment of pan-territorial pricing on the locationally disadvantaged areas 
may, in the short term, prove to be disastrous. For example, in Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, 
integrated rural development projects, commenced in the later 1970s, had the objective of raising 
farmer incomes and household nutrition by promoting increased production of staple food (mainly 
maize). The plan was that, in normal years, the maize surplus would be exported from the region to 
towns and to food-deficient rural areas, providing' an important source of cash income to farmers. 
Furthermore, it was argued that, even in bad years, local food availability would be higher than 
would have otherwise been the case. Such projects depended on farmers receiving attractive prices 
for food crops, and this required transport subsidies. In the early years of these projects, the supply 
response was often substantial, with large numbers of farmers becoming dependent on maize sales 
as their principal income source. Withdrawal of transport subsidies leaves these farmers in a difficult 
position. The response must include: 
• agricultural research support to develop less 'transport-intensive' export crops; 
• encouragement and support to the private sector to seek out new opportunities in these areas 
(e.g., they may have a comparative advantage in pulse production, but the public sector may not 
have been seriously interested in marketing this); 
• studies to define the impact on the poor, and the implications for growth. 
Liberalization and Consumer Welfare 
To the extent that liberalization, and associate~ policies to support the private sector, promote more 
efficient marketing, it would be expected that, m general, consumers would benefit, as a consequence 
of a narrowing of marketing margins. ~o~~ve~, some groups ~ay be worse off, experiencing higher 
prices and/ or substantially greater vanabihty m C0l1Sumer pnces. Adversely a ffed ed groups could 
include: 
• urban residents who had previously had access to food supplies from parastatals, where these 
supplies had been subsidized; 
• rural residents in food-deficient areas subject to high transport costs; 
• food-deficient households in thos~ rura~al:~s with} n ?verall food surplus and low access to the 
main centres of demand. Food pnce me U ely t~ 1 Ise m the e areas as private sector marketing 
activity intensifies as a consequence of the areas compara tive advantage as a food supplier; 
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• if satisfactory arrangements are not made for the maintenance of food security stocks, and there 
is marked production variability over seasons, then there may be more generally damaging 
effects on consumers. 
Monitoring Requirements 
It will be important to monitor effects of liberalization, to identify progress and problems, and to 
provide the basis for reviewing policies. Key phenomena to be monitored are: 
• flows of goods; 
• volumes of produce in storage (at different times of the year); 
• geographical coverage of markets; 
• the size and structure of the marketing industry (shares of flows at different points of the year 
accounted for by parastatals, co-operatives and categories of private trader); 
• marketeers' access to finance, storage facilities, market places; 
• the regulatory environment affecting marketeers, at the national and local level; 
• the costs of marketing and marketing margins; 
• technical problems encountered in the marketing system; 
• consumer access to food and consumer prices over the year, disaggregated by region, rural/ 
urban and income level; 
• budgetary costs of publicly supported marketing functions; 
• indicators of activity levels in government programmes to support the private sector. 
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divergence and 118 
examples of 120 
infant industries and 120 
monopoly 120 
Market functions 51 
data requirements on processing 53 
data requirements on storage 52-53 
data requirements on transport 53 
data requirements for efficiency analyses 51 
data requirements on buying and selling 52 
marketing activities and 51 
performance analyses and 51 
sources of data on 52 
Market imperfections 
costs and benefits of 
sources of 
Market information 
asymmetrical supply of 
economic efficiency and 
equity, and 
inadequacy of 
policy, and 
spatial integration and 
see also information 
Market insecurity 
Market integration 
67 
65 
67 
120 
120 
108 
109 
109 
73 
59 
70 
assessment of 98 
competition and 74 
economic efficiency and 7 4 
monopoly and 7 4 
price correlation coefficient analyses and 72 
Market integration/ connection 
assessment of 
Market liberalization 
arguments for 
causes of 
example of actions required 
83 
1, 68, 139 
5 
1 
examples of subsidiary policies 
financial liberalization and agricultural 
141 
142 
markets 148 
government commitment to 147, 148 
in Tanzania and Zambia 124-125 
increasing the efficiency of state 
enterprises 143 
macro-economic crises and 1 
marketing efficiency and 147 
parastatals and 146, 147 
price liberalization 142 
privatization 143 
problems in 1, 146,147 
promotion of private sector 142 
reducing the role of government 143 
removing controls on trade 143 
sequencing reforms 143-144 
structural adjustment and 1, 141, 143 
theory of perfect competition and 3 
Market margins 16, 70 
see also deconstructed and gross market 
margins 
data for measurement and calculation 
definition of 
77 
75 
76 determinants of size of 
103 economic efficiency and 
measurement, and deconstruction, of 77 
75 
58, 64, 67 
size of under competition 
Market participant interviews 
see also interviews 
Market participants 
identification and classification of 
Market performance 
analyses of 
assessment of 
data requirements for assessment of 
definition of 
economic performance and 
organization of exchange and 
Market performance indicators 
price correlation coefficients 
Market places 
Market power 
index, or measurement, of 
Market structure 
58 
49,50 
10 
46 
83 
30 
10 
10 
59 
72, 73 
65 
68 
assessment of 
competition and 
concentration indices and 
56, 67, 68 
55 
68 
Marketing 
commodity characteristics and 
consumption and 
costs of service 
development and 
government policies and 
physical infrastructure and 
production and 
Marketing activities 
uses of defining 
Marketing chain 
Marketing chains 
commodity flows through 
identification of 
uses of 
Marketing co-operatives 
Marketing costs 
benefits of lowering marketing costs 
46 
43 
64 
5, 6 
40-42 
42-43 
43 
51 
51 
75 
50 
50 
49,50 
114 
77 
159 
r 
Marketing efficiency 
means of enhancing of 
Marketing monopsony 
Marketing parastatals 
see also parastatals 
Marketing policy 
definition of 
Marketing reform 
see market liberalization 
structural adjustment and 
Marketing resources 
spatial integration and 
Marketing services 
influences on costs of 
quality and quantity of 
147 
120 
146-147 
107, 139 
111-112 
143 
141 
73 
75 
76 
rendered between production and 
consumption 75 
75 
62 
supply and demand for 
Marketing systems 
Markets 
a conceptual framework of 
analysing the relationship with 
consumption 
analysing the relationships with 
production 
assessing the performance of 
common problems in LDCs 
consumption and 
data requirements for analysing 
marketing systems 
development and 
economic analyses of 
economic efficiency and 
economic growth and 
economic welfare and 
employment and 
9-10 
24-25 
44 
47 
24 
7 
21,43 
46 
2-3 
24 
3 
2, 5,11 
6 
20 
extracting resources from agriculture 
and 18 
food security and 
government policies and 
historical evolution of economic 
analyses of 
income distribution and 
innovation in agriculture arld 
modelling of 
Pareto optimality and 
perfect competition and 
physical infrastructure and 
price generation and 
pric transmission and 
production and 
resource allocation and 
specialization and 
Measuring seasonal price changes 
techniques of 
Middlemen 
numbers of 
160 
11, 21, 22 
40 
24 
6, 11, 19 
18 
l1 
3 
3 
42 
3, 16 
2, 16 
21 , 43, 45 
2,3 
2-3 
84 
77 
Milling 
see also processing 
data requirements for a e s ing 
efficiency of 100 
economic effici ncy of, and competition 99 
indications of competitive behaviour in 68 
influences on costs and returns 100, 101 
the organization of services 100 
Milling conversion rate 82, 83 
Milling costs 
fixed 
variable 
Milling technologies 
Model of perfect competition 
see also perfect competition 
and competition 
Modelling gross market margins 
an example 
Modelling markets 
Monopolistic markets 
profits and 
Monopoly 
effects of 
102 
101 
100 
16 
92 
11 
102-103 
102 
120 
government intervention and 120 
in agricultural marketing 120 
Monopoly power 
measures of 69 
Moving averages 85 
Multi-directional trade 96 
price correlation coefficient analyses and 74 
Multiple interviews 
11ece ity of 82 
NominaJ exchange rate 118 
Nominal protection coeffi ients 126 
assumptions 126 
calculation of 126 
calculation of on tradable inputs and 
outputs 133 
definition of 126 
interpretation of results 
limitations of 
uses of 
Non-economic efficiency objectives 
Non-economic objectives 
Non-tradables 
definition of 
Normal profit 
competition and 
definition of 
Numbers and sizes of firm 
0-efficiency 
Observational surveys 
cross-checking data 
uses of 
Off-season prices 
under perfect competition 
Oligopolistic markets 
126-127 
126-127 
126 
10 
31 
131 
83, 84, 91 
102 
75 
67,68 
10, 63, 65 
67 
34 
34 
84 
efficiency of resource allocation and 67 
1 
profits in 102 
Oligopoly 
measurement of 68 
Operational efficiency 10, 26, 63, 65 
assessment of 14 
competition and 15 
data requirements for the assessment of 64 
definition of 14 
economics of 
index of 
marketing examples of 
Opportunity costs of capital 
interest rates as indicators of 
Organization of exchange 
Over-valued exchange rates 
Pan-territorial pricing 
effects of abandonment 
Parallel market 
Parastatal markets 
Parastatals 
see also marketing parastatals 
14 
63 
15 
82 
58 
118 
149 
149 
118 
92 
efficiency of 144 
increasing the efficiency of 144, 146 
market liberalization and 146-147 
performance of marketing parastatals 
in Africa 145 
role in liberalized economies 144, 145, 147 
social objectives of 147 
structural adjustment and 147 
subsidization of 147 
Pareto optimality 66 
definition of 3 
markets and 
perfect competition and 
Perfect competition 
analysing the conditions, and 
requirements, of 
3 
3 
10, 103 
67 
67 assessing economic efficiency and 
assumptions in the neo-classical model 
of 62 
62,66 
3 
conditions of 
consumer welfare and 
critiques of the neo-classical model of 
economic efficiency and 
economic performance, and the 
neo-classical model of, 
government role and 
market and 
12 
15 
12 
6 
3 
neo-classical model of 
Pareto optimality and 
resource allocation and 
3, 4, 10, 62 
4, 5 
using the model of 
4, 5 
12,66 
Perfectly competitive markets 
maximization of resource productivity 
and 
resource productivity and 
social, or economic, welfare and 
63 
63 
63 
Performance 
see also economic performance 
contradictions between objectives 
definition of 
Policy 
9 
24 
26 
data on 40 
economic welfare, and 117 
examples of those influential in markets 40 
food security, and 21, 22, 108 
neo-classical economics 117 
income distribution and 20 
markets, marketing and 40--41 
Policy analysis 
comparing subsidies and tariffs 
assessing policy instruments 
assumptions in 
calculating output transfers 
calculating factor transfers 
calculating input transfers 
calculating net transfers 
calculating shadow exchange rates 
calculating the opportunity cost of 
capital 
conflicting objectives and 
121 
121 
125 
133 
133 
133 
133 
118 
87 
multiple instruments 112, 113, 115, 116 
conflicting objectives and single 
instruments, an example 
consumer subsidies and 
correcting market failure 
definition of marketing policy 
distortions 
distributional effects 
117 
110, 116 
121 
111 
122 
110 
divergence 118 
domestic resource cost ratios in 123 
economic efficiency and 112, 113, 122 
economist's approach to 112 
effective protection coefficients in 123 
effects of market failure 132 
effects of policy 132 
effects of policy on economic 
efficiency 125, 126 
export limits, effects on production, 
consumption and prices 109 
export quotas 110 
export taxes 110, 116, 117 
food subsidies and export earnings 116 
government intervention and 122 
hierarchy of objectives and instruments 114 
identifying objectives and instruments 113 
indicators of economic efficiency and 125 
influences on government 
objectives 112, 113 
limitations of neo-classical approach 122 
lowering food prices 113, 116 
market failure and, 119, 120 
marketing interventions and 111 
neo-classical economics approach 116 
nominal protection coefficients in 123 
161 
non-economic objectives and 
optimizing under constraints, an 
example 
optimum application of policy 
instruments 
optimum subsidy levels 
over-valued exchange rates, and 
policy hierarchies 
policy analysis matrix and 
primary objectives 
producer subsidies 
profitability coefficients 
ranking commodity / marketing 
122 
123, 124 
121 
121 
118 
123 
131 
113 
122 
134 
systems 129 
ranking objectives 117 
ranking policy instruments 121, 122, 123 
second-best options 123 
social and private costs and 126 
social prices and 118 
subsidiary objectives 113 
subsidies and budget costs 116 
subsidies and by-products 116 
subsidies to traders 109 
subsidy ratio to producers 134 
supporting marketing co-operatives 115 
tariffs 122, 124 
use of neo-classical approach 122 
uses of 112 
Policy analysis matrix 
an example of use of 
basic form of 
construction of the 
data requirements 
definition of 
distortions and 
entries into 
134 
132 
131 
134 
131 
133 
131 
133 extended form 
indicators in 
market failure and 
131, 133 
133 
opportunity costs of domestic resources 132 
Policy instruments 113 
Policy objectives 
sources of data 
Population and consumption data 
as indicators of demand 
uses of in market analyses 
Population growth 
Price analyses 
162 
inter-form price differences 
gross market margins 
inter-spatial price variation 
international/ domestic comparisons 
objectives, data requirements and 
problems 
relative price relationships 
seasonal price variation 
trends in real prices 
113 
43 
43 
74 
58,70 
71 
71 
71 
71 
71 
71 
71 
71 
Price analysis 
economic efficiency and 70 
model of perfect competition and 70 
Price correlation coefficient analyses 58 
calculations, and interpretation of results 73 
combining different analyses 7 4 
competition and 74 
inferrential problems and 73 
interpretation of results 73 
market disconnection and 74 
market integration, and economic 
efficiency and 70 
market performance indicators and 72 
market segmentation and 7 4 
monopoly and 74 
pre-treating the data 74 
spatial integration and 72 
using secondary price data 73 
transport costs and 73 
in perfectly competitive markets 72 
Price correlations 16 
Price data 
problems with 58 
uses of 58 
Price difference between forms of the same 
product and competition and processing 
costs 82 
Price discovery 
mechanisms of 
Price elasticity of demand 
Price formation 
efficiency of, and correlation 
coefficient analyses 
efficiency of, and market margin 
analysis 
Price liberalization 
example of subsidiary policies 
Price transmission 
efficiency of, and market margin 
analysis 
Price variation 
competition and monopoly and 
Prices 
supply and demand and 
Pricing efficiency 
see also allocative, economic and 
exchange efficiency 
and competition 
of marketing functions and services 
Primary data collection 
analyses of enterprise records 
barriers to entry and 
commodity flows and 
consumption and 
direct observation 
example interview guides 
fieldwork techniques 
interviews and case studies 
58-59 
69 
74 
70 
75-76 
142 
75-76 
70 
70 
76 
76 
33 
56 
48,49 
43 
33 
38 
33 
33 
key informants 
objectives of 
observational surveys 
production and 
Private cost ratios 
definition of 
profitability and 
Private profits 
37 
32 
33-34 
45 
128, 132 
133 
132 
as indicator of economic efficiency 
Private sector · 
132 
means of promoting 142-143 
Private sector marketing 
means of enhancing the efficiency of 
Private and social costs and benefits 
147 
103 
99-100 Processing 
calculating costs and returns in 
hiring mills 102 
comparing costs, with inter-form price 
differences 100, 101 
comparing prices of milling services, 
with costs of mill owning 
conversion ratios, and 
data requirements for 
economic efficiency of 
operational efficiency in 
unit costs of, and returns to 
Processing costs 
calculating costs and returns to 
owning mills 
data requirements 
fixed 
inter-form price differences, and 
of owning mills 
sources of data 
valuing unit costs 
variability in 
Product differentiation 
101 
101 
53, 100 
99-100 
15 
83 
99, 101 
102 
102 
102 
99-100 
101 
101, 102 
101 
102 
68 
Production 45 
analysing the relationship with markets 47 
marketing and 43,44 
markets and 21 
primary data collection on 45 
secondary data on 45 
Production techniques 64 
Productive efficiency 10, 11, 62-63 
assessment of 15, 26 
assessment using descriptive analysis 26 
data requirements for assessing 54, 55, 63 
definition of 15 
identifying means of enhancing 
intra-firm organization 
of marketing channel or industry 
problems and limitations in assessment 
64 
53 
65 
of 26, 64 
Profit 
definition of 
maximization objective and 
normal, definition of 
104 
63 
75 
oligopolistic markets, and 
resource mobility, and 
Profitability 
103 
103 
as an indicator of performance 104 
at the enterprise level 63 
calculation of private profits 133 
calculation of social profits 133 
comparing results 104 
competition and 103 
defining and measuring 103 
domestic resource cost ratios and 128 
economic efficiency and 103 
efficient price formation and 103 
high rates of 103 
low rates of 103 
standards for comparison 103 
variation in 103 
Profitability analyses 16, 55, 59, 103 
absolute net profit and economic 
efficiency 
absolute net profit, definition of 
annual turnover and 
calculating firm level profits 
calculating profitability as a rate of 
104 
104 
105 
104 
return to capital 
comparisons between firms 
comparisons with agricultural, or 
104 
104-106 
parastatal, enterprises 105 
comparisons with interest rates 105 
data requirements for 54, 103 
data sources 103, 104 
economic efficiency and 105 
firm viability and 105 
gross earnings 1 OS 
interpreting results 103-104 
labour productivity and 105 
limitations on 103 
pricing management 105 
pricing unpaid family labour 105 
private cost ratio and 106 
profit as a return to capital 104 
profitability coefficient calculations 134 
pure profit, definition of 105 
representing profits 104 
use of secondary data in 103 
using and interpreting results 54, 105-106 
vertical integration, and 106 
Profits 
monopolistic markets and 
Public goods 
definition and examples 
Rapid appraisal 
see rapid reconnaissance 
Rapid reconnaissance 
definition of 
fieldwork techniques 
Rates of return 
102 
120 
30, 63, 64, 69, 75 
33 
33 
assessing economic efficiency and 90 
163 
Rates of return to marketing 
comparisons with other economic 
enterprises 82 
Redistributive markets 92 
Renting storage facilities 
operational costs, and crop losses 88 
Research objectives 9-10 
definition 31 
economic efficiency and 31 
Resource allocation 70 
market integration, or price 
transmission and 70 
markets and 3 
optimal 62 
perfect competition and 3 
Resource extraction 
markets and 18 
Resource immobility 
profits and 103 
Resource mobility 73 
Resource productivity 
perfectly competitive markets and 63 
Retail food price formation 81 
Returns 
in an efficient market 83 
Returns to economic activities 
under competition 82 
Reverse flows 93 
Risk 
reduction of 65 
Risk-averse market strategies 70 
Rural and urban markets 
as centres of supply and demand 92 
Scale economies 
see economies of scale 63 
Seasonal disconnection between rural and 
urban markets 
Seasonal price analyses 
uses of 
Seasonal price changes 
measurement of 
Seasonal price indices 
12 month moving averages 
the 'grand seasonal index' 
Seasonal price rises 
storage costs and 
Seasonal price variation 
Seasonal prices 
competition and storage costs and 
Seasonality and storage 
Secondary data 
164 
availability and use of in LDCs 
evaluation of 
firm numbers and sizes and 
major sources of 
on population and consumption 
on spatial and temporal commodity 
flows 
93 
84 
84 
84 
85 
85 
88 
71 
82 
84 
30 
31 
31,32 
56 
32 
43 
48 
production and 45 
use of, in assessing transport efficiency 92 
Seller concentration 
definition of 
index, or measurement of 
ratios 
Shadow exchange rate 
Shadow prices 
67 
68 
16,62 
118 
see social prices 118 
Size distribution of firms 56 
Small gross market margins 76, 77 
producers and consumers h1 LDCs and 76 
Social price of capital 
calculating the 
SociaJ price of labour 
119 
calculating the 119 
Social prices 16 
capital and labour of 118 
definition of 11 
of domestic resources/non-tradables 131, 132 
of foreign exchange 118 
of labour 131-132 
of tradables 131-132 
world prices as 
Social profits 
Social welfare 
perfectly competitive markets and 
Spatial arbitrage 
125 
133 
63 
see tran port 92 
Spatial integration 75 
price correlation coefficient analyses and 73 
Spatial monopoly 
definition of 
Spatial planning 
in markets 
Spatial price differences 
93 
120 
109 
competition and transport costs and 82 
measurement of 92 
perfectly competitive markets, and 91 
rural producer and urban consumer prices, 
and 92 
Spatial price variation 71 
Specialization 
development and 
markets and 
Specialization in production 
Speculative storage 
definition and assessment of 
Stabilization 
see macro-economic stabilization 
Storage 
analysing the economic efficiency of 
calculating the unitary rates of return 
to variable capital in 
3 
2-3 
2, 70 
91 
139 
139 
83 
90 
calculating and representing the returns 
to 88,89 
comparing costs of, with seasonal 
price rises 84 
r 
I 
I 
costs and decisions 
data on 
economic efficiency of 
fixed costs 
food security and 
generalizing results of analyses of 
91 
52-53 
88 
90 
83 
returns to 89 
gross rates of return to 89 
high returns to 90 
implications of returns to 90 
incentives and disincentives in 84 
low returns to 90 
profitability and 88 
rate of return to capital in 90 
returns to labour in 90 
unit cost ot and returns, to 83 
unit returns as indicative of efficiency 88 
unitary rate of return to all resources in 90 
varied returns to 90 
Storage costs 
assumptions in calculating unit values 87 
calculating per unit values 86, 87 
calculating the opportunity costs of 
working capital 
calculating unit crop loss costs 
calculating unit handling and 
treatment costs 
calculating unit rental costs 
calculating unit values of store 
87 
88 
88 
87 
depreciation 87 
categories of 86 
crop losses and 87 
data requirements for calculating 86 
examples of different categories of 86 
handling and treatment 88 
interest rates and 87 
intra-annual or seasonal price rises and 88 
sources of data on 86 
summary equations 
technical, operational and economic 
efficiency analyses and 
Storage costs and seasonal prices 
under perfect competition 
Storage decisions 
influences on 
Storage facilities 
88 
86 
84 
91 
renting 87 
Structural adjustment 139, 140 
definition of 140 
instruments 141 
loans to Sub-Saharan African countries 141 
major components of 
market liberalization and 
marketing reforms and 
objectives 
parastatals and 
removing pan-territorial pricing 
sequencing the reforms 
141 
1, 143 
141 
140 
148 
149 
143 
stabilization and 
structural 
the World Bank and the IMF 
transport subsidies and 
Structure 
definition of market 
141 
1 
140, 141 
149 
27 
Structure, conduct, performance school 11, 26 
critique of 27 
definition of 
hypotheses generated by 
problems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
the crisis of the 1980s 
Sub-systems analysis 
Subjective utilities 
Tanzania 
26 
27 
27 
139 
139 
11 
63 
market liberalization in 124-125 
marketing co-operatives in 124-125 
Technical efficiency 10, 26, 63, 64 
an index of 63 
assessment of 12 
data requirements for the assessment of 64 
data sources on 14 
definition of 12 
marketing examples of 12 
the economics of 13 
Technological innovation 
also see innovation 
Tradables 
definition of 
Trader interviews 
11 
11 
131 
74 
Trader organizations 57 
nature of membership and roles of 57 
Transport costs 
calculating unit values 97 
Transactions costs 
definition of 108 
high levels of 1 08 
Transport 
see also transport costs 
analysing the economic efficiency of 91, 96 
assessment of economic efficiency of 94, 97 
assumptions in analysing the efficiency 
of 92 
assumptions in calculating returns to 98 
buying transport services 95, 96 
calculating returns to vehicle owners 97 
calculating unit costs of 97 
calculating unit net returns 98 
comparing costs of with spatial price 
differences 92 
comparing costs with returns to 
owning vehicles 98 
comparing costs with spatial price 
differences 97 
comparing unit costs, and spatial 
price differences 94 
computing unit returns to 91 
165 
data requirements on 53,95 opportunity cost of investment capital 95 
food security and 83 rates of depreciation 94 
high returns to 98 unit costs in buying transport 
implications of returns to 98 services 96, 97 
low returns to 98 unit costs of hiring a vehicle 97 
market integration, and 98 unit costs of owning a vehicle 97 
rates of return to 96 variability in 97 
renting a vehicle 95 Transport efficiency 
representing returns to 98 data requirements 96 
returns to owning a vehicle 94 data sources 97 
rural and urban markets, and 92 using secondary price data, and 92 
three forms of organization in LDCs 94 Transport subsidies 
unit costs in 97 pan-territorial pricing and 149 
units costs of, and returns to 83 structural adjustment and 149 
Transport bottlenecks 73 Uncompetitive behaviour 
Transport cost data in food marketing 68 
assessing the efficiency of transport, and 94 Unemployment 68 
Transport costs 66 Unit costs and returns 
assumptions in calculating unitary economic efficiency and 83 
values 95 Value-added 
buying transport services, in 95 definition of 128 
calculating unit values 92,97 Vertical integration 64,65 
categories of 94 Vertical relations 
comparisons with spatial price sources of data 58 
differences 97 Vertical relations and conduct 58 
data requirements for calculating Vertical relationships between firms 57 
unit values 94,97 Workable competition 66 
factor costs 94 X-inefficiency 15 
interspatial price differences, Zambia 
and, an example 91,99 market liberalization in 124-125 
list of 94 marketing co-operatives in 124-125 
market integration, and 98 Zimbabwe 
physical flows and price differences 98 grain marketing in 123 
price correlation coefficients and 73 market reform in 123 
renting a vehicle, and 95 
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Publications in the NRI Marketing Series cover the complete range of 
marketing topics from initial analysis and methodology via policy formulation 
and monitoring to implementation. 
Based on NRI's long experience in the field of development, the series will 
aid all those in both the public and private sectors who are concerned with 
marketing issues in the developing world . 
.. 
The economies of many developing countries are heavily reliant on their 
agricultural and food sectors and much recent development effort has been 
targetted at these areas. 
Such work is often carried out against a background of recent policy shifts 
towards market liberalization, with a need for rapid formulation of 
recommendations from scarce data. 
Economic Analysis of Agricultural Markets: a Manual is aimed 
particularly at economists working on the problems of markets and marketing 
policy under such conditions. 
Following a presentation of the theoretical and historic background of 
economic analysis of markets, the book deals in detail with data collection and 
analysis, including the theoretical limitations and the techniques required for 
fieldwork. The final examination of agricultural market liberalization in Africa 
provides specific examples of the issues. lt will be relevant to all those 
responsible for providing advice to governments, aid agencies and non-
government organizations on marketing policy reform. 
